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ABSTRACT 
This thesis has adopted a qualitative approach to research into executive 
remuneration, to look inside the 'black box' of process. Executives, non- 
executives and others involved in the remuneration-setting process were 
interviewed in order to establish how executive remuneration is determined. In 
all, 40 interviews were conducted, covering 12 FTSE 350 companies plus other 
stakeholder bodies. 
The interviews yielded rich data illuminating the processes followed by the 
companies, and highlighting their similarities and differences. These data were 
considered in the light of existing economic, social-psychological and 
organisational theory approaches, none of which proved sufficient, either alone or 
in combination, to explain what was happening. 
Companies determine the level of their executive pay based on their interpretation 
of 'the market', but the research shows that such a market is a construct that does 
not exist independently. They determine the structure of their executive pay based 
mainly on structures successfully adopted by other companies, and those 
considered acceptable to the investing institutions and regulators. Institutional 
theory explanations and the need for legitimacy are clearly seen in the data. 
A further finding of the research was that all of the companies had made changes 
to their remuneration schemes, some major. The various reasons for these 
changes included changes (actual or desired) to the corporate environment, 
changes to key personnel, and, notably, the need to increase pay packages that 
were 'below-market'. Incentive schemes that did not pay out were also changed. 
Finally, as regards process, it was clear that each of the case companies followed 
'good governance' practices. It was also clear that each did this in a different 
I 
way. For some, the process was managed by the non-executives; in others the 
executives had a leading role. The relationships between the protagonists had an 
important impact on the resultant governance processes. 
vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction and overview 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Preamble 
In 1997 1 was asked to speak at a Strategic Planning Society conference on 
shareholder value, specifically addressing the topic of Shareholder Value-Based 
Reward Schemes. At the time I knew a lot about shareholder value, but little 
about reward schemes. In my preparation I discovered that the design of 
executive reward schemes was complex, and that there appeared to be no obvious 
'right answer'. Accordingly, after the conference I started to explore how 
companies actually make their remuneration decisions, what they do whenjaced 
with these different choices. It was then I discovered that there was little 
academic research on the subject -I could not find the answer from books or 
papers. 
It was trying tofind the answer to that original question - 'what happens? '- that 
provided the motivation that ultimately led to this thesis. 
1.2 Introduction 
This thesis explores how executive directors' pay is determined in large listed 
companies in the United Kingdom (UK). 
In recent years the subject of executive pay has captured the imagination of 
shareholders, regulators and, through the media, the general public. It has also 
been the focus of much academic research. In this chapter I describe some of the 
I 
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background to the debate, and set this research project in the context of the work 
done by others, and the governance debate on remunerationt. 
1.3 The public debate 
One reason that directors' pay has captured so much attention is the perception 
that the amounts being paid are very high, and growing. This is seen in the many 
surveys published in the media, particularly those which highlight the growing 
differential between executive pay and that of lesser employees (e. g. Toynbee, 
2003). However, it seems likely that it is not just the amounts themselves that 
cause the unease - footballers and movie stars often earn far more - but rather, 
the potential for conflict of interest. Board executives receive large pay awards; 
board executives are in a position to influence their own pay. It is that 
juxtaposition that is a root cause of the controversy, and undoubtedly the high 
pay awards could be interpreted as evidence of a conflict of interest being 
resolved in the executives' favour. 
Because of this potential for a conflict, regulators have taken many opportunities 
to pronounce on how directors' pay should be governed. 
The regulatory context 
Institutional shareholders, generally represented by bodies such as the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF) have issued many pronouncements on what does and does not 
represent good practice amongst companies. For example, in 1995 the ABI 
1 In this thesis, following common usage the words 'pay', 'remuneration' and 'compensation' are 
2 
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issued guidelines on how share option schemes should be constructed; in 1996 
they issued a guideline on long term incentive schemes; ftuther guidance on 
share incentive schemes was issued in 2002. Such pronouncements have helped 
to shape the nature of remuneration contracts. Individual shareholders also play a 
role; those with large holdings will let their views be known if they are not 
satisfied with a company's remuneration arrangements (Holland, 2002). 
Regulators, both governmental and non-governmental, have had an even more 
significant influence on directors' remuneration in the UK. Although the 
Cadbury committee (1992) and the Myners; report (1995) had both made 
reference to directors' remuneration, the greatest influence was the report of the 
Greenbury study group in 1995. 
The Greenbury study group was set up on the initiative of the Confederation for 
British Industry (CBI) in early 1995, when public interest was stirred by large 
pay increases and option awards for directors of the recently-privatised utilities. 
Its terms of reference were "To identify good practice in determining Directors 2 
remuneration and prepare a Code of Practice for use by UK PLCs" (para 1.2). 
The report's Code of Best Practice stated, inter alia, that companies should set up 
remuneration committees of non-executive directors to determine the executive 
directors' remuneration; that rewards should be linked to performance; and that 
detailed disclosure be made of the company's remuneration policy and of each 
individual director's remuneration package. The Greenbury report was published 
used interchangeably. 
2 Implicit in the Greenbury report is that the term "Director" refers to executive directors. The 
report was not concerned with the pay of non-executive directors, and refers separately to "Non- 
3 
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in July 1995, and incorporated into the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
with effect from 31" December 1995. 
After 1995, no doubt because of the regulatory requirements, there was an 
increase in the number of remuneration schemes identifying variable 
remuneration for directors (Conyon and Mallin, 1997). However, public concern 
at the levels of such remuneration did not abate: indeed, possibly due to the 
increased disclosure required by Greenbury, it rose. The overall tenor of 
comments on the subject of directors' remuneration has been negative. Few 
publicly go as far as the then Shadow Minister, Frank Dobson, who in 1992 
referred to "fat cat executives" as "stinking, lousy, thieving, incompetent scum" 
(Landale, 1997). However, there is certainly an attitude that top directors are 
overpaid for what they do; that large salaries and bonuses and, particularly, large 
awards of share options are not justified; and that there is unease about a growing 
inequality in society, with directors' pay being far greater than the average 
employee's. The continued interest of the media provides a backdrop to 
remuneration committees' decisions, of which all participants are very aware. 
Since Greenbury there have been several major reports and regulations relating to 
directors' remuneration. Hampel (1998) reviewed the implementation of the 
Cadbury and Greenbury reports, and produced the Combined Code, to be 
followed by companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Higgs (2003) 
reviewed the role of the non-executive director, and in so doing made fin-ther 
pronouncements on directors' remuneration and the role of the remuneration 
Executive Directors" where appropriate. The same convention is used in this thesis. The 
4 
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committee. The recommendations of the Higgs report were largely adopted in 
the revised Combined Code (2003). 3 
The government also takes an interest in the level of pay for executive directors 
of quoted companies. In 1999 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
issued a consultation document on directors' remuneration which assessed the 
then-current situation and set out the government's view on the approach to be 
taken on setting remuneration policies and packages. This was followed by a 
second consultation document in 2001, the results of which ultimately led to the 
publication of The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (DTI, 2002). 
These regulations were introduced as a result of a perceived need to introduce 
greater transparency into the remuneration decision. They set out in great detail 
the disclosures that companies must make about the remuneration policies and 
packages for all of their directors, and required shareholders to have an advisory 
vote on the published remuneration report. 
The increasing amount of regulation surrounding directors' remuneration has had 
several effects. It has seen the almost universal use of remuneration committees 
in order to determine pay (according to the Higgs dataset (2003) only two 
companies in the FTSE 350 did not have a remuneration committee). More 
significantly, it has been a contributing factor in the increased sophistication of 
directors' remuneration arrangements, as companies try to comply with all of the 
American term "executive" is also used to describe executive directors in this thesis. 
3 Although most of the research work for this thesis was carried out before the 2003 Code was 
issued, where possible references have been made to the 2003 Code rather than its predecessor, to 
facilitate referencing. 
5 
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institutional and regulatory pronouncements. 4 What it has not necessarily 
achieved is 'better' remuneration schemes; schemes which, in the words of the 
Financial Times, are "simple, transparent and justifiable" (Fuller, 2003). It is 
possible that one reason for this is that regulators have focused on the outcome of 
the process, the amount awarded, and may have ignored the process itself. One 
motivation for this research is to shed light on the processes companies and their 
remuneration committees undertake, in the anticipation that this will possibly 
inform future regulation and debate on the whole issue of appropriate and 
justifiable remuneration practices. 
1.4 The academic debate 
Directors' remuneration has been a source of interest to scholars since Taussig 
and Barker's Paper in 1925. However, Murphy (1999: 2487) noted that 
academic interest in the subject accelerated in the mid-1980s. His analysis 
showed that in 1996 (the latest year he examined) the annual number of academic 
papers published on CEO pay had risen to 60; the literature review carried out 
for this thesis gives no reason to believe that the number has fallen since then, 
and so one can see that there are literally hundreds of papers on the subject. The 
majority of the work has been carried out in the United States (US), but the same 
issues arise in the substantial body of UK-based research. Much of the research 
echoes (or leads) the regulatory focus on the link between pay and various 
aspects of corporate performance (Barkema, and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), but many 
factors and combinations of factors have been considered. 
4 Appendix I sets out an overview of how remuneration schemes are structured. 
6 
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Researchers have, for example, tested the links between directors' pay and 
corporate size (Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1991), industry (Ely, 1991), 
profitability (McKnight, 1996), ownership (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin, 
1987), shareholder return (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a), and human capital 
attributes such as age and qualifications (Agarwal, 1981). They have also 
considered how changes in tax and regulatory systems affect the level and 
currency of directors' remuneration (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988), and 
invcstigatcd the impact of the rcmuncration committcc (Conyon and Pcck, 1998). 
Almost all of these studies involve testing hypotheses by taking one or more of 
the variables mentioned above and comparing them with the remuneration 
(defined in various ways) actually received by the directors. Conclusions are 
then drawn as to the validity or otherwise of the propositions -being tested. 
However, there appear to be almost no studies which examine what actually 
happenS5 . As Figure I -I indicates, if we consider the setting of remuneration as a 
simple input-process-output model, prior researchers have correlated inputs (the 
variables) with outputs (the remuneration paid), but have ignored the process in 
the middle. 
5 Notable exceptions are Main (1993), Conyon et al. (2000), and Ogden and Watson (2004). 
These papers are discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
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Such research has proved conceptually important and added considerably to our 
understanding of executive remuneration issues. However, studies to date have 
not addressed the question: what is the process by which executive directors' 
remuneration policies and packages are determined? 
This issue has been raised in passing by several researchers over the last two 
decades. For example, Keff and Bettis, in a study which examined archival data 
for a sample of Fortune 500 companies, noted the following: 
It is difficult not to concur with critics who claim that there is no rational 
basis for the compensation paid to top management ... research thus far has failed to provide solid evidence to refute the charge. Perhapswhatis 
needed are studies that look closely at the process by which boards make 
compensation decisions. Most research has attempted to infer the critical 
variables in the process by examining decision outcomes in relation to 
performance. As a result, we continue to guess at the inputs to the 
compensation decision. Given the importance of the topic and of the 
corporate governance process in general, it is clear that we must izet closer 
to the process of top management compensation i: [we are to understand it. 
(1987., 661) [emphasis added] 
Since Kerr and Bettis's observation, other authors have echoed the sentiment. 
For example, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, in their conclusion to a paper reporting 
survey-based research into executive pay (one of relatively few studies using this 
methodology) stated: 
8 
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All things considered, overreliance on archival data that treats the 
executive compensation process as a black box has led us into a blind 
alley. While easy to use, it is doubtful that continued "number crunching" 
of these data bases will provide much additional insight on the 
determinants of executive pay. Yhis study suggests that a more fruitful 
avenue to pursue in understanding executive pay issues is tofocus more on 
the process and less on the observed "objective " measures. ... Some of the 
process questions that need to be addressed in the future include the 
following: How do compensation committees design executive pay 
packages? no are the main actors in that committee and what roles do 
they play? How do political considerations enter into the CEO pay-setting 
process? How are those decisions legitimized? How are goals established 
by the board of directors for the CEO? "at is the nature of the 
relationship between the board, the CEO, and major stockholders as it 
pertains to executive pay? How does the board 'filter out"Jactors beyond 
the executive's control in determining the CEO pay level (e. g., a general 
market downturn)? What "checks and balances" are established within a 
firm to ensure that conflict of interest does not arise in determining 
executivepay? 
The answers to such process questions will likely reveal more about 
executive compensation than have past studies done ftom archival 
databases, hut researchers will need to he both more creative and more 
diligent to obtain the data needed to shed new light on the sensitive realm 
of the executive pay-settingprocess. (1989: 185) 
Almost a decade later little progress appeared to have been made, as one of the 
authors reiterated in a paper with a new co-author: 
In short, after at least six decades of research ... the failure to identify a 
robust relationship between top management compensation and firm 
performance has led scholars into a blind alley. To move this stream of 
research forward requires that greater efforts be devoted to examining 
alternative mechanisms and criteria for how top management 
compensation is set. 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 135) 
Pettigrew, in a more general discussion of research into managerial elites, 
articulated the same problem: 
... these studies also sufferftom their distance from the phenomenon they 
are addressing. As a result, great inferential leaps are made from input 
variables such as board composition to output variables such as board 
performance with no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms 
which presumably link the inputs to the outputs. (1992b: 171) 
9 
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The research undertaken for this thesis is an attempt to address the gap in the 
literature identified by these various authors, and examines in detail the process 
of determining directors' remuneration. The difference between this and 
previous work is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1-2. 
Figure 1-2 The territory covered by this research study 





The research question consequently arising from the above is: 
How do companies determine the remuneration of their 
executive directors? 
1.5 The research approach 
Given the processual focus of this question, a predominantly qualitative approach 
has been taken to this research, using face-to-face interviews with protagonists in 
the debate to attempt to establish how, at the process level, individual companies 
have made and make their pay decisions. As will be seen from the literature 
summarised above (and analysed in more detail in chapter 2), this is an unusual 
approach to research into directors' remuneration. However, it is one that is well- 
suited to the research question, and potentially opens up a new phase in research 
into this vexed area of corporate govemance. 
10 
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The research commenced with a review of prior academic research into directors' 
pay. This literature review also covered the practitioner literature, since this was 
clearly relevant. Articles in the broadsheet press were also reviewed, given the 
apparent role of the media as an influence on regulation and practice. 
From a comprehensive review of relevant academic, professional and regulatory 
literature it became apparent that there are certain questions common to all 
companies. In order to devise a remuneration policy which generates 
remuneration packages that are congruent with (a) the company's strategy, (b) 
the needs of individual directors, and (c) the requirements of the company's 
shareholders and regulators, remuneration committees need to address the 
following five generic questions: 
1. How much should the company's executive directors be paid for expected 
performance? 
2. What relative proportions of this amount should be basic salary and 
performance-related? 
3. For the performance-related components, how should performance be 
measured? 
4. How should performance targets be determined? 
5. What form should the remuneration take? (For example, shares, share 
options, cash or a mix thereof? ) 
Broadly, these questions address the two key issues that need to be decided - 
what is an appropriate level of pay, and how is it to be structured? These 
11 
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questions initially formed a basis for gaining an understanding of the area, and 
have been used throughout this thesis as a means to organise the analysis. 
1.6 Outline of this thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 provides a review of the academic 
literature on directors' pay, for the purpose of mapping the territory and 
demonstrating the gap to be filled by this thesis. It does this by setting out a 
typology of theories used by previous researchers, divided into three generic 
types, based on whether they utilised economic, social-psychological or 
organisational. perspectives. This chapter also analyses the literature overall to 
derive a list of factors that researchers to date have identified as potential inputs 
to the remuneration decision; this list was used in forming the interview 
questions. A further task of this chapter is to set out the advantages and 
disadvantages of the performance measures and fonns of payment in common 
use, an analysis of which indicated, at this preliminary stage, that there is no one 
correct answer to the question 'how should we pay the directorsT. 
Chapter 3 sets out two preliminary models derived during the literature review 
process and before fieldwork commenced. A process model builds on the input- 
output form suggested by Figure 1-2, to generate an initial view of what might be 
taking place in the remuneration committee. Legitimacy-comparison theory 
builds upon four of the theories discussed in chapter 2, and was a framework 
adopted early in the research process for looking at the remuneration decision. 
While both of these models informed the research process at first, neither, as the 
12 
Chapter 1: Introduction and overview 
analysis in chapter 6 indicates, proved to be an ultimately satisfactory explanation 
of how in practice pay is set. 
The methodological approach to the research is set out in chapter 4, which 
discusses the philosophical underpinnings of the qualitative approach adopted, as 
well as how the sample companies were selected, and how the fieldwork was 
conducted. 
In chapter 5 the fieldwork and empirical findings of that work are set out. This 
chapter therefore begins to uncover in detail the process by which companies 
determine the level and structure of directors' pay. An issue that arose over and 
again in the interviews was the fact that almost all the companies had made 
recent changes to their remuneration policies: this too is explored in this chapter. 
Lastly within this chapter, and as part of the empirical findings, I consider the 
range of relationships between the different protagonists in the remuneration- 
setting decision, and review the range of processes that companies adopt in 
practice, as contrasted with the recommended decision-making structures that are 
set down in regulation. 
The data set out in chapter 5 are analysed in chapters 6 and 7 in two 
complementary ways. In chapter 6, they are set in the context of prior research, 
which takes a less processual focus than this research. The various theories 
discussed in chapter 2 are revisited to determine the extent to which they can 
provide an adequate answer to the question 'how is directors' pay determinedT. 
My answer is that they cannot, and do not. Accordingly, in chapter 7 the 
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possibility of providing an adequate answer is explored in a different way. The 
new approach is based on the premise that there is no 'right answer' to the five 
questions listed earlier. Given that, it looks at the ways in which a decision is 
made, or emerges, from the remuneration-setting process. In this chapter I 
suggest that the remuneration committee practices set out in the Combined Code 
(2003) are in fact an unattainable ideal, and look at how in practice committees 
end up having to make compromises from this position. I also consider the inner 
workings of the remuneration committee, beneath its formal structure, and look at 
the relationships between the different players. 
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis, summarising the key findings and exploring the 
contribution to knowledge. This chapter also includes a discussion of the 
implications of this study for regulators and for practitioners involved in setting 
pay in listed companies. 
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2. REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a review of research into directors' pay. Its purpose is 
three-fold. Firstly, it sets out the ways in which scholars have addressed the issue 
of executive pay, in order to determine the extent to which the research question 
of this thesis has been addressed previously and, if so, how it has been addressed. 
The review found many papers that had addressed this research issue tangentially, 
but none that directly answered the processual question: 'how is directors' pay 
detennined? '. 
The second purpose of this literature review relates to the way the work was 
approached. The research model set out in Figure 1-2 of chapter I takes an input- 
process-output form. In order to flesh out this model, the literature has been 
reviewed to determine possible inputs considered by previous scholars. These 
input factors were later tested with the research participants. 
The review also serves a third purpose, in that it considers how academic research 
has addressed the five generic questions set out in chapter 1. 
Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows. A typology of theories 
used by previous researchers divides them into economic, social-psychological 
and organisational theories. The individual theories within each type are then 
considered, and their respective relevance to answering the research question is 
discussed. Following this, the possible inputs to the remuneration process are 
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considered. Finally, the chapter discusses the five generic questions set out in 
chapter 1, concerning the level and structure of pay. 
2.2 Limitations of prior research in considering this project 
There is an extensive body of research into directors' pay, which has provided a 
wide range of theoretical approaches and much empirical data. However, before 
addressing that research it is important to set it in context, as this affects its 
interpretation for this project. It is worth noting the following. 
1. Much of the research cited in this chapter, indeed the ma ority of the extant j 
research, relates to the United States. Whilst some US practices are relevant 
to the UK context of this research, others are not. In particular: 
a. The board of directors in a US company normally comprises mainly 
non-cxceutivcs, Icd by an individual holding the dual CEO/chairman 
position (Conyon and Muldoon, 2004). In the UK, the board will 
include other executives and, since the Cadbury report (1992), the 
company is likely to separate the positions of chairman and CEO. 
b. Tax laws differ considerably between the US and UK, a factor which 
may influence the types of scheme or mix of incentives in use. 
Similarly, legal restrictions on schemes differ between the 
jurisdictions. 
C. The body of institutional shareholders is more cohesive in the UK than 
the US, giving UK institutional shareholders relatively more potential 
influence over governance issues than their US counterparts. For 
exarnple, in the US there is no equivalent of the ABI or the NAPF, 
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whose members between them control over 40% by value of shares in 
the UK Stock Exchange. 
d. Directors of US companies appear often to be richer than their UK 
counterparts and to have greater shareholdings in their companies 
(Marcus and Rhoads, 1997/8). 
e. Non-executives of US companies appear to be executive directors of 
other quoted US companies more often than is the case in UK 
companies (Hallock, 1997; O'Sullivan, 2000). In particular, the US 
has a high incidence of interlocks where the CEO of Company A sits 
on the board (and remuneration committee) of Company B, and vice 
versa (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004a). 
2. The growth in performance-related pay schemes over the last two decades 
means that some of the results reported in prior research, for example about 
short- and long-term performance schemes, may not be valid today. As an 
example, Bruce and Buck, writing in 1997, stated: 
A further consideration in interpreting empirical investigation of 
innovations such as the ESO [executive share option] is that they are still, 
in the mid-1990s, a comparatively novel phenomenon in executive 
remuneration, particularly in the UK (1997., 90) 
At the time of undertaking this research, these "novel" share options have 
become ubiquitous. 
3. Research undertaken in the UK over the last two decades has been done in 
different regulatory contexts. Remuneration practices differ considerably 
before and after 1995; the year that the 'fat cat' debate took off and the year 
of the Greenbury report. Disclosure of directors' pay is much more 
Source: author's evaluation from data supplied on the websites of the ABI and NAPF and the 
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comprehensive than it has ever been. Furthermore, the evolving regulatory 
environment described in chapter I and the growth in the importance of 
governance in general together mean that research findings of 10 years ago 
might not be duplicated if that research were conducted today. 
2.3 Overview of the literature 
In 1925 Taussig and Barker wrote what appears to be the first scholarly paper 
discussing directors' remuneration. In an extensive survey of over 400 US 
companies covering the period 1904 - 1914 they set out statistics of how much the 
directors were paid, and how much of that was variable, segregating their data in 
terms of company size and ownership. Taussig and Barker provided little by way 
of theoretical explanation of the patterns in their data - the very act of collating it 
was itself a major contribution. 
Three quarters of a century have passed since Taussig and Barker's report. In that 
time, the study of directors' remuneration has become a major branch of academic 
management and financial research, and many theories have been expounded to 
explain why directors are paid as they are. 
The remuneration of executive directors impacts many fields of study. 
Economists have considered it (e. g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976), as have 
strategists (e. g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989), psychologists (e. g. Belliveau, 
O'Reilly and Wade, 1996), accountants (e. g. Healy, 1985) and writers on 
corporate governance (e. g. Conyon, 1997). This is not unreasonable - it is an area 
National Statistics Office. 
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which has an impact on many different aspects of business, and so is of wide 
interest. 
In examining this scholarly research, a typology was developed, as already noted, 
which categorises the various theories into the three main theoretical stances: 
economic, social-psychological and organisational. The typology was developed 
from ideas suggested by Finkelstein and Hambrick, (1996: 266), but has departed 
from and extended their work. 
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Figure 2-1 Overview of extant theories of directors' remuneration 
Theories underlying directors' remuneration 































Institutional theory and legitimacy 
Decision theory 
Power and politics 
Contingency theory 
Figure 2-1 shows how theories have been divided into those that take an economic 
perspective and others, which take either a social-psychological or an 
organisational view. 
It has been observed in the literature that there is little overlap between economic 
and other perspectives. Merchant, Van der Stede and Zheng (2003) reported just 
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such a segregation in their citation analysis of remuneration-related papers (not 
just executive pay) published in four major accounting journals between 1989 and 
1999. Of the 67 papers in their study, the citations of 61% were economics-based 
and 28% took a behavioural perspective; only 11% of the papers seemed to draw 
from both disciplines. Merchant et al. (2003) noted that in many cases the 
different theories seemed to provide different explanations of the same 
phenomena, and suggested that the narrow approach of adopting only one 
theoretical perspective may mean that the research conclusions were too limited, 
and incomplete. Further, they reported that the two approaches used different 
terminology to explain what appeared to be the same phenomena (a finding which 
is noted later in this review when discussing the overlap between several of the 
theories). Therefore, they put forward the case for more cross-disciplinary 
research to provide greater understanding. 
The structure of Figure 2-1 merits a comment. The heading 'organisational 
theories' has been used to describe institutional theory and legitimacy, decision 
theory, theories of power and politics, and contingency theory. This defines the 
heading quite broadly - some may consider that not all of these are organisational 
theories - but this typology is convenient as a way to signpost the discussions that 
follow. 
Having introduced the typology, I use it to structure the following sections, which 
set out an explanation of the various theories shown, the perspectives they adopt, 
and how each can inform this research. Explanation is also given as to why none 
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of the theories is sufficient on its own to provide an answer to the processual 
research question posed here. 
2.4 Economic perspectives 
Traditional or neo-classical approaches to economics have developed a view of 
the world based on a series of simplifying assumptions. For example, economists 
have assumed that 'Economic Man' acts rationally in such as way as to maximise 
his utility (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997); or they have assumed 
perfect markets in which prices are determined by the influences of supply and 
demand (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 1991). Within those constraints they have 
developed some powerful theories which have advanced our understanding of the 
world. In this section I examine the theories put forward by economists to explain 
directors' remuneration, dividing them between those that see market forces as a 
significant influence and those that regard remuneration as a driver of behaviour 
of what are assumed to be rational individuals. 
Z4.1 Markelforces 
Much of the economics-based remuneration literature relates to the action of 
market forces. In considering how market forces are seen as operating in this 
literature, one can adopt a definition put forward by Begg et al., who define a 
market as "a set of arrangements by which buyers and sellers are in contract to 
exchange goods or services" (1991: 32). Begg et al. go on to explain that in any 
market there will be an "equilibrium price" at which, with the operation of supply 
and demand, the quantity demanded just equals the quantity supplied. Market- 
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based theories using this neo-classical view of market operation thus aim to 
explain the level of pay (at the equilibrium position), rather than its structure. 
Labour market theory 
Researchers adopting a labour market theory approach apply supply-and-demand 
principles to the market for company executives, and argue that this can be used to 
explain the level of executive pay (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996). They suggest that there is a limited pool of talented 
individuals who have the ability to run large businesses successfully, and 
accordingly their price is high. 
The 'labour market' is a broad concept and, as with any other market, it can be 
understood more clearly if appropriately segmented. This segmentation has been 
undertaken in various ways by scholars interested in different aspects of the 
subject. Some researchers (for example Deckop, 1988; Palia, 2000) have 
demonstrated that remuneration levels differ considerably by industry. Others 
have taken company size as a differentiating factor in the labour market, for 
example adopting an argument put forward by Gomez-Mejia (1994) that 
executives running larger companies need to be more skilled, and this effectively 
segments the market. (Both of these arguments can also be and have been 
adopted in studies that draw upon human capital theory to explain remuneration 
decisions, as discussed later. ) The way in which the market is defined will have a 
significant effect on the level of pay (if the segmentation is done by the company) 
or on the outcome of the study (if segments are chosen by scholars). 
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Executives and remuneration consultants have also adopted labour market 
explanations of remuneration, arguing that there is a "tight labour market for 
senior executives that can manage business of the scope of today's global 
companies" (Skapinker, 2001). They use the argument to explain (or perhaps to 
justify) the relatively high levels of executive remuneration paid in the UK and 
US. The line of reasoning also reflects aspects of managerialist theory (Davis, 
1991; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Combs and Skill, 2003), in that the directors, who 
can control a company's size more easily than its profitability, have an incentive 
to grow the company, regardless of profitability, because company size impacts 
directly on directors' pay. 
An aspect of labour market theory can be seen indirectly in the UK, in the 
pronouncements of the Greenbury study group on directors' remuneration. This 
stated (1995: para. 1.10) that the level of remuneration should be "sufficient to 
attract, retain and motivate" high quality directors and managers, but not in excess 
of that amount. One implication of this is that a market-clearing rate does indeed 
exist. 
In their published remuneration reports, companies often cite their use of 
remuneration surveys as a means of tacitly demonstrating compliance with this 
principle of 'sufficient but not excessive'. They use both aspects of market 
segmentation introduced above: industry and size. For example, The Abbey 
National Group p1c, a UK bank, referred in its 2001 remuneration report to 
salaries being based on "pay levels in other financial services companies, major 
retailers and in other UK companies with a similar market capitalisation". In the 
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US, Porac, Wade and Pollock (1999) found that companies' compensation reports 
showed that they anchored their comparability judgements within a firm's primary 
industry. 
The comparisons chosen by companies appear to be reasonable, but not unique - 
other valid comparators could perhaps be used instead. The comparators adopted 
are almost always based on surveys. In their deliberations on the labour market, 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman discussed remuneration surveys, referring to: 
... a cottage indusay of consultants that specializes in conducting surveys 
to measure a wide range of CEO compensation statistics ... [which suggests 
that] surprisingly, very little is known ahout the use of "competitive market 
going rates " as a criterion to set CEO pay, despite the lip service paid to it 
in economic theory, the human resource management literature, and 
compensation practice. (1997., 327) 
They suggested that compensation survey data are often used to justify and 
legitimise rather than rationally determine executive pay. 
The widespread use of remuneration surveys (Ungson and Steers, 1984; Baker, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1988; Lorsch, 1999) to benchmark appropriate remuneration 
levels might indeed indicate that market forces are at work in some way, but does 
not therefore prove that the remuneration levels paid do in fact represent a market- 
7 
clearing rate at which executive supply and company demand exactly equate . 
The surveys show that larger companies pay higher remuneration, but can by their 
nature only indicate what is paid, rather than what should be paid. Baker (1978) 
long ago highlighted this aspect of the 'is-ought' problem, in his critique of the 
use of such surveys. He pointed out that the surveys provide data on the average 
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pay level for companies of a certain size, but say nothing about whether this 
average is justified. In an elegant simile, he wrote of a hypothetical survey 
determining the average weight of six foot high men; the result would be a valid 
average but it would not be a valid justification of weight. 
Nonetheless, the published surveys set a benchmark for remuneration which is 
often seen as a proxy for a director's 'worth' (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988: 
550). Accordingly, no director would wish to be below average in his or her 
remuneration as this might imply below-par value to the company. However, if 
most directors and their companies' remuneration committees see the rightful 
position of the directors as in the median or upper quartile, and award pay 
accordingly, then, inevitably, average remuneration will be ratcheted up for future 
surveys. 
The impact of comparative surveys on ever-rising remuneration levels is widely 
acknowledged. Hampel (1998), for example, referred to the danger of uncritical 
use of such surveys causing an "upward ratchet" in remuneration, and Ezzarnel 
and Watson (1998) presented strong evidence of the importance of such external 
pay comparisons in explaining rises in executive remuneration to meet the "going 
market rate". Along similar lines, Patton observed that the compensation survey 
"may well be the most important ingredient in rising executive compensation, for 
it lends itself to often well-meaning actions that lead to unwarranted 
compensation" (1991: 47). A decade later, Roberts stated (2001: 1558): "The 
market mechanisms that are held to constrain opportunism and the pursuit of self 
Ezzamel and Watson (2002: 2 10) refer to it as "a labour market which, though competitive, is 
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interest can be seen actually to feed if'. 
The use of remuneration surveys not only provides a link between size and 
remuneration but also between industry and remuneration. Companies use 
industry referents as well as size referents in their survey data, and so the industry 
in which a company's business is positioned will be an important factor in 
determining an appropriate level of pay (Murphy, 1999: 2493). Furthermore, the 
country in which a company operates will influence the choice of comparator for 
the survey, and so country factors too are relevant (Murphy, 1999: 2496). 
Human capital theory 
Labour market theory regards executives as a 'commodity' being needed to fill a 
particular role in a company, whose remuneration is subject to the laws of supply 
and demand. However, human capital theory (Agarwal, 1981; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1989,1996; Combs and Skill, 2003) suggests that the level of 
remuneration paid to an executive does not reflect solely the job that s/he is asked 
to do, but also reflects the qualities that s/he brings to it. Human capital is a signal 
to a prospective employer that an individual is capable of doing a job (Gerhart and 
Rynes, 2003). The human capital of the individual includes their age, 
qualifications and experience. Proponents of the theory argue that individuals 
with better qualifications for a job will attract higher pay: 
... an executive with a greater amount of human capital would be better 
able to perform hisjob ang thus, be paid more. (Agarwal, 1981: 39) 
characterized by costly and incomplete contractine'. 
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Agarwal (1981), in one of the earliest studies on human capital theory in this 
arena, found that human capital variables were a factor in influencing executive 
remuneration, but that they were not as significant as other factors such as job 
complexity or the employer's ability to pay. Gerhart and Milkovich (1990), in a 
sample of about 14,000 managers, found that base pay and pay mix were related 
to human capital. Palia (2000) found that the labour market slotted executives 
with lower educational qualifications into more regulated business environments 
which, with less growth potential, paid lower remuneration. From this it is clear 
that human capital attributes could be inputs to the remuneration-setting decision. 
Gomez-Mejia (1994) linked labour market and human capital approaches, 
suggesting that one reason for the phenomenon of larger companies paying higher 
remuneration is that the executives running those companies need greater human 
capital to cope with the complexities of the job, and it is this human capital that is 
rewarded. 
Labour market theory and human capital theory are in some ways complementary. 
Both see an explanation for directors' remuneration in terms of market structures 
and supply and demand. Both implicitly suggest that there is a 'true value' for 
remuneration, captured in some way by using market forces or human capital 
attributes. Furthermore, both also have a bearing on remuneration practices, in 
that the ideas behind them are used by companies to explain some of their 
remuneration choices. Researchers adopting these theories have focused on the 
level of remuneration rather than its structure, and have examined this level in the 
context of a company's size and industry (for example, Ezzamel and Watson, 
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2002; Combs and Skill, 2003). This research has been useful in highlighting 
some factors which appear to influence remuneration policies. However, although 
providing insight into the level of executive pay, these theories do not attempt to 
explain its structure. 
Z4.2 Shaping individual directors' hehaviour 
Another aspect of economics-based research approaches to executive 
remuneration considers the way in which remuneration affects the individual 
directors. The fundamental driver of theories in this arena is that the individual 
directors will wish to maximise their utility - i. e. increase their pay, reduce their 
effort, and minimise their risk. In this context, theorists have suggested that one 
role of the remuneration contract is to constrain the executives in their choices so 
that maximising their own utility will result in their acting for the ultimate benefit 
of the company's shareholders. 
Three main economics-based theories are relevant here. Agency theory is the 
oldest, dominating the executive remuneration literature, with relative 
performance evaluation fbiming a significant offshoot thereof Both of these 
theories focus on how pay contracts are structured. Tournament theory takes a 
different perspective, considering the level of pay rather than its structure, and 
looking at hierarchical rankings. However, this also follows the theme of 
motivating the rationally-behaving individual to behave in a particular way. Each 
of these theories is now considered. 
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Agency theory 
Studies examining the economic justification for directors' remuneration mostly 
revolve around agency theory. This theory, which arises from the separation of 
ownership and management (Berle and Means, 1932), is developed and discussed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and reviewed by Eisenhardt (1989a) and Hart 
(1995) amongst others. 
Agency theory in this context relates to the differences in motivation and payoff 
between the shareholders (the principals who own the firm) and the directors (the 
agents to whom is delegated its day to day running). Risk-neutral shareholders, 
whose interest in the company is likely to be as part of a diversified investment 
portfolio, seek to maximise their returns by way of dividend and/or capital gain. 
However the directors (whose jobs are not part of a diversified portfolio), who 
have day-to-day control over the assets and the operations of the business, may 
prefer to increase their own utility rather than maximise returns to their principals. 
Thus there is potentially a conflict of interest. Indeed, Jensen and Meckling 
clearly set out their presupposition that there will be a conflict of interest by 
defining their terms as follows: "[w]e retain the notion of [utility] maximizing 
behavior on the part of all individuals in the analysis to follow" (1976: 307). 
Lambert and Larcker (1991) identified three types of potential conflict of interest 
between shareholders and directors, namely: (i) non-pecuniary benefits or 
expenditure which has a higher value to directors than to shareholders ("perks"); 
(ii) risk-aversion in directors' pursuit of potential opportunities, leading to 
potentially value-enhancing projects being rejected; and (iii) differences in the 
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decision-making time horizons of directors and shareholders, leading to a 
reluctance to undertake profitable long-term investments. 
The proponents of agency theory suggest that in order to avoid the adverse effects 
of these potential conflicts of interest, shareholders need some mechanism to 
control the directors. Two 'direct' methods of control could be envisaged: they 
could monitor directors' actions closely, or they could specify exactly what 
directors should do in all circumstances. However, neither such control is 
possible in practice. In most listed companies it is not practical for shareholders 
to monitor directors' actions in detail. Similarly, it is not feasible for shareholders 
and directors to enter into contracts that specify tightly the appropriate behaviour 
for directors in every possible situation. Furthermore, it is difficult for 
shareholders to evaluate the level of directors' effort by considering the output of 
the company (for example its profits) as many external factors impact on results, 
creating 'noise' which makes it difficult to judge individual or team performance. 
Other approaches not being satisfactory, agency theorists see the remuneration 
contract as a practical way to align directors' interests with those of the 
shareholders. By relating the directors' remuneration to an appropriate measure of 
performance, shareholders have some means of ensuring that directors behave in 
their (i. e. the shareholders') interests. Thus, researchers adopting an agency 
theory perspective have investigated whether pay varies with the company's 
performance, to identify such an alignment. For example, Jensen and Murphy 
(I 990a), testing for a relationship between directors' pay and shareholder return in 
over 1,000 companies from the Forbes Executive Compensation Surveys 1974 - 
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8 1986, found a weak relationship. Similarly, Conyon (1997) examined 213 large 
UK companies from 1988 and 1993 and found a relationship between directors' 
pay and shareholder returns in the current period, although not with preceding 
periods. Theorists argue that if there is no relationship (or only a weak one) then 
this implies that agency theory is not working, inasmuch as the contracts are not 
linking pay to performance. However, this could just indicate that the measures 
being tested are not sophisticated enough to reflect the contracts being adopted 
(Tosi et al., 2000). 
Literally hundreds of studies9 have exmnined the relationship between indicators 
of company performance and directors' remuneration but no universal conclusions 
have been reached. While many studies, including those by Lewellen and 
Huntsman (1970), Murphy (1985), Deckop (1988), and Main, Bruce and Buck 
(1996) found a strong relationship between company performance and directors' 
remuneration, others, such as that by Ezzamel and Watson (1997), did not. The 
position was aptly surnmarised by Barkerna and Gomez-Mejia who stated: 
In short, after at least six decades of research ... the failure to identify a 
robust relationship between top management compensation and firm 
performance has led scholars into a blind alley. (1998. - 135) 
Tosi et al. (2000) suggested that one reason for the inability of researchers to find 
a consistent relationship between directors' remuneration and company 
perfonnance could lie in the variety of techniques used to test hypotheses and 
analyse results. In their meta-analysis of the directors' remuneration literature, 
a Some researchers have argued that Jensen and Murphy's conclusions on their data, i. e. that the 
link is weak, were wrong. Murphy (1999: 2532) acknowledges this, and states that the results 
may well be consistent with the predictions of agency theory. The research has been updated, for 
example by Hall and Liebman (1998), again in a US context, who found a much greater 
sensitivity. 
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they referred to: 
... different methods of data collection, different statistical techniques, different samples, the presence of moderator variables, and differences in 
how the constructs of interest have been operationalized in the various 
studies. (2000: 305) 
In their sample of 137 manuscripts which examined CEO pay, they found 16 
different measures of company size and 30 different measures of company 
perfonnance. As different variables have been tested under different conditions it 
is not surprising that the findings of prior studies have varied markedly. 
Relative performance evaluation 
Proponents of agency theory suggest that executives be rewarded based on the 
company's performance. However, they may not have full control over aspects of 
that performance. For example, a company could do well (in terms of profitability 
or share price performance) due to market conditions rather than executive 
initiatives. Likewise, in a bad market its poor performance in absolute terms 
might be regarded in a much more favourable light when set against that of its 
peers. 
In order to accommodate such anomalies, Holmstrom (1982) developed agency 
theory to consider relative performance evaluation (RPE). Under RPE, it is 
acknowledged that, due to the interference of external noise, an individual 
director's or company's 'good' or 'bad' results may not be an appropriate 
indicator of how well the director or company has performed. However, the 
effects of that noise can be reduced or eliminated by comparing the individual's 
Source: the database compiled for this research. 
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results to those of a suitable peer group: the noise is common to all, and the 
individual's relative performance can be determined and rewarded. This 
additional information has benefits for both parties: the shareholders will be 
better able to evaluate performance, and the managers will not be penalised for 
poor environmental conditions. As Holmstrom stated: 
I show that aggregate measures like peer averages may often provide 
sufficient information about common uncertainties and thus schemes that 
compare agents with such aggregate measures will be efficient. An 
example of relative performance evaluation of this kind is given by the new 
executive incentive packages, which base rewards on explicit comparisons 
withfirms in the same industry. (1982: 325) 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) examined a similar sample of US listed companies to 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a). They looked at RPE in the context of chief 
executive officers (CEOs), examining both market-relative and industry-relative 
perforrnance. They found evidence that RPE contracts were in place, in that 
boards of directors appeared to incorporate both industry and market performance 
in their determination of CEO compensation. The widespread use of total 
shareholder return (TSR) as a performance measure benchmarked against 
comparator companies (as discussed, for example, in New Bridge Street, 2003b) is 
a further example of RPE in practice! 
Tournament theory 
Agency theory and RPE are economics-based theories that focus mainly on the 
structure of pay, seeing the remuneration contract as a means to influence the 
individual director's actions. Tournament theory, developed by Lazear and 
10 Referring to an earlier point, on surveys, it is worth noting that by adopting TSR, companies are 
rewarding what 'is', rather than what 'ought to be'. This particular measure is embedded in the 
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Rosen (1981), is also economics-based, but its focus is on the level of pay. 
Although also considering the effect of the remuneration on the individual, 
tournament theory differs substantially from the theories previously discussed, in 
that the individual executive's remuneration is seen not as the product of supply 
and demand, or as a means of controlling their contribution to the business, but 
solely as a reflection of his/her position in the company. 
Researchers taking this view see the workplace hierarchy as a tournament in 
which managers compete for the prize of promotion and a higher salary. The 
predictions of tournament theory are that as a manager rises through the 
executive ranks, because there are fewer opportunities at each level, the pay 
differential will increase at each stage. So, it is hypothesised that one reason for 
high pay at the top of a company is to motivate the people lower down the 
organisation. 
The findings of research investigating tournament theory are mixed. Lambert, 
Larcker and Weigelt (1993) found support for the theory in a review of four 
organisational levels for a sample of 303 listed US companies between 1982 and 
1984, using private data from a compensation consultant. Similarly, Conyon, 
Peck and Sadler (2001) found some supporting evidence in a study of 100 large 
listed UK companies. However, O'Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988), who 
examined CEO pay in relation to the number of vice presidents in their sample of 
105 US listed companies, found no support for tournament theory. On a wider 
note, the concept of CEO compensation relating at least partly to their roles as 
comparator universe rather than reflecting performance against a timeless benchmark (for 
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figureheads is discussed by Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), and by Ungson 
and Steers (1984), although neither of these papers includes empirical work to 
support the proposition. Overall, although the ideas behind tournament theory 
may have influence in some instances, the evidence of its effect on executive pay 
is limited. Of the three theories discussed in this section, this one appears to have 
the least currency amongst academics. 
Although tournament theory is evidenced only slightly in practice, the ideas 
underlying the other economics-based theories discussed in this section, agency 
theory and relative performance evaluation, appear to be clear influences on the 
debate around the structure of remuneration contracts. For example, in the UK the 
report of the Greenbury committee stated that remuneration contracts should: 
... link rewards to performance, by both company and individual; and 
align the interests of directors and shareholders in promoting the 
company's progress. (1995: para 1.15) 
The need for a pay-performance link was reiterated by the DTI in its consultation 
document on directors' remuneration, which stated in its introduction: 
... it is damaging to business itself if companiesfail to achieve an effective link between directors' remuneration and company and individual 
performance. (1999: 1) 
The consultation document did not elaborate on why it would be "damaging" were 
there not a pay-performance link. However, by inference one might assume that 
their argument could relate to aspects of shareholders' need to control directors' 
actions and eliminate conflicts of interest - an agency theory argument. 
example, cost of capital). The choice of comparators influences the performance outcome. 
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At the time of writing this thesis, the latest pronouncement on corporate 
governance is the Combined Code (2003). This reinforces the messages from the 
other reports, and states (Bl): "A significant proportion of executive directors' 
remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and 
individual performance". This differs from previous versions of the Code by the 
insertion of the word "significant" - an indication of the perceived importance of 
this aspect of pay structuring. " 
Thus the ideas underlying the economics-based theories of executive 
remuneration appear to be echoed in common practice, and provide some insight 
into the construction of executive remuneration contracts. However, the purpose 
of this section is to review these theories and determine whether they are 
sufficient to provide a full explanation of how executive directors' remuneration is 
determined. This seems unlikely, for two reasons. 
The first reason that the economics-based theories, whether they relate to the 
market or to the individual, do not appear to be sufficient to answer the research 
question in that each of them tends to focus either on the level of remuneration 
(market theories) or on its structure (agency and RPE), but no theory explains 
both. Individually the theories are incomplete in the context of this research 
question and, even if combined, they would still fail to address the processual 
issues of this thesis. 
11 There is little evidence that relating pay to performance, and, in particular, using equity 
incentives, has any positive impact on shareholder value. See, for example, Daily, Dalton and 
Cannella (2003). 
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A second issue is that economics-based perspectives deliberately focus on only 
one model of human behaviour, and thus provide a partial but one-dimensional 
view of remuneration. Simon (1957) critiqued the economists' model of 
Economic Man who maximises his utility, and behaves rationally in so doing. He 
pointed out that the economic model assumes nothing about the wider 
psychological characteristics of Man. Davis (1991) expanded on this point. He 
suggested that managerial action is "embedded in ongoing social structures", and 
thus economic incentives provide only a partial picture of what is happening. This 
is a practical point as well: Brennan (1994) argued persuasively that schemes that 
are economically rational, to the exclusion of behavioural issues, are unlikely to 
work effectively for senior executives. Davis, Schoonnan and Donaldson (1997) 
saw two competing "models of man": a "homo economicus" who acts rationally, 
and a steward, whose interests are aligned with the principals' and who acts from 
intrinsic motivation. It can be difficult to reconcile the two views. Moreover, 
although there is much media comment on 'fat cat' directors, this researcher finds 
it difficult (albeit not totally impossible) to believe that the individuals who have 
made it to the top of large companies are solely driven by utility maximisation, 
with its presuppositions of risk-averseness and its focus on monetary reward. 
Thus, even if economics researchers had chosen to examine process (which they 
have not) such an approach is unlikely to be able to produce a satisfactory answer. 
Taking the economic theories on their own terms, these points are not criticisms: 
they work (by and large) in the context of their own assumptions. But their 
assumptions are not those of this study, which sees the executives' behaviour in a 
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much more rounded fashion. As Eisenhardt (1989a: 71) stated, in the conclusion 
to her review of the agency literature: 
A recent article by Hirsch et al, (1987) eloquently compared economics 
with socioloo,. They argued that economics is dominated by a single 
paradigm, price theory, and a single view of human nature, self interest. In 
contrast, the authors maintained that a strength of organizational research 
is itspolyglot of theories thatyield a more realistic view of organizations. 
Consistent with the Hirsch et al. arguments, the recommendation here is to 
use agency theory with complementary theories. Agency theory presents a 
partial view of the world that, although it is valid, also ignores a good bit of 
the complexity of organizations. Additional perspectives can help to 
capture the greater complexity. 
Accordingly, the next section of this review considers theories developed through 
a different lens, one that engages directly with the complexity of the remuneration 
decision. 
2.5 Social-psychological and organisational perspectives 
Although economics provides the dominant paradigm in the executive 
remuneration literature, many researchers have considered other theories that rest 
on the notion that remuneration committees, and the executives whose rewards 
they set, make decisions based on factors that reflect a richer reality than an 
economics-based approach would suggest. Such theories, which address level and 
structure of pay, are the subject of this section. The theories are considered in two 
categories: those which relate specifically to the executive being remunerated, 
and those relating to the remuneration committee and the processes that determine 
the remuneration. 
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2.5.1 Social-psychological theories: the individual 
Motivation 
As discussed earlier, economics theories see variable pay as a driver that can be 
used to incentivise the director. However, some authors have queried whether 
performance-related pay can indeed be used to motivate directors to perform. For 
example, Deci (1972) maintained that intrinsic rewards (such as the employee's 
sense of accomplishment of a job well done) can be reduced when employers are 
perceived as seeking control through offers of money (an extrinsic reward - 
provided by someone else). Kunz and Pfaff (2002) suggested that although 
agency theory would predict that increased incentives, such as performance- 
related pay, raise the agent's productivity, research into intrinsic motivation 
concludes the exact opposite. Osterloh and Frey (2002) reviewed the motivation 
literature and concluded that there is strong evidence that extrinsic rewards 
"crowd out" intrinsic motivation, which may lead to jobs being less well 
performed. 
The finding that reward reduces intrinsic motivation is not universally accepted. 
For example, although Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) present a meta-analysis 
that shows the negative effects of reward, papers by Eisenberger, Pierce and 
Cameron (1999) and Gerhart and Rynes (2003: 258) argue otherwise. 
In any event, the research into the conflict between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation has tended to focus on employees lower down the hierarchy than 
CEOs and their board colleagues. It could be argued that matters are different at 
this top level. For example, one argument put forward by Osterloh and Frey 
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(2002) is that extrinsic motivation crowds out the job satisfaction if the reward is 
perceived to be "controlling" and acts as a restriction on the individual. Common 
sense suggests that this feeling is more likely to occur at lower levels of the 
organisation than in the CEO, who has considerable autonomy. F Scott Fitzgerald 
wrote that the very rich are different: the negative impact of monetary reward on 
performance has yet to be tested at this top level of the organisation. 
Although not going so far as to suggest that pay has a negative effect on 
motivation, Finkelstein and Hambrick asserted that "[p]restige, challenge, and 
power may rival or even greatly surpass pay in their importance to executives" 
(1988: 534). For top executives it is perhaps not the absolute level of 
remuneration in itself that provides motivation, but remuneration in relation to 
peers and rivals, as a symbol of achievement. To quote Finkelstein and Hambrick 
in a later paper (1996: 286): 
Pay is a primary scorecardfor managerial success; hence, top managers 
may not work harder in response to higher pay, but they probably will be 
dissatisfied with lower pay. 
If this is the case, pay may be seen as a motivating factor for directors who wish to 
be perceived as 'successful' in the eyes of their peers. Cognitive theories relating 
to the motivation of the individual director include expectancy theory and equity 
theory. These both relate to how the individual perceives the remuneration that 
s/he is promised. 
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Expectancy theory 
Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964; Pinder, 1987; Lawler, 1991) states that if 
variable pay is to act as a motivator then (a) the individual has to expect that by 
exerting effort s/he will be able to meet the targets set; and (b) that meeting the 
targets will result in receiving the reward, which (c) s/he believes is worth having. 
Expectancy theory argues that an individual's effort will be based on his/her 
expectation of the probability of success (expectancy) and the attractiveness of the 
final outcome (the value of the reward). A significant aspect of expectancy theory 
is that it explicitly recognises the differing preferences of individuals, and 
implicitly assumes that differently structured packages might work differently in 
different contexts. 
Equity theory 
Equity theory contributes a different, although complementary, explanation of 
executive remuneration, one that focuses mainly on the level of pay. Its 
proponents argue that employees consider the ratio of their inputs (how hard they 
work) to outcomes (one of which is their remuneration) and compare this ratio 
with that of a referent 'other. 
Adams (1963) proposed equity theory as a way of understanding how employees 
respond to situations in which they are treated either more favourably or less 
favourably in comparison to others (although he did not specify how the 'others' 
would be determined, nor which inputs and outcomes people would use). He 
referred not so much to equity as to inequity, arguing that inequitable comparisons 
induce a state of tension which employees are motivated to work to reduce. They 
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can choose to reduce that tension, restoring the equity of balance between inputs 
and outcomes, by such actions as raising or lowering their work efforts,, changing 
their pay, inducing the referent other to make such changes, or by changing their 
referent other to someone whose ratio is in line with theirs. Any of these could re- 
establish equity, without which the employee will be demotivated. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 286) suggested that equity theory may not be 
directly applicable to the senior management of a company, as money is not their 
sole driver - top management tend also to covet acclaim and other non-monetary 
rewards of success. However, theirs appears to be a minority view. Other 
commentators have noted that equity theory does have application at this level of 
the company. For example, Williams (1994: 60) described how directors make 
comparisons to establish pay fairness with others within their company, and with 
people in other companies in similar positions to themselves. Miller (1995) found 
that such referents tend to be found within the same industry. For example, 
finance directors in the media industry will compare their pay to other finance 
directors in media companies, but not to those in manufacturing companies. (This 
of course can be related back to the earlier discussion of comparators in 
remuneration surveys. ) 
Research indicates that these theories of individual motivation appear to have 
some practical application. However, on their own they cannot provide a full 
explanation of how remuneration contracts are structured. As Miller (1995) 
pointed out, the rcmuneration-sctting process is a negotiation between the 
remuneration committee and the individuals, and these motivational theories only 
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attempt to explain the actions and reactions of the one party, the individuals. 
Accordingly, we need to look elsewhere, to theories that may shed light on the 
committee's perspective. 
2.5.2 Social-psycholýgical theories: the remuneration committee 
The remuneration committee is a complex social organisation comprising diverse 
individuals. Accordingly, several different theories have been suggested 
concerning how the directors' remuneration is set by this group. Social influence 
theory suggests that an explanation can be found in the interaction between the 
individual executives and non-executives. Social comparison theory relates to the 
way in which the remuneration committee takes its external pay referents. These 
are discussed below. 
Social influence theory 
Proponents of social influence theory see 'social influence' as referring to several 
different types of relationship that may occur in a board of directors. It may be 
seen in the desire to reciprocate favours done by one director for another; in 
deference shown to figures of authority; in social relationships between 
individuals who get on well; or in the influence that similarities and differences in 
social status bring to a relationship. Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1995) investigated 
the role of social influence on compensation in two samples of listed US 
companies (an original sample of 89 companies was augmented with a ftu-ther 
sample of 291 companies, using more sophisticated data). They considered the 
extent to which boards of directors may be influenced or captured by their CEOs, 
and hypothesised that companies in which social influence could be seen would 
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pay greater executive remuneration than other companies. Main et al. determined 
that social influence factors did indeed affect directors' pay. For example, they 
found that CEO compensation was significantly higher if the non-executive 
director who served as chair of the compensation committee had been appointed 
after the CEO joined the company; they saw this as an indication of influence due 
to reciprocity. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 275) suggested other social effects which might 
influence the remuneration-setting process: for example, the publication of 
directors' remuneration details in annual reports, which facilitates comparisons 
between individuals and between companies. They cited the wide reporting of 
remuneration information and the publishing of surveys and other data which act 
as a scorecard of professional status, setting a benchmark against which 
companies and directors can measure their remuneration packages. It will be seen 
that there is a conceptual link with market-based economic theories, discussed 
earlier, which see these remuneration surveys as an example of labour market 
theory. There is also a considerable overlap between this view of social influence 
and social comparison, considered below. 
Social comparison theory 
The function of the remuneration committee is particularly important in the 
context of organisational explanations of remuneration strategies. Remuneration 
policy is set by remuneration committees comprising non-executives, some of 
whom have executive positions in other companies (Higgs dataset, 2003). 
According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), individuals evaluate 
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themselves by comparison with others whom they perceive to have similar 
abilities to themselves. In the context of research into directors' remuneration, it 
has been argued that executives' salaries will be set with reference to the 
remuneration committee members' experience of the pay that they and others 
receive in their own (outside) executive roles: the greater their remuneration, the 
greater that voted to the CEO. 
O'Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) tested a social comparison theory hypothesis 
for a sample of 105 US listed firms in 1984 and concluded that CEO pay was 
indeed positively related to the outside pay of the compensation committee 
members. A few years later Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1995) tested a separate 
sample of companies and noted again that the compensation of outside directors 
on the compensation committee had a significant and positive effect on the focal 
CEO's compensation (although the magnitude of the effect was lower in the 
second sample than in the first). However, it should be noted that both these 
studies used US data: in the US it is far more common for non-executives to be 
CEOs of other listed companies than it is in the UK, thus the results of this 
research may not be transferable to a UK context. 
Researchers have also suggested the use of social comparison theory to explain 
the phenomenon of 'bidding up' executive remuneration, whereby the overall 
salary benchmark rises significantly each year. Ezzamel and Watson (1998) 
argued that if non-executives do make comparisons between themselves and the 
executives, they are unlikely to wish to underpay the executives compared to the 
market. In a UK study of 94 FTSE 100 companies, Conyon and Peck (1998) 
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found that the existence of remuneration committees was associated with higher 
levels of remuneration (they had originally hypothesized the opposite) and 
suggested social comparison as one explanation for that phenomenon. Continuing 
the theme of overlaps between the theories, this social comparison explanation can 
be related to the remuneration surveys discussed earlier in this chapter; it can also 
be seen as an equivalent to equity theory, benchmarking an individual against 
others in similar roles. 
Social comparison and social influence theories would appear to have relevance in 
the remuneration decision, given that it is made by individuals who exist in a 
social environment. However, although they go some way towards providing an 
explanation for the level of pay, they do not necessarily explain its structure. 
Thus, further explanations are still required. 
25.3 Organisational theories 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory, which considers the isomorphic pressures that influence 
companies to act in similar ways, provides another theoretical approach which 
may be used to explain directors' pay from an organisational viewpoint rather than 
an economic one. DiMaggio and Powell's 1983 paper defines three types of 
isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative, each of which may have a part to 
play in the determination of directors' remuneration policies and packages. 
Coercive isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism. results from pressures exerted on 
organisations by other organisations on which they are dependent, and by the 
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cultural expectations of society. One example of this may be the organisation's 
response to government mandate: in the remuneration arena, companies' 
responses to the pronouncements of regulators from Cadbury (1992) to the 
Combined Code (2003) appear to fall into this category. 
Mimetic isomorphism. Institutional theorists suggest that mimetic processes 
occur when organisations imitate others because the way forward is not obvious 
and other organisations appear to have found a successful formula: if there is no 
clear course of action to take, it appears that organisations often copy others. It is 
suggested that the imitation may be deliberate, or may be diffused unintentionally 
through the work of consultants. The relative homogeneity of performance 
measures and targets adopted by UK listed companies (New Bridge Street, 2003a, 
2003b) may indicate mimetic isomorphism in action. 
Normative isomorphism. The professional practices of the remuneration 
consultants may also display normative pressures. Normative isomorphism relates 
to the desire of professionals to control and legitimise their professional practices. 
This may be seen, for example, in the recognised practice of using compensation 
surveys as a key tool in determining remuneration (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 
1988). Johnson and Greenwood (2002) suggest that director interlocks between 
boards also provide strong normative pressures of conformity. 
Isomorphic pressures may thus provide a coherent explanation for the 
homogeneity of companies' remuneration practices. Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1996: 275) discussed the isomorphic pressures which may lead to similarity in 
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pay structures between companies, and more particularly within industries. They 
noted that many industries have distinct pay patterns and suggested that 
isomorphism, in particular, practices passed on by consultants, might be an 
explanation of this. (The same phenomenon was attributed earlier in this chapter 
to labour market theory, and will be discussed later in the context of contingency 
theory. ) 
As DiMaggio and Powell stated: "Large organizations choose from a relatively 
small set of major consulting firms, which, like Johnny Appleseeds, spread a few 
organizational models throughout the land" (1983: 152). This statement was 
amplified by a director of a UK listed company: 
"[Consultants] keep promoting what they think is the indust? y norm ... and 
then they promote it to another company and then to a third company ... so 
it's become an industry norm " (quoted by Conyon et al., 2000: 488) 
Institutional theory takes as one of its premises that organisations structure 
themselves not so much for reasons of economic efficiency but in order to gain 
legitimacy (Staw and Epstein, 2000). Legitimacy relates to the way in which 
organisations fit in with what society expects in order to gain acceptance. It was 
defined by Suchman (1995: 574) as "a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, beliefs and definitions". 
Legitimacy would appear to have relevance to directors' remuneration policies 
and packages as the way in which society perceives these may have an impact on 
the company's status in the domains from which it draws resources. Gomez- 
Mejia and Wiseman (1997) suggested that one reason companies adopt 
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compensation practices that are widely accepted in their industry is in order to 
gain legitimacy. Legitimacy theory suggests that this can make it easier for them 
to gain the resources (financial, political, etc) necessary to continue their 
operations. For example, if a company is seen as being over-generous in paying 
its directors, its reputation may suffer and it may lose valuable support. This was 
evidenced when the UK lottery company, Camelot, paid large performance 
bonuses to its directors. To quote The Economist (26h August 2000): "Camelovs 
public image was dented by the claim that its directors were 'fat cats' who had 
awarded themselves excessive salaries and bonuses at the expense of good 
causes". The Economist went on to suggest that this negative impact on the 
company's image was one reason why Camelot was not initially favoured in the 
contest for the award of a further lottery licence; using the terminology of 
legitimacy, the company was being denied necessary resources 12 . 
Ezzamel and Watson (2002: 208) continued this line of thought, discussing the 
"potentially high political costs that arise whenever an unusually high cash bonus 
or share option arrangement is disclosed". They suggested that this is a constraint 
on the way in which pay is made contingent on performance - the potential upside 
might be limited, for reasons of presentation. 
Theorists in this area argue that legitimacy can also be seen to have an impact 
upon the way that boards operate and structure themselves (Meyer and Rowan, 
" There are many similarities between the institutional perspective and the resource dependence 
perspective. Oliver (199 1) points out that the two are complementary. Barringer and Milkovich 
(1998: 310) comment on the "remarkable resemblance between the external pressures of resource 
dependence and the coercive pressures of institutional theory. Resource dependence theory was 
considered for this thesis, but it was eventually decided that it offered no better explanation than 
institutional theory. 
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1977). Harrison (1987) suggested that board committees have at least two roles: 
to carry out their stated duties and to legitimise the acts of the company. For 
example, a remuneration committee determines the remuneration policy and 
packages for the executive directors; in addition, its very existence is a signal to 
the outside world that the company is undertaking governance in accordance with 
accepted practice. (However, having that committee is not in itself a guarantee of 
good practices; Cascio (2004) pointed out that a board is a social system in itself, 
and structural factors such as the existence of committees do not themselves 
distinguish good boards from bad. ) 
Institutional theory may provide an explanation of the structure of remuneration, 
but is less convincing as an explanation of the level. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, remuneration contracts in practice seem to be a matter for negotiation 
between the various parties - so any theory that only looks at the board or the 
committee without considering the individual director is by definition incomplete. 
Decision theory 
The term 'decision theory' covers a wide spectrum of academic propositions, and 
the aspect of decision theory that is particularly relevant to this discussion is 
Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) adjustment and anchoring heuristic 
C'anchoring"). Tversky and Kahneman maintained that in many situations people 
make numerical estimates by starting from an initial value (the anchor), and 
adjusting this to yield a final answer. They suggested that the adjustments made 
are usually insufficient: different starting points yield different estimates, which 
are biased towards the initial values. 
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The anchoring phenomenon was illustrated in a study conducted by Northcraft 
and Neale (1987). They examined the decisions of 21 real estate agents and 48 
business school students on valuing a property. Each of the subjects was given all 
of the information needed for pricing the property and understood how it should 
be used. One piece of information was manipulated - the "listing price", which is 
the seller's best guess of the property's fair market value. Different levels of 
listing price, ranging between $65,900 and $83,900, were given to two different 
experimental groups. The researchers found that the level of the listing price had 
a significant influence on the amounts at which the subjects valued the property: 
both experts and amateurs biased their answers towards the listing price they were 
given. 
The findings of Northcraft and Neale may be interpreted as relevant to the 
deliberations of remuneration committees: given the widespread use of 
remuneration surveys, the figures supplied by those surveys could provide an 
anchor for the committee's final decision. Anchoring was also considered by 
O'Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) in their discussion of social comparison theory: 
they suggested that the level of remuneration with which committee members 
were familiar (i. e. their own) could act as an anchor to their setting of suitable 
compensation. Similarly, it could be contended that the level of remuneration 
considered reasonable by the executive, using the 'equity theory' argument above, 
might be an anchor for what s/he considers acceptable. Current levels of pay 
could also act as an anchor for future pay negotiations. 
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Power andPolitics 
The determination of directors' remuneration is in part a process of negotiation 
between the protagonists (Williams, 1994; Clapman et al., 2004), and the 
outcome of negotiations is often favourable to those with power, who negotiate 
from strength. Furthermore, the remuneration contract represents the outcome of 
a decision, or series of decisions, and writers on decision theory acknowledge the 
importance of power relationships and politics (Pettigrew, 1973; Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992). In discussing organisational perspectives on directors' 
remuneration, it is thus vital to look at power, and the organisational politics in 
which it is set. 
Research in this area focuses mainly on the power that the executives (normally 
proxied as the CEO) have over the committee, as evidenced by favourable terms 
in their remuneration contracts. Such favourable terms might include higher pay, 
13 
or contracts with less pay-risk , 
limiting the executives' downside in the event of 
poor performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
Finkelstein (1992) defined power as the capacity of individual actors to exert their 
will. Researchers into directors' remuneration have suggested that such power 
can and does arise from a number of sources, including, for example: executive 
share ownership (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Barkema and Pennings, 1998); 
executive tenure (Hill and Phan, 1991; Sanders, Davis-Blake and Fredrickson, 
1995); the proportion of non-executives appointed by the CEO (Lambert, Larcker 
and Weigelt, 1993); or CEOs' social capital (Barkerna and Pennings, 1998). 
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Each of these could be relevant in different circumstances - as will be discussed 
later in this thesis, power is contextual and relational (Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1995). 
Related to the 'power' argument is the argument that remuneration contracts are 
influenced by political considerations within (and without) the organisation. This 
was discussed by Ungson and Steers (1984). They considered several issues 
relating to the political nature of the CEO's job: his/her role as a political 
figurehead; his/her role as a political strategist; and executive succession. 
Regarding the first of these, they saw the figurehead role of the CEO as an 
important part of that function, and suggested that the symbolic meaning of a 
CEO's remuneration may send signals about his/her position (within the 
company) or about the company (to outsiders). The 'political strategist' view is 
that the CEO role is a complex one, managing coalitions within and between the 
organisation and external parties, and is difficult to evaluate, thus making it 
difficult to establish a link between pay and performance. The executive 
succession issue could relate to the relative power of incoming CEOs in 
negotiating packages greater than would be given to those who are promoted from 
within (Deckop, 1988; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2003). 
The paragraphs above describe research that has attempted to demonstrate a 
power/political influence on executive compensation. However, the literature 
does not always make a clear distinction between political and other social- 
psychological or organisational theories. Phenomena described by some 
" Pay-risk refers to the percentage of a director's remuneration that is perceived to be at risk due 
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researchers as being attributable to the influence of managerial power are seen by 
others as being the product of social influence, as discussed earlier. One example 
of such a phenomenon is the relationship of CEO remuneration to the proportion 
of non-executive board members appointed after s/he took office. For example, 
Lambert et al. (1993), examining 303 US listed companies, reported that the 
proportion of external directors appointed by the CEO had a positive influence on 
his/her compensation. They took this as support for a managerial power 
hypothesis. However, in a similar study Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1995) 
examined whether CEOs appointed before the chairman had higher pay. They 
found this to be so, and attributed the result to social influence theory. At the start 
of this chapter I noted a comment by Merchant et al. (2003) to the effect that 
different research disciplines use different terms to describe the same phenomena 
- this would seem to represent such an instance. 
Contingency theory 
The last theory explored in this chapter is contingency theory, which has a useful 
part to play in a discussion of executive remuneration. Proponents of contingency 
theory (for example Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Barkerna and Gomez-Mejia, 
1998) state that different enviromnental conditions and finn characteristics 
demand different pay policies, tailored to an individual firm's circumstances. 
Several studies (for example Milkovich, 1988; Montemayor, 1996) discuss the 
need to tie performance-related pay to the company's strategy. Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia explain the essential logic of the contingency approach as follows: 
to being performance-related, compared to fixed elements such as basic salary. 
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(1) diverse environmental conditions, organizational strategies andfirm 
characteristics require different paypolicies andpractices, (2) the relative 
effectiveness of different pay policies and practices varies across contexts, 
and (3) significant deviations from the ideal compensation profile that 
would be most appropriate given a firm's environment, strategies and 
characteristics will result in lowerperformance. (1998: 139) 
There is no one universally ideal pay structure for all organisations, and 
accordingly an organisation's remuneration practices should be appropriate to its 
unique characteristics and reflect the external environment in which it operates. 
Without an appropriate match between compensation policy and strategy it will be 
difficult to achieve high performance. Montemayor (1996) undertook 
questionnaire research with members of the American Compensation Association 
and established that there was indeed an association between pay policy and 
business strategy. Milkovich (1988) also made this point, but noted that although 
it is important to reward behaviours that are consistent with the organisation's 
objectives, it can also be difficult to design systems that create an exact fit. 
2.6 Summary of the theories described in this chapter 
So far in this chapter some key theories that have been used to explain directors' 
remuneration have been reviewed. Each of the theories has been shown to have 
validity in its own area. However, none of them on its own can be used to explain 
both the level and structure of executive remuneration, which is the focus of this 
research. The application of these theories is summarised in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1 How theories explain level and structure of remuneration 







Labour market theory 
Human capital theory 






Social influence theory 
Social comparison theory 
Organisational 
Institutional theory and 
legitimacy 
Decision theory 
Power and politics 







Only to the extent that 





Only to the extent that 
power may reduce the pay- 
risk 
Yes 
It can be seen that, for the most part, each theory focuses on either the level of pay 
or its structure. Agency theory has some application in both areas, but its 
contribution as regards explaining the level of pay is limited. Social influence and 
power theories, which, as explained earlier, have sometimes been used 
interchangeably, may also impact on both areas. They clearly have the potential 
to enable executives to increase pay levels. They might also be used to explain 
executive contracts where pay-risk is low, but could not act as an explanation for 
situations where the pay-risk is high. 
Yes 
Yes 
Only to the extent that poorly 
designed contracts might 







Only to the extent that level 
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Furthermore, each of the theories approaches the issue from the point of view of 
one of the participants in the remuneration decision, either the individual director 
or the remuneration committee, whereas in practice the negotiation involves all 
the parties. Also, it is apparent from this review that none of the theories has been 
used to consider the processes by which pay is set. Accordingly, none of the 
extant theories can provide an answer to the research question 'how is the 
remuneration of executive directors determinedT. It was this thought which led 
to the development of a tentative theory of remuneration, to be outlined in chapter 
3. 
2.7 Inputs to the remuneration decision 
In chapter 1, Figure 1-2 shows remuneration-setting as an input-process-output 
model. Such a model is described further in chapter 3. One of the purposes of 
reviewing the literature was to determine possible inputs to the model, as 
considered by previous scholars. 
Some of these factors are clear from the summary of theories set out above. These 
include: company size, performance, industry, strategy, remuneration surveys and 
other forms of comparison, and human capital. The academic literature was also 
reviewed to examine the variables used in previous research, to determine further 
inputs. The tables in Appendix 2 set out examples of some of the research papers 
reviewed, and the variables they considered. In total, the potential inputs from the 
literature are as set out in Figure 2-2. 
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Social comparison factors 
Strategy and stage in lifecycle 






Tax - individual and corporate 
Retention needs 
2.8 Other factors influencing the remuneration decision 
Before completing the literature review, it is necessary to consider again the five 
generic questions set out in chapter 1. For convenience, these are set out below. 
Relating to the level ofpay 
1. How much should the company's executive directors be paid for expected 
perfonnance? 
Relating to the structure ofpay 
2. What relative proportions of this amount should be basic salary and 
perforinance-related? 
3. For the performance-related components, how should performance be 
measured? 
4. How should perfannance targets be determined? 
5. What form should the remuneration take? (For example, shares, share 
options, cash or a mix thereoP) 
So far in this chapter, prior research relating to questions I and 2 has been 
considered. It is now necessary to see what researchers have written about the 
other three questions. 
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28.1 Performance measures and targets 
If directors' pay is structured to encourage good performance, it is important that 
the performance measures and targets are set appropriately. Two of the key 
drivers of success in performance-related pay are the determination of appropriate 
performdrice measures and then the setting of suitable targets. 
Performance measures 
Surveys by New Bridge Street Consultants (2003a, 2003b) show that 98% of 
FTSE 350 companies have annual bonus schemes for their directors, mostly 
rewarding performance measured by a profit measure or personal performance. A 
similar percentage also had in place a long term incentive scheme, either a share 
option scheme or an Itip (long term incentive plan). The most common 
performance criteria for the longer term schemes were eps (earnings per share) 
growth or total shareholder return (TSR) over a performance period extending, at 
the mode, for three years. 
Eps and TSR are the most commonly-used performance measures, but they are 
not the only ones available. The performance measures used as a basis for 
performance-related pay can be accounting-based, economic profit-based, market- 
based or non-financial. For the remuneration committee addressing the question 
'how should performance be measuredT each of these types of measures has both 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Table 2-2 surnmarises some of the advantages and disadvantages, from the point 
of view of the remuneration committee, of the different types of performance 
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measure. 
Table 2-2 Features of common performance measures 
Performance Measures Advantages Disadvantages 
Accounting measures 0 Simple to use. 0 Accounting policies are easy to 
0 Easy to understand. manipulate. 
Profit-based measures: 0 Universally acceptable 0 May encourage short-termism. 
for example profit before measure. 0 Takes no account of risk. 
or after tax, earnings per 
share (eps), Return on ' . 
Information is readily May be distorted by inflation. 
Assets (RoA) and Return available, often 
based on Internally-determined targets may 
on Equity (RoE). audited 
figures. be set artificially low. 
Ignores the cost of capital: not 
necessarily a good indicator of 
shareholder value. 
Economic profit 0 Takes account of Easy to manipulate, as figures are 
underlying capital accounts-based, and adjustments 
And other internally- requirements. may 
be seen to be subjective. 
based shareholder value 0 Seen as an indicator of 0 May encourage short-termism. 
measures such as shareholder value. 0 Difficult to measure. 
Economic Value Added. 
0 Internally-determined targets may 
be set artificially low. 
0 Not always understood by the 
participants. 
Markct-based 0 Simple to use (but may 0 Share prices may vary for reasons 
measures be difficult to calculate). unconnected with company's or 
0 Directly related to 
directors' performance. 
For example share price, shareholder value. 0 Share prices reflect views of the 
or total shareholder 0 Targets are set based on 
future, and may be unrelated to 
return (TSR) - dividend an external measure. past performance. 
plus change in share 0 May be judged against 0 Changes 
in share prices reflect 
price. relative performance of a performance which 
differs from 
comparator group or original expectations, rather than 
index. good/bad performance. 
0 Information is readily 0 Market 
imperfections may cause a 
available for quoted share to 
be under/over valued. 
companies. 0 It can be difficult to determine an 
0 Determined appropriate comparator group. 
independently (by the 0 Difficult for managers to know 
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Non-financial 
indicators 




These can be split 
between quantifiable and 
more subjective 
measures. They may be 
individual or team- 
based. 
" May be perceived as 0 Often difficult to establish and 
reflecting business evaluate. 
drivers of shareholder 0 Qualitative measures involve 
value. considerable judgement, and 
" Can be used to reinforce targets or outcomes may be 
a business's strategy. fudged, or influenced by a 
" Qualitative measures powerfid executive. 
may be interpreted more Link to shareholder value may be 
flexibly in the light of difficult to confmn. 
external factors. 
Sources: Rappaport (1978), Tehranian, Travlos, and Waegelein (1987), Burchman (1991), 
Brindisi (1991), Stewart (1991), McTaggart, Kontes and Mankins (1994), Langley (1997), 
Murphy (1999). Also the researcher's general financial knowledge. 
Burchman (1991) specified three criteria for performance measures, namely that 
they should be: highly correlated with shareholder wealth creation; consistent with 
the company's organisational and management environment; and consistent with 
the company's compensation philosophy. He noted that market-based measures 
address shareholder wealth directly but are limited in that they reflect the vagaries 
of the overall economy rather than the performance of the individual company 
(and hence its managers). He considered eamings-based measures to be useful, in 
that they are widely prepared and understood, but pointed out that they have little 
correlation with shareholder value. Burchman also observed that non-financial 
measures provide a means to reinforce strategy, although they are often not linked 
to the business as a whole. 
Langley (1997) also examined the features of some commonly used performance 
measures, taking a UK perspective. He noted difficulties with accounting 
measures such as eps which, he pointed out, is short-term and does not account for 
the cost of capital. However, he also noted that the measure does have strengths 
such as being derived from audited figures. Share price growth, on the other 
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hand, may align directors' interests with those of shareholders, but is forward 
looking, and reflects market expectations rather than rewarding past performance. 
One final consideration on performance measures is that the use of any single 
measure can distort performance, encouraging the executives to meet that 
performance measure rather than work for the best outcome for the company 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996). 
Performance targets 
In addition to determining the proportion of directors' remuneration that is to be 
performance-related, and the measures to use, remuneration committees need to 
ensure performance targets are set that will motivate directors towards desired 
performance. However, research by Healy (1985) and Holthausen, Larcker and 
Sloan (1995) found that performance targets may not achieve their desired 
outcomes. Both of these studies found that managers use accounting accruals to 
manipulate profits downwards when the upper limit for bonuses is reached, thus 
'banking' any additional profits for the ensuing year when profit targets may not 
otherwise be reached. Murphy (2001) also found that income-smoothing takes 
place when companies use internal performance targets 14 such as budgets, thus 
ensuring a more constant bonus payout year on year. Furthermore, Jensen (2003) 
gave examples of how paying people for budget-based targets can lead to poor 
business decisions. 
14 Murphy refers not to targets but to 'standards'. However, that usage is not common in UK 
companies, hence 'targets' is used here. 
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Z8.2 Theform of remuneration 
The fifth question to be addressed by remuneration committees concerns the form 
in which directors' remuneration is to be paid. Broadly, it may be paid in cash, 
the company's shares, share options, or a mixture thereof Researchers have 
identified a number of factors that influence remuneration committees' decision as 
to which form(s) of payment to adopt. These include: 
1, The company's available cash resources and directors' personal need for cash 
to support their lifestyles (Langley, 1997); 
* The desire to retain executives in the company - which encourages payment in 
shares to be held for the longer term (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b); 
* The need to align directors' interests with those of the shareholders - 
encouraging payment in equity (Hall, 1997); 
The impact of the form(s) of payment on the company's and the individual 
director's tax liability (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988); 
The impact of the form(s) of payment on the company's financial statements 
(Murray, Smithers and Emerson, 1998). 
It is generally accepted that at least part of directors' remuneration should be paid 
in cash in order to meet their immediate financial needs, and most commentators 
also agree (for reasons indicated above) that some part of the remuneration should 
be paid in equity (shares or share options). However, there is considerable debate 
as to whether payment in shares or options is more appropriate and the use of 
share options to reward directors has attracted considerable research interest. 
Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) investigated this issue in a study of 60 FTSE 100 
64 
Chapter 2: Review ofprior research 
companies and concluded that share options provide a performance-sensitive link 
between pay and performance. This suggests that companies wishing to enhance 
their executive directors' performance could adopt share options as a means of 
payment. 
However, Yermack (1997) also investigated companies' use of options to reward 
their directors and found that a downside of their use arises from the ability of 
directors to manipulate the timing of the exercise of their options in order to 
benefit from favourable stock market conditions that have nothing to do with their 
own performance. The Greenbury Committee (1995: para 6.28) similarly cited 
what it referred to as "windfall gains" as a disadvantage of options as a form of 
remunerating directors. Hall (1997) acknowledged this disadvantage of options 
but still favoured their use over shares as a means of rewarding directors, 
observing that a properly structured option scheme can provide the leverage of a 
share scheme but at a lower cost to shareholders. However, a few years later, after 
some high-profile corporate excesses, he commented on the many disadvantages 
of options: Hall and Murphy (2003) stated that too many options were granted, 
and that although attractive in some respects, they were an inefficient way to 
achieve the objectives. 
On a related matter, Jensen and Murphy (1990b) questioned the value of equity as 
a means of motivating directors towards desired performance. Studying the 
behaviour of CEOs in large US companies, they concluded that, in order for this 
form of reward to affect performance, CEOs need to have a substantial investment 
in the company's shares. 
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A further issue relating to the use of share options is the tax environment of the 
company and the directors. Main (1997), for example, traced the history of the 
use of share options in the UK and noted that companies' propensity to use 
options has changed over time with changes in tax rules. Similarly, Main, Bruce 
and Buck (1996) observed that differences in the tax enviromnents of the UK and 
US may account for the lesser use of options by companies in the UK compared 
with their US counterparts. 
The use of share options to reward directors may also be affected by their 
treatment in companies' financial statements. The findings of Murray, Smithers 
and Emerson (1998) and Cooper and Hraiki (1998) showed that the accounting 
treatment of options can affect reported earnings and that, if options were fully 
charged against earnings this could result in a significant reduction in reported net 
income. This factor is of particular relevance given the introduction of MRS 2- 
Share-based Payment - for accounting periods beginning on or after I" January 
2005. Once options are charged against profits in the same way as other forms of 
remuneration, companies' decisions as to the form of payment for their directors 
may change to reflect fundamental issues rather than accounting convenience. 
As with the different types of performance measure, advantages and 
disadvantages attach to each of these methods of payment. These are surnmarised 
in Table 2-3. 
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Table 2-3 Features of some common methods of payment - 
Payment Methods Advantages Disadvantages 
Shares 0 Perceived as creating 0 Depending on scheme restrictions, 
alignment between may not be retained long-term. 
directors' and shareholders' 0 Director can benefit even if share interests. price falls. 
0 Depending on the source of 0 Director can benefit from share 
the shares, may not result in 
full charge against profits*. 
price rises relating to anticipated 
future events rather than past 
performance. 
0 Potential dilution of existing 
shareholders. 
* May result in a charge against 
profits*. 
0 May discourage risk-taking 
behaviour if the shareholding 
represents a significant part of the 
director's personal wealth. 
Share options 0 Perceived as creating 0 After exercise, the shares may not 
alignment between be retained long-term. 
directors' and shareholders' 0 Difficult to value. interests. 
0 May be no downside for the 
" Directors only benefit if potential recipients. 
share price increases. 
0 Possible windfall gains arising 
" May not result in full charge 
* from general movements in the against profits . market, or inflation. 
0 Director can benefit from share 
price rises relating to anticipated 
future events rather than past 
performance. 
a Potential dilution of existing 
shareholders. 
0 If out-of-the-money's, may not 
have an incentive effect. 
0 Directors may be unwilling to pay 
significant dividends. 
41 May encourage the directors to 
pursue volatility of results. 
Cash 0 Universally acceptable. 0 Does not provide aligriment of 
0 Transparent as to value. 
directors' and shareholders' 
interests. 
" Charged to profit & loss account*. 
" Staff are free to leave once bonuses 
have been paid. 
Sources: Jensen and Murphy (1990a), McTaggart, Kontes, and Mankins (1994), Mehran (1995), 
Main (1997), Rappaport (1999). Also the researcher's general financial knowledge. 
0 It should be noted that although this is shown as an advantage (disadvantage), reflecting current 
corporate sentiment, many commentators see it as a disadvantage (advantage). 
15 "Out-of-the-money" or "underwater" options are those for which the exercise price of the option 
exceeds the current share price, meaning that it would not be worthwhile for the director to 
exercise the option. 
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Jensen and Murphy (I 990a) suggested that directors' shareholdings are a powerful 
tool in aligning the financial interests of directors with those of shareholders. 
Accordingly, both option-based and share-based remuneration will have 
considerable advantages; but only if the executives retain the shares after they 
become fully vested. In this context, New Bridge Street (2003b) report a growing 
trend of companies requiring directors to hold substantial shareholdings in the 
companies for which they work, which would help to secure alignment of 
interests. 
Although share- and option-based schemes can secure alignment, as noted earlier 
in this chapter, many share option schemes are flawed, producing large monetary 
gains for directors irrespective of the company's performance (see for example 
Overell (2002) for a discussion of how CEOs have benefited from, "riding the 
rising tide"). Furthermore, as Murphy (1999) and Meulbroek (2001) point out, 
share options are worth less to the undiversified director than they would be if 
issued on the open market; thus the option-based remuneration costs the company 
more than its value to the directors. 
This feature of share options is not an issue for share-based schemes. Schemes 
that award directors shares, often with vesting contingent on the company's 
performance, are popular with many companies. There is a wide range of such 
schemes in existence. Tehranian, Travlos and Waegelein (1987) and Larcker 
(1983) both set out details of different types of share-based remuneration plan, 
used particularly in the US. However, share-based remuneration also has its 
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critics. For example, Main (1997) showed that for a given monetary value, more 
options can be given to directors than can shares, thus increasing the pay-gearing 16 
for directors. 
2.9 Prior interview-based studies 
In chapter 1, while outlining how this study differs from previous research, I made 
reference to three studies which have used interviews with the protagonists in the 
remuneration-setting decision: Main (1993), Conyon et al. (2000) and Ogden and 
Watson (2004). It is appropriate now to discuss these studies, and to explain why 
they do not address the question asked by this thesis. In this section I will also 
consider the review conducted for the Higgs report by McNulty, Roberts and 
Stiles (2003). 
Main (1993) conducted interviews between October 1992 and April 1993 with 24 
"top executives" at 24 of "Britain's largest companies". The executives included 
CEOs, chairmen, main board directors with responsibility for pay, company 
secretaries and human resource professionals. No explanation is given of how 
these people and companies came to be selected for the research, nor is any detail 
given of the research methodology (for example, whether the interviews were 
taped, how long they took, etc. ). 
Main's work provides a useful description of practices in his companies in the 
period following the publication of the Cadbury committee's report. All his case 
companies already had remuneration committees in place (indeed, he suggests that 
16 Pay gearing refers to the relative change in director's remuneration for a given change in 
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it may be that "those agreeing to participate in this study are more likely than most 
to have sound governance procedures in place" (1993: 4). 17 His paper covers 
many matters - the use of comparator surveys, bonus plans, the use of consultants 
and professional advice, numbers of committee meetings - but at a necessarily 
superficial level, given the constraints of the length of the paper. This is an 
interesting description of practices at a time of change in the governance 
environment, but no attempt is made to apply a theoretical approach to the 
empirical findings. 
The work done by Conyon et al. (2000) combined quantitative and qualitative 
methods to produce a work that added in many ways to the debate. In their 
quantitative work they valued the equity-based remuneration earned by directors 
in 200 of the largest UK companies, and also valued their portfolio of equity and 
unvested options, to demonstrate the relationship between changes in the firms' 
wealth and changes in the directors' wealth. They also analysed in detail the 
elements of the directors' pay (using 1997 data) and showed how much was fixed 
and variable, and how the variable pay related to performance. Furthermore, they 
showed that the most commonly-used performance measure - growth in eps - was 
historically easy to achieve at the target levels set. 
Conyon et al. supplemented their quantitative data with taped interviews at 8 large 
companies (out of a total of 50 companies approached). The interview 
questionnaire is reproduced in the paper, and is comprehensive. It is not obvious 
exactly how many interviews were conducted, with how many interviewees: the 
performance; higher gearing means that the total remuneration is more sensitive to performance. 
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text states "[t]here were typically six high-profile non-executive directors - 
usually including the Chair of the remuneration committee - and two human 
resource directors who were responsible for providing information to the 
remuneration committee". It is not clear if all of these people were interviewed, 
and if such interviews were on an individual or group basis. 
This research provides insights into, for example, why the companies used options 
or Itips, the difficulties they had in determining appropriate performance measures 
and targets, and their use of consultants. The qualitative data supplement the 
statistical analysis to produce a very interesting paper. However, despite the very 
detailed nature of the questions being asked, the interview results are not reported 
in detail, and thus the paper skirts around many of the issues. Like the Main 
(1993) paper discussed above, this paper makes no attempt to relate its findings to 
theory. 
The third qualitative paper referred to in chapter I is a recent one by Ogden and 
Watson (2004) that combines quantitative analysis of water companies' pay in 
1991-99 with interviews with members of the remuneration committees of four 
water companies. No details are given as to when the interviews were conducted 
(although this must have been in/after 2000, as the paper refers to there only being 
five independent water companies from which to choose, and this was not true 
before that year). And although the paper refers to interviewing "members of 
remuneration committees" it does not state how many interviews and how many 
interviewees. 
17 That same matter is noted in chapter 8 as regards this study. 
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Ogden and Watson discuss several aspects of directors' remuneration, including 
the committees' terms of reference, their use of consultants and of surveys, and 
their practices in committee meetings. In common with the other papers reviewed 
in this section, no attempt was made to link the findings to theory. 
Another qualitative paper written by academics, although not published in a peer- 
reviewed j oumal, is the review of the work of NEDs prepared for the Higgs report 
by McNulty, Roberts and Stiles (2003). This paper, which records the results of 
interviews with 40 directors of FTSE 350 companies, conducted during the 
summer of 2002, covers the whole spectrum of NED activities, of which 
remuneration-setting is a sub-set. McNulty et al. found that the behavioural 
dynamics of the individuals on the board (and by extension, its committees) 
played a major part in its effectiveness. As regards remuneration, they cited the 
need for remuneration committees to be able to defend the remuneration they 
awarded, and to be sensitive to the perceptions of the wider community. They 
stated that although committees are composed of non-executives, the executive 
has a high influence in determining pay. Finally, they commented on the need for 
the non-executives to be technically competent in the complex area of 
remuneration. 
Although each of the four papers reviewed in this section has made a useful 
addition to our knowledge about how executive pay is set, none has satisfactorily 
addressed the gap in the literature and answered the research question of this 
thesis. 
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2.10 Summary of chapter 
In the eighty years during which academics have researched directors' pay, many 
approaches have been used. In this chapter I have set out some of the theories 
adopted, categorising them in terms of whether they take an economic 
perspective, or a social-psychological or organisational one. I have shown which 
of the theories reflect the point of view of the individual being remunerated and 
which the committee; which consider the level of pay and which its structure. By 
doing this, I have demonstrated that no one theory is adequate to answer the 
research question set out in chapter 1. Furthermore, I have analysed the few 
papers that have discussed processual issues, and shown that they have not 
attempted to link them to theory. It thus appears that no prior research has 
attempted to answer the research question of this thesis. 
The chapter also sets out the factors which previous researchers have considered 
as potential inputs to the remuneration-setting process. Further, it sets the five 
generic questions into context of previous research, highlighting the issues that 
remuneration committees face, and the fact that there is no 'right answer' waiting 
for them to apply. 
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3. PRELIMINARY MODELS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe two models developed from the review of the literature 
which were used to guide the initial research design. The process model, 
described first, grew from the representation of prior literature set out in Figure 1- 
2 in chapter 1, the input-process-output model. It draws directly on the list of 
potential input factors derived from the literature review in chapter 2. The other, 
legitimacy-comparison theory, is a tentative framework drawn from the literature 
review. As noted in chapter 1, both were superseded in the course of the research 
process, as the need for a different, more comprehensive, approach to theorising 
the complexity of the remuneration-setting processes became apparent. 
3.2 Process model 
The Combined Code (2003) of the London Stock Exchange specifies that: 
Companies should estahlish a formal and transparent procedure for 
developing policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the 
remuneration packages of individual directors. (section B2) 
In the order of its wording, placing 'policy' before 'packages', the Code mirrored 
the Greenbury report (1995) which stated that companies should disclose their 
policy on executive remuneration (section B2) and they should "... also include 
full details of the remuneration package of each individual Director ... " (section 
B4) 18 . Both of these documents seem to envisage a system whereby remuneration 
committees first develop their company's remuneration policy and then determine 
individual directors' packages in accordance with that policy. Such a system is 
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depicted in Figwe 3-119 
Figure 3-1 Illustrative remuneration-setting system 
Policy 
'Process I Process 2a 
Inputs 
emuneration Packages 
Process 2b paid 
INPUT OUTPUT OUTCOME 
Figure 3-1 indicates that the remuneration-setting process commences with the 
remuneration committee gathering data (or 'inputs') to inform their decisions. 
Following from the discussion in chapter 2, it is likely that these data will include, 
inter alia, information about the company's size, industry, strategy and lifecycle 
phase; personal attributes of the executive directors whose remuneration packages 
are to be determined; remuneration levels of directors in other companies within 
the same industry and in the market as a whole; and relevant tax and financial 
reporting requirements. Such information will be gathered from a variety of 
sources including, for example, remuneration consultants, internal sources (such 
as HR personnel), published data, and the acquired knowledge of remuneration 
committee members obtained from other companies in which they hold (or have 
held) executive or non-executive directorships. 
The information available to the remuneration committee will, influence its 
18 The terms 'policy' and 'packages' are defined in the Greenbury report. See glossary. 
75 
Chapter 3: Preliminary models 
decisions in developing the company's overall remuneration policy. However, the 
committee is unlikely to use all of the information at its disposal - nor is it likely 
to seek to obtain the universe of possible data. Remuneration committee members 
charged with formulating their company's remuneration policy could not 
cognitively or physically accommodate all of the information potentially available 
to make a fully informed decision. Furthermore, time constraints on commercial 
decisions mean that exhaustive research and data collection are rarely possible in 
practice. Bounded rationality (see Simon, 1957) suggests that the committee 
members will obtain sufficient information to reach a decision, basing that 
decision on their perception of the world, gained from the limited (or bounded) 
infonnation they consider. The process of bounding in the context of the 
remuneration-setting decision is illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
Figure 3-2 Bounded rationality in the remuneration committee's choice of 
remuneration policies and packages 










remuneration Factors Decision as to 
committee for actually remuneration 
its decision- i considered policy and 
making Ll-ý packages 
Adapted from Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 42) 
19 Much of this discussion of the process model was published in Bender and Porter (2003). 
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An example of bounded rationality in the remuneration-setting context is afforded 
by the setting of basic salary levels. As noted previously, remuneration 
committees are usually assisted in their deliberations by remuneration consultants, 
and they also use survey data when detennining appropriate salary levels for their 
executive directors. However, a review of companies' remuneration reports and 
discussions with directors indicate that most companies use only one consultant; 
few use more than three. By using more consultants, access to more information 
would be possible, but companies choose to satisfice, limiting the information 
they have available for their decision-making. Even committees that obtain 
survey data from several sources do not search the market exhaustively for all 
possible sources of information. 
Figure 3-2 suggests that the remuneration committee will use only a subset of the 
possible input data in making its remuneration decisions. These decisions are 
illustrated in Figure 3-1. The first stage is to use the relevant data to develop a 
remuneration policy appropriate to the company's context and its directors' needs. 
This is shown as Process 1. Its output is the remuneration policy which provides 
the broad framework within which the remuneration packages of the individual 
directors will be determined. For example, the remuneration policy might state 
the comparator group(s) against which the level of pay will be benchmarked, and 
specify whether it will be at the median or above or below that level. The policy 
will also set out the structure of the remuneration, giving the broad parameters of 
the short- and long-term incentive schemes, and provide for the form in which the 
remuneration is to be paid, for example, by establishing a share option or 
restricted share scheme. 
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Based on the sequence suggested in the Greenbury report (1995) and the 
Combined Code (2003), the remuneration committee next turns its attention to the 
remuneration packages of the individual directors. This represents Process 2 in 
the remuneration-setting system but, as Figure 3-1 reveals, it comprises two sub- 
processes. In the first, Process 2a, the remuneration committee applies its over- 
arching remuneration policy to the circumstances of each executive director. 
Simultaneously, the committee engages in Process 2b, that is, it considers some of 
the system's inputs that will directly impact individual directors' remuneration 
packages. For example, a remuneration committee may take into account the 
average level of executive directors' pay in the company's industry (an input) 
when establishing its overall remuneration policy (in Process 1). Applying that 
policy (in Process 2a), would give an initial view of what that directors' packages 
should be. However, when determining the package of an individual director, the 
committee may (in Process 2b) consider other inputs such as the director's human 
capital - for instance, their age and experience, or the likelihood of their being 
poached by a rival firm. 
Just as the remuneration policy is the output of Process 1, the remuneration 
packages of individual directors constitute the output of Process 2 (that is, the 
combination of sub-processes 2a and 2b). The packages include details of the 
relevant director's basic salary and any performance-related pay. They also set 
out the basis for the award of performance-related pay (including specific 
performance measures and targets, and the level at which the maximum bonus is 
reached). 
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An individual director's remuneration package can be likened to a formula 
embodying a basic salary and (usually) a performance-related component - the 
latter generally being linked to stated performance targets. Thus, once a director's 
package has been determined, the remuneration s/he will receive flows 
automatically from it (the perfon-nance-related component being calculated 
according to the director's perfonnance relative to the stated targets). The 
remuneration each director receives is the 'outcome' of the remuneration-setting 
system. No process is indicated in Figure 3-1 to link the system's outputs to its 
outcome because if the director's remuneration package has been unambiguously 
designed, and circumstances remain unchanged, no further decision process is 
required. 
In the event that circumstances change (for example, there is a fundamental shift 
in industry dynamics making existing remuneration arrangements inappropriate), 
and the remuneration paid to the company's executive directors becomes a matter 
for the remuneration committee's judgement, such judgement may well be 
exercised at the end of a multi-year performance period. (Most long-term 
remuneration schemes have a performance period of at least three years and, as a 
result, come to fruition some considerable time after the remuneration policy and 
packages are initially determined. ) In such instances, the remuneration committee 
will, in effect, re-engage in process 2b (the changed conditions being reflected in 
the inputs used in the process) and new packages for the directors will be devised. 
These, in turn, will generate the outcome of the remuneration-setting system, that 
is, the remuneration paid. 
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One further point to note is that Figure 3-1 portrays a stylised remuneration- 
setting system, with linear paths linking policy to packages and packages to 
remuneration paid. In practice, the system will almost certainly be more complex. 
It is likely that feedback loops will exist at each stage so that, if conditions change 
(as noted above) or the amount paid is not satisfactory (to the company or to the 
director concerned) for some other reason, then the directors' packages or, indeed, 
the remuneration policy may be amended. This is an implication of Ezzamel and 
Watson's study (1998) which examined a sample of 199 large UK companies 
between 1992 and 1995 and found that pay anomalies in one period influenced the 
o owing perio is pay. 
This process model was used to inform the research design, and was discussed 
with two of the research participants. The discussion in chapter 6 explains why 
the model proved to be incomplete, and how it needed changing to reflect 
companies' processes. 
3.3 Legitimacy-comparison theory 
As shown in chapter 2, none of the extant theories adequately explains both the 
level and structure of directors' remuneration, and none of them addresses the 
issues from the point of view of both parties to the negotiation, the executives and 
the remuneration committee. A model of greater explanatory power is needed. 
Having undertaken the literature review, and noted the suggestions of authors who 
recommended a multi-theoretic approach to governance research (for example: 
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Eisenhardt, 1989a; Barringer and Milkovich, 1998; Young, Stedharn and 
Beekun, 2000; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003) 1 attempted to derive such a 
model from four of the theories, which seemed to have some common elements. 
These theories are: social comparison theory, equity theory, anchoring and 
institutional theory / legitimacy. A summary of the key ideas behind each of these 
theories is presented in Figure 3-3. 
Figure 3-3 Theoretical approaches underlying legitimacy-comparison theory 
Social comparison theory - remuneration committees evaluate executive pay based on a 
comparison with their own remuneration and other executive jobs elsewhere. 
Equity theory - directors judge the fairness of their own remuneration packages based on 
what other directors in similar positions earn. 
Anchoring and adjustment heuristic (anchoring) - both the remuneration committee 
members and the executives will anchor their view of an appropriate level of 
remuneration based on what they know from other sources. 
Institutional theory / legitimacy - homogeneity of practices is explained because 
companies adopt approaches that legitimise their activities. They follow 
regulatory directives on directors' remuneration (coercive isomorphism); they 
look to other companies for best practice (mimetic isomorphism); practices are 
passed between companies through professional networks (normative 
isomorphism). 
The framework so developed was entitled 'legitimacy-comparison theory' (L-C), 
because, as will now be discussed, it seemed that the two main influences on 
directors' pay were (a) whether the remuneration would be seen as legitimate to 
the stakeholders, and (b) comparisons made by the remuneration committee and 
by the executives with remuneration being paid in comparable companies. 
L-C theory is illustrated in Figure 3-4 below. In this Figure the underlying 
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theories are represented by the interlocking circles 20. The framework suggests 
that the level of remuneration can be explained by using a combination of ideas 
from social comparison theory, equity theory and anchoring. It further suggests 
that the structure of directors' remuneration can be explained using ideas from 
institutional theory, with social comparison theory and equity theory also playing 
a role. The dotted circle in Figure 3-4 represents the theoretical territory covered 
by the theory. 












'0 41 Ilk 
Equity 
theory 
The following sections explain how the theoretical framework was developed 
from the literature, and illustrate the connections between the theories used. 
3.3.1 Level of remuneration 
As noted above, the level of remuneration can be explained by combining aspects 
of social comparison theory, equity theory and anchoring. O'Reilly et al. (1988), 
20 Although the circles in Figure 34 are all the same size, there is no underlying reason for this. 
Had the model been taken further in the research, they could have been re-drawn to signal greater 
or lesser input from individual theories. 
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Main et al. (1993) and Ezzarnel and Watson (2002) all noted the connection 
between social comparison theory and anchoring. Main et al. also made the 
connection between social comparison theory and wage compression, a form of 
equity theory. They suggested that top team members need to work well together, 
and that there is a greater likelihood of this occurring if the team members are 
satisfied with their pay. Based on social comparison theory and equity theory, 
they considered this more likely to happen if there is less rather than more wage 
dispersion. 
Miller (1995), observing that remuneration paid is the result of a decision-making 
process, saw equity theory as providing a link between the compensation literature 
and the decision-making literature. He noted that directors compare their level of 
work (inputs) to their remuneration (outcomes) and make comparisons with the 
relative input/outcome levels of other directors whom they perceive as being in 
similar positions. 
Thus social comparison theory, equity theory and anchoring all contribute to the 
remuneration literature. Each embodies the suggestion that an external referent is 
used to determine the level of executive remuneration, although none clearly 
specifies how that referent is determined, and each contains the possibility of 
several different equally appropriate comparators. 
3.3.2 Structure of remuneration 
In addition to determining the level of directors' remuneration, the structure of 
that remuneration - its gearing, performance measures and targets, and payment 
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methods - must also be determined. Institutional theory (Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Oliver, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1994) provides useful insights into the structure 
of remuneration, suggesting one explanation for the homogeneity of companies' 
remuneration schemes, performance measures and targets noted earlier. Such 
homogeneity could arise through coercive isomorphism (for example, the 
perceived need for companies to comply with all of the regulatory 
pronouncements) or through mimetic processes. 
Finkelstein & Hambrick (1996), in an extensive review of executive 
compensation, saw a link between social comparison theory and institutional 
isomorphism in the work of compensation consultants who disseminate practices 
and publish comparative figures. They also, noted that remuneration within 
industries tends to follow the same pattern, again reflecting social comparison and 
isomorphic pressures. However, they cautioned: "... the idea that executive 
compensation differs by industry because of isomorphic pressures for conformity 
has yet to be fully tested" (1996: 276). They further stated: 
Because the notion of comparability leads naturally to an emphasis on 
social process and the setting ofpay in accordance with 'social norms', we 
should consider ways in which executive compensation is influenced by 
institutionally driven isomorphic pressures and social comparison 
processes. (1996: 275) 
The above quotation makes the link between institutional theory and social 
comparison theory. Figure 3-4 also suggests a link between equity theory and 
institutional theory in determining the structure of the remuneration. No such link 
has been found in the literature. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
individuals being remunerated will compare the structure of their pay with that 
decreed acceptable in other companies, especially those within the same industry. 
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Thus an association between the two ideas is proposed. 
Institutional theorists argue that one reason for companies adopting socially 
acceptable practices is to gain legitimacy, and this too has relevance in the setting 
of directors' remuneration. If companies follow the expectations of society in the 
structure of their remuneration, they are likely to gain legitimacy and thus, as 
noted earlier, easier access to resources. Legitimacy may also arise through the 
use of compensation consultants to advise on appropriate remuneration structures. 
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, for example, referred to: "... judgements of the 
committee members, legitimized by the opinions of external consultants" (1998: 
141). Further, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) observed that compensation 
survey data are often used to justify and legitimise executive remuneration rather 
than rationally to determine it. If a company is seen by society as operating 
outside the accepted norms in paying its directors, its reputation may suffer and 
this could affect its ability to attract resources. 
3.3.3 Legitimacy-comparison theory 
From the above observations the proposed L-C theory was developed to provide a 
possible explanation for level and apparent homogeneity in the structure of listed 
companies' remuneration packages. It suggests that the level of remuneration is 
derived from the committee members' and directors' expectations of what is 
'reasonable' given their knowledge of pay in other, similar jobs and by reference 
to pay surveys. Social comparison theory, equity theory and the anchoring 
heuristic can be seen to be linked to produce an acceptable level of pay. The 
theoretical framework also provides an explanation of the structure of pay, based 
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on institutional theory and legitimacy. The structure of pay is set with reference 
to what has 'worked' in other companies and what will be accepted by the 
domains within which the company operates. As the design of a remuneration 
scheme is complex, with no obvious 'correct' answer, it is seen as important to 
follow best practice, as this will be acceptable to outsiders, and legitimise the 
company's actions. 
This may be illustrated by the homogeneity of remuneration schemes and 
perfonnance targets discussed by New Bridge Street (2003a, 2003b). Prior to the 
Greenbury and Myners reports in 1995 it was established practice for companies 
to have share option schemes. Greenbury and Myners suggested that Itips were 
preferable to share option schemes, and companies began so to make that change 
(coercive isomorphism). Then, when companies and their consultant advisors 
realised that Itips also had disadvantages, some companies began to resuffect their 
share option schemes. Others followed (mimetic isomorphism). 
L-C theory was used to guide the initial research approach for this work. 
However, early in the interview process it was found to be insufficient to explain 
what was happening in companies. 
3.4 Summary of chapter 
In this chapter I have introduced two models which guided my thinking in 
developing a research plan. In the event, neither proved totally appropriate as an 
explanation of executive pay. In chapter 61 explain how the process model can be 
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adapted as a representation of what happens, and discuss how L-C theory proved 
to be insufficiently sophisticated to capture what was happening. 
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4. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES, AND WORK DONE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out my philosophical stance in approaching this work, explaining 
how the research question and its design fit my philosophical approach. 
It then goes on to describe in detail how the research was carried out, using a 
design of multiple case studies with the unit of analysis being the company. In 
this section I explain how I started with legitimacy-comparison theory held lightly 
in mind. This was not bome out by the empirical findings, and the work then 
progressed inductively, using some of the techniques of grounded theory. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the rigour of the research (within its own 
ontological paradigm), considering the validity and reliability of the results. 
4.2 Philosophical approach 
As explained in the preamble in chapter 1,1 became interested in this research 
problem when trying to understand how companies determine the pay of their 
executives. I found no satisfaction in the many research papers on the subject, and 
was initially at a loss to understand why this should be. It was only when I 
became familiar with the different philosophical approaches to research that I 
understood the problem: most of the body of existing research approached the 
subject from a positivist point of view, and this was not my stance. They were 
asking more of a 'what' question; I wanted to look primarily at 'how and why', 
and the rules differed. 
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4.21 Different rules 
In defining a philosophical stance, one looks to both ontology and epistemology. 
Blaikie (1993: 6) defines ontology as: "the claims or assumptions that a 
particular approach to social enquiry makes about the nature of social reality". It 
is necessary to have considered what 'reality' looks like before starting to research 
it. Having determined an ontology, an epistemological stance needs to be 
established. Again we can turn to Blaikie for a definition: "the claims or 
assumptions made about the way in which it is possible to gain knowledge of this 
reality": given what we see as reality, how can the researcher gain evidence of it? 
This needs to be done to establish a coherent approach to the research, selecting 
an ontology, epistemology and methodology that are aligned (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979: 3). 
Although research in the natural sciences (as understood by many social 
scientists) works on the basis that 'The Truth Is Out There'21 , that paradigm is not 
universally followed in the social sciences. For example, Easterby-Smith et al. 
(1991: 22) refer to two extremes in research philosophy: the 'blue comer' of 
positivism, adopting the approach of natural science, and the 'red comer' of 
phenomenology, which sees reality as socially constructed rather than objectively 
detennined. Between these lies an array of different philosophical stances, with 
differing views of reality and how it can be known. These have been described 
(using different labels) by, inter alia, Burrell and Morgan (1979), Morgan and 
Smircich (1980), Ryan, Scapens and Tbeobald (1992), and Tsoukas (1994). Some 
of these authors set out their arguments as on one side or the other; others present 
21A slogan from the 20'h Century Fox television series, The X-Files. 
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a continuum of views. This continuum is discussed by Morgan and Smircich 
(1980: 492), who say: 
[T]he transitionftom one perspective to another must be seen as a gradual 
one, and it is often the case that advocates of any given position may 
attempt to incorporate insightsfrom others. 
4.2.2 My research philosophy in approaching this work 
All FTSE companies are apparently doing much the same thing with their 
executive pay; the aim of this research was to find out the extent to which they 
were doing it in the same way, and for the same reasons. 
Years of working in corporate audit and investigation have led me to believe that 
although companies often do the same things, they do them for different reasons. 
Whilst there are certain objective facts (for example, the amount that directors are 
actually paid) examining these will not shed light on the processes behind the pay- 
setting decisions. At the extreme, each company provides its own context; within 
each company, each of the actors has his or her own background, understanding 
and prejudices; accordingly, each decision is different. Thus, a company can only 
be understood in its own context, from which it follows that there is no reality 
independent of such context. To quote Pettigrew (1992a: 9): "processes are 
embedded in contexts and can only be studied as sucW'. At the same time, not 
everything is context: the facts of 'what happens' matter too. 
It is helpful here to consider these issues in the light of the arguments of Mouck 
(2004). Referring to the work of John Searle, he makes a distinction between 
epistemological objectivity and subjectivity, and ontological objectivity and 
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subjectivity. The following table, based on Mouck's work, highlights the 
differences in the concepts. 
Table 4-1 Distinctions of reality 
Objective Subjective 
The truth or falsity of the The truth or falsity of the 
Epistemological statement is not dependent statement depends on an 
on attitudes or feelings. individual's attitudes or 
feelings. 
Example: the director was Example: IthinkB00,000 
paid a salary of B00,000. is too high a paymentfor 
thejob. 
Ontologically objective The existence of 
Ontological entities exist independently ontologically subjective 
of the perceiver or any entities depends on the 
mental state. mental state of the 
perceiver. 
Example (Mouckpage 
529): atoms, electrons. Examples: remuneration 
(No remuneration-related committees, the Combined 
examples could befound. ) Code, tax laws, all of which 
exist as a social 
construction. 
0 
Thus, although some of the outcomes of remuneration-setting will be 
epistemologically objective, I am largely working in realms which are socially 
constructed and subjective, the "ontologically objective" being a realm not 
affected by human intentionality. 
Accordingly, for this research I take the view that reality is constructed and 
interpreted rather than objectively determined. This position is set out by 
Easterby-Smith, et al.: "Human action arises from the sense people make of 
different situations, rather than as a direct response from external stimuli" (1991: 
24). Given that, I expect each of the protagonists in each of my companies to 
have a different perspective on the pay-setting process, just as I will have a 
perspective on their perspectives. To quote Easterby-Smith et al. again, my aim is 
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to "appreciate the different constructions and meanings that people place upon 
their experience" (1991: 24). 
Thus, although statistical analysis has great use as a research tool in some 
contexts, it would be the wrong tool for this examination of process. I see 
knowledge in this area as coming from in-depth discussions with the actors 
involved, each with their different perspective, to try to construct a coherent and 
consistent view, but contextually aware. Further, as regards the knowledge 
collected, this can only be gained in respect of the units examined, and not for a 
generalisable whole: people and contexts differ. At the same time, certain 
regularities cannot be ruled out, and may indeed emerge. 
If I had to put a label on my philosophical approach, I would follow Crotty (1998: 
42) and describe my stance as constructionism. He describes this epistemology as 
follows: 
What is constructionism? It is the view that all knowledge, and therefore all 
meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being 
constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their 
world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context. 
Crotty (p8-9) argues that this philosophical stance means: "there is no objective 
truth waiting for us to discover if', and "[m]eaning is not discovered, but 
constructed". However, he makes the point that constructionism differs 
significantly from 'pure' phenomenology. Individuals place a social construction 
on events in order to create their own version of reality, but they do not do so in a 
vacuum: they build on the basic facts and situations that they find. As he says 
(p42-3): "The world is always already there". The basic facts exist "pregnant 
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with potential meaning", but it is to the individuals to make that meaning, and for 
the researcher to interpret it. The researcher, of course, is inevitably constructed 
as him- or herself, but is a sense-maker who can construct interpretations from 
that ground. 
4.3 Methodological approach and research design 
4.3.1 Overall approach 
Given the above discussion of my philosophical approach, it seemed appropriate 
for me to adopt a qualitative methodology. In looking at process, I saw little that 
could be done with 'hard' data, since I needed to find out about the individuals 
involved, and how they saw their roles. 
Initially I considered using a questionnaire to elicit these responses. However, I 
very soon dismissed this idea as impractical, and turned to interview-based case 
studies as the most suitable research method for this study. There are many 
reasons why this method was an appropriate form to address this research 
question. The question dealt with the nuances of what happened in companies, in 
an area that had seldom been researched before. It would be difficult to establish 
how companies operated primarily by using archival or survey data, although such 
data can help clarify sectoral context. Furthermore, the subject matter was very 
politically sensitive, and it was unlikely that the participants would have 
responded as freely - if at all - to another form of research such as questionnaires 
or group interviews (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991: 74). And, given my research 
paradigm, I was encouraged by Yin: 
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The case study is the method ofchoice when the phenomenon under study is 
not readily distinguishedfrom its context. (1993: 3) 
Although most previous research in this area has taken the form of data analysis, a 
powerful argument has been made for getting closer to the subject by using, 
amongst other research methods, interviews. The quotations (e. g. Kerr and Bettis, 
1987; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989) set out in chapter I illustrate the need for 
research into process. More recently, Werner and Ward (2004: 220), in their 
extensive review of the compensation literature, comment that the overwhelming 
use of secondary data in studies of executive pay has resulted in a "paucity of 
research focusing on behavioral and attitudinal aspects of CEO pay". 
Pettigrew (1992b: 178) argued that there is a need for research to "redress the 
overwhelming prescriptive bias in the literature" in order to find out more about 
how boards actually work. This argument was taken up by Stiles (2001), who 
commented: 
There is, therefore, a very small body ofprimary research on boards of 
directorsftom which to draw any methodological insights. We argue that 
to understand the nature of boards in operation, we must have the reports of 
directors themselves. This article is therefore grounded in the 12erceptions 
ofmain board directors through the use ofsemi structured interviews. 
(2001: 631) [emphasis in original] 
Although the arguments for interview-based research with directors are powerful, 
one reason for the dearth of studies in this area might be the difficulties of 
accessing this elite group (Winkler, 1987; Pettigrew, 1992b). Directors of listed 
companies are busy and powerful people, who have no need to give their time to 
research studies. Accordingly, the study commenced in the knowledge that this 
might prove a constraint. (The sample frame was changed during the study as a 
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result of this, as described later. ) And even if access is obtained, actually 
conducting interviews with elite subjects is in some ways more difficult than 
conducting other types of interview. Hill (1995) and Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) 
both discuss the difficulties of interviewing when the interviewee has considerably 
more status than the interviewer: the discussion may tend to follow the pattern 
determined by the interviewee rather than the interviewer. 
Despite these constraints, an interview-based case method seemed a logical 
approach to adopt. I then had to understand its strengths and limitations, and to 
adapt it to my research context. The next sub-section discusses interviews as a 
research method. 
4.3.2 Theface-to-face interview as a research method 
Interviews are not neutral tools ofdata gathering but active interaction 
between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, contextually based 
results. 
Fontana andFrey(2000: 646) 
The interview is a powerful tool with which to obtain information about process, 
but it is not a neutral research method. I knew from my experience in due 
diligence investigations that the interaction between interviewer and interviewee 
is crucial: if a good bond is fbimed, the conversation can be broad and 
illuminating; if there is some personal distance, then the discussion will be less 
wide-ranging. 
Fontana and Frey (2000: 647) discussed this, pointing out that the context of an 
interview can shape its outcomes: 
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Each interview context is one of interaction and relation; the result is as 
much aproduct ofthis social dynamic as it is aproduct ofaccurate 
accounts and replies. 
And 
The nature ofthe social dynamic of the interview can shape the nature of 
the knowledge generated. 
Silverman (2001) also elaborated on the personal nature of interviews. He 
explained that the questions and answers are not "passive filters" but themselves 
shape the understanding. He stated that the: 
... interviewer and interviewee actively construct some version of the world 
appropriate to what we take to be self-evident about the person to whom we 
are speaking and the context of the question (2001: 86) [emphasis in 
originaU 
Thus the shape of the interview reflects the both the interviewee's view of the 
subject, and their beliefs regarding the interviewer's understanding. Furthermore, 
the latter's understanding colours the interpretation of the interview material. 
Additionally, the interview is set in the context of the characteristics of the two 
parties. In my case, I know from past experience that gender can be an issue: I 
have experienced occasions in my professional life when I have obtained more - 
or less - from an interviewee than has one of my male colleagues, because a 
powerful interviewee was unaccustomed to being interviewed by a woman of 
status. This situation in a research context is discussed by Fontana and Frey 
(2000: 865). 
Given all of the above points, Figure 4-1 represents how I see the interview 
process. 
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Figure 4-1 The interview process 
Behavioural phenomenon 
What the actors perceived happened 
Data obtained from 
What the actors remember happened 
documents and other 
sources What the actors tell the researcher about it 
What the researcher hears 
What the researcher writes 
Source: author 
In line with the philosophical approach stated earlier, there are some facts 
underlying the process - 'what actually happened' is that a decision was made to 
implement a certain scheme or pay a given amount of money. However, each of 
the interviewees will have perceived this differently at the time, will remember 
different aspects of the process, and will select different things to discuss during 
the interviews. As Weick (1995: 11) suggests, they will start with the outcome - 
the remuneration choices that were made - and will render that outcome sensible 
to themselves, selectively editing the events to produce a plausible story of how 
they arrived at those choiceS22. It is my job as researcher to distil the 
commonalities and differences in their accounts and to understand their totality as 
best as possible across these filters. I also have to manage this process and present 
the results in such as way as to minimise the prejudices of my own social pre- 
conditioning. 
22 Furthermore, drawing again on Weick (1995: 30), it is possible that because all of the 
companies had 'good' schemes (not criticised by institutions or executives) there is a possibility 
that they will have retrospectively identified that with the idea that they must therefore have had 
Ggood' processes, and this will have influenced their accounts. 
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4.4 The research process 
4.4.1 Overview 
In the rest of this chapter I discuss the research process, from the initial 
investigations through to theory development. In order to put this into context, 
Table 4-2 sets out a chronological overview of the process, and Table 4-3 displays 
the numbers and descriptions of the interviewees. Both are expanded upon in later 
text. 
Table 4-2 Overview of the research process 
1997-2004 Literature review 
1998-2000 Informal interviews with consultants, institutions, an HR director 
Sept-Dec 2001 Preparation of interview guide and sample frame 
Dec 2001 Commenced pilot studies 
April 2001 Commenced finding companies for main study 
July 2002 Sample strategy amended due to Remuneration Group introduction 
March 2002 Commenced formal data analysis 
April 2003 Company interviews completed 
Oct-Dec 2003 1 Writing up and theory generation 
Feb 2004 
-I 
Respondent validation with focus group 
Table 4-3 Number and categories of interviewees 
Interview category Number 
Data gathering 
Companies and their consultants 35 
Additional views (outside the unit of analysis) 
Remuneration Group 
Institutional professional bodies 
Headhunters 2 
Confirming i itial theories 
Focus group of remuneration professionals 
Total (*inc two 40 
The interviews took place between December 2001 and August 2003. This was 
an eventful time in corporate governance, and there were several developments in 
the remuneration arena. Appendix 3 sets out how the timing of the interviews 
related to the extemal enviromnent. 
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4.4.2 Preliminary investigations 
The empirical work underlying this thesis commenced informally some time 
before I registered for the PhD, interviewing various individuals connected with 
the remuneration-setting process. In 1998 1 obtained an introduction to a leading 
institutional shareholder with an interest in corporate governance and conducted 
two unstructured interviews, one with a director and one with a senior manager. 
Having commenced the literature review at that stage, the purpose of these 
interviews was to establish how the institutional shareholders viewed the debate 
on directors' remuneration, who they saw as the key players, and what their role 
was in appraising companies' remuneration schemes. 
The next set of interviews was with individuals from a large firm of remuneration 
consultants. Initial discussions with one of their partners were supplemented by 
an unstructured interview with a senior remuneration consultant. The purpose of 
that interview was to establish, for the benefit of the future research project, how 
the consultants obtain their work and what it is that they do. The unstructured 
questions were supplemented by showing the consultant a list of factors (an early 
version of the list displayed in Figure 2-2) to deteimine if these were relevant to 
their deliberations. A later interview with another remuneration consultant built 
on this list of factors by using a repertory grid approach in comparing the schemes 
and characteristics of the consultant's clients. This confirmed the intended 
approach to the main research project. 
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Having interviewed institutions and consultants, a further unstructured interview 
was conducted in 2000 with an experienced HR director, who had held that 
position in FTSE 350 companies. The aim of this interview was to obtain his 
view on the remuneration process generally, the intended research approach, and 
some of the theories which had been put forward in the academic literature. This 
individual is a personal friend, and the interview was particularly wide-ranging. 
During 2000 and 2001 1 continued my informal investigations into how people 
saw the research subject and their views on my intended research approach. This 
work included discussions with non-executive directors attending a course on 
corporate governance; discussions with fellow participants at a seminar on senior 
remuneration; and discussions and a semi-structured interview with a colleague 
who sits as chairman of the remuneration committee on an AIM-listed company. 
There were several advantages to undertaking this preliminary work. Firstly, it 
grounded me in the complexities of the phenomenon under investigation. It also 
confirmed that the proposed research would be relevant to both practitioners and 
academics. Furthermore, the interviews gave me experience which proved 
invaluable when designing the interview guide and undertaking the research 
fieldwork. 
4.4.3 The choice of interviewees 
As stated earlier, the unit of analysis for this study was the company. From the 
understanding of the process generated by the initial investigations and the review 
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of the literature, I determined that there were five key parties involved in a 
company's remuneration-setting process: 
i. the chairman of the remuneration committee 23 ; 
ii. the other non-executives on the remuneration committee; 
iii. the HR director; 
iv. the CEO; and 
V. the remuneration consultant employed by the company. 
The research design was to interview five individuals from each company, 
representing each of these categories. In this it was intended that a rounded 
picture would be obtained of the process in each company. I was very aware that 
in interview-based research on such a potentially sensitive subject there was likely 
to be distortion in the discussion, as individuals remembered different aspects of 
what had happened, and chose to tell their stories in different ways. As Piore 
(1979: 566) stated: 
You can never believe the answer to a direct question about behavior, or, 
more crudely, "businessmen always lie". This interpretation, however, 
suggests that this law misses thepoint: what interviews can reveal is not a 
set ofspecific answers to specific questions, individual hits andpieces of 
information. What they reveal are Izatterns ofresponses. Each answer, 
whether true orfalse, is apiece ofthatpattern. Individual responses 
cannot be interpreted in isolation. But the responses grouped together, and 
taken as a whole, are clues to the mentalprocesses of the economic 
participants. [emphasis in original] 
23 Of all of the interviewees, only five were female. Accordingly, in order to preserve 
confidentiality of company and individual, the masculine form is used to describe all of the 
participants and their roles. 
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Although each participant would have constructed his own interpretation of what 
happened, by designing the research to have several different interviewees from 
each company a pattern could be established. 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, a review of relevant documentation 
was also seen as part of the fieldwork process. Companies generate a 
considerable amount of documentation surrounding the remuneration process, for 
example: the published remuneration report; scheme details; minutes of the 
remuneration committee meetings; and consultants' reports. Reviewing this 
documentation, together with other public domain information such as media 
reports on companies' remuneration, was a method of extending the interview 
data. 
4.4.4 Selecting the case study companies 
From the above discussion it is clear that this research is not generalisable in terms 
of corporate behaviour; there is no suggestion that the findings can be 
extrapolated into a wider population. However, as Yin (1994: 31) points out, 
case study research can be generalisable into theory. Analytic generalisation 
involves comparing the empirical results of one case study with theory developed 
from other cases. There is a replication logic if the cases support the same theory. 
In an ideal world, the multiple case studies would be selected serially, each one 
being chosen to serve a specific purpose, aiming either to predict similar results or 
to produce contrasting results for predictable reasons (Yin, 1994: 46). Strauss 
and Corbin (1998: 201) refer to this as theoretical sampling, and discuss how the 
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sample evolves during the research process. The results of one case study would 
guide the choice of the next. However, such an approach was not practical for this 
study. The time limits on the research funding and on the Phl), together with the 
uncertainty of being able to gain access to the elite groups, meant that all of the 
cases were selected in a relatively short period, although the interviews took 16 
months. 
The research focused on FTSE 350 companies. There were two reasons for 
limiting the study to these large companies. Firstly, such companies are more 
likely to comply with good governance principles (Hampel, 1998: 1.10) and there 
seemed little point in researching companies which had poor governance 
practices. Secondly, the bulk of the literature on directors' remuneration relates to 
larger companies (Carr, 1997), and it was felt appropriate to restrict the study to 
companies similar in size to those studied by previous researchers. 
The original research design was to select eight case study companies (including a 
pilot study), four each from utilities and the finance sector. 
The reason for choosing utilities was twofold. Firstly, in considering directors' 
remuneration in the UK, utilities have an interesting place in history. It was 
primarily the generous packages awarded to the directors of the newly-privatised 
utilities that led to adverse public and govermnent attention that ultimately 
resulted in the setting up of the Greenbury study group, which produced its 
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24 influential report on directors' remuneration in 1995 . Utilities were the 
perceived home of the original 'fat cats', although much has changed in the sector 
since that time. 
A second reason for choosing utilities as a context for the case studies is that 
profits in that sector are heavily influenced by a regulator, who makes a regulatory 
review at five-yearly intervals and effectively wipes out the companies' economic 
profit potential in their regulated businesses, re-setting prices at a level which is 
intended to be sufficient only to cover the cost of capital (OfWat, 2002). As at 
least part of remuneration is linked to profit in the majority of companies (New 
Bridge Street, 2003a) the way in which utilities structure their remuneration to 
adapt to this constraint is also of interest. 
Finance sector companies were selected as being at the other end of a scale to 
utilities. They pay much higher levels of pay than do utilities, but historically 
there has been less outcry at their pay levelS25 . Furthermore, although the industry 
is regulated, profits are not, so they do not face the same constraints as utilities. 
Having determined that the case study companies would come from these sectors, 
the next stage was to identify potential companies. This was done using the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Register CDROM dated June 2001. For the 
utilities sample, searches were run on companies in the Gas distribution, 
Electricity, Water and Fixed line and wireless telecoms sectors in order to find 
24 There is even a section in the Greenbury report - section 8- relating specifically to privatised 
utilities. 
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regulated utilities in the FTSE 350. For the finance companies, selection was 
more difficult, as there is no obvious 'finance' sector on the CDROM. 
Accordingly, 12 separate sectors with some relation to finance were searched. 
The searches produced a potential sample frame of 15 utilities and 37 finance 
companies. Any of these would have met the criteria required for the research, 
being in the relevant sectors with no obvious defects in their corporate governance 
(i. e. all of the companies had the requisite number of non-executives and 
governance committees). In deciding which companies to approach, an analysis 
was done to identify companies where the directors (executive or non-executive) 
sat on the remuneration committees of more than one company, the thought being 
that interviewing such individuals would produce richer results (Stake, 2000: 
446). The result of this analysis was that the 'ideal' target companies were 
reduced to a total of 29: 13 utilities and 16 finance. Financial statements were 
requested from all of the companies, and the remuneration reports reviewed 26 . 
4.4.5 The interview guide 
Before the interviews could commence an interview guide was developed, based 
on research aims, in the light of the conceptual framework of legitimacy- 
comparison (L-C) theory developed from the literature. A copy of this interview 
guide is included as Appendix 4. In order to establish which inputs were 
23 In the last couple of years, institutional comment has become more pointed for all types of 
company. However, in the context of this research design the remuneration of finance companies 
was not a significant issue at the time. 
26 At this point an analysis was done on the remuneration reports of all of the companies in the 
sample frame. This confirmed that the finance companies on average paid considerably higher 
remuneration than the utilities, with proportionately more of that being performance-related. That 
analysis is not reproduced in this thesis as it has no bearing on the research question. 
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considered important to the decision, a brief questionnaire was designed, to be left 
with the interviewees and returned by post. This is set out in Appendix 5. 
It should be noted that the interview guide was used as a prompt to the 
conversation rather than followed in detail in each interview. Furthermore, the 
original plan of sending it to participants in advance was thwarted because several 
of the HR professionals, my contacts at the companies, did not pass the document 
on to the directors I was interviewing. There appeared to be no difference in the 
quality of the interview between those who did have the document in advance and 
those who did not: in all cases the interviews were wide-ranging, covering far 
more ground than the bare bones of the interview guide. 
As Bryman states (1989: 25), qualitative research aims to "capture people's 
perspectives and interpretations". The qualitative researcher "seeks to elicit what 
is important to individuals as well as their interpretations of the environments in 
which they work". With this in mind, my interview technique was to start the 
conversation using a topic of relevance to the interviewee (often by asking about a 
change that had been made in the remuneration schemes, to give them a critical 
incident on which to focus) and then to follow their conversational direction. In 
all of the interviews the main points were covered, but this interview technique 
meant that much more was covered as well, and the areas of significance to the 
interviewee were highlighted. In this respect, the interviews were towards the 
unstructured end of a continuum, as described by Bryman (1989: 147). 
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4.4.6 Thepilotstudies 
Having determined the sample frame, it was time to find a company willing to 
participate as the pilot study. It was anticipated that this would prove difficult, as 
writers on elite research always note the problems with gaining access (Winkler, 
1987; Pettigrew 1992b). Accordingly, I decided to approach two utilities in the 
first instance, anticipating rejection from both of them but intending to learn from 
that experience. As it happened, telephone calls to both companies produced 
positive responses within a week of the initial contaCt27 . Rather than put off a 
company which had agreed to participate, I decided to run two pilot studies at the 
same time. 
Interviews at the pilot study companies commenced in December 2001 and were 
mostly complete by early March 2002, although one director could not be seen 
until the April. The work provided me with a steep learning curve into the 
intricacies of remuneration schemes, which was very usefU128. 
One outcome of the pilot studies was that legitimacy-comparison theory was 
found to be lacking. Of its four underlying theories (social comparison, 
anchoring, equity and institutional theory) minimal evidence was found to support 
social comparison theory, and evidence was found that conflicted with this 
approach. Furthermore, having entered data collection, other theories - for 
example, agency theory - appeared more relevant. Accordingly, this lightly-held 
theory was dropped, and a more inductive approach was adopted. 
27 Once companies agreed to consider participation, I followed up the call with a written 
explanation of the research. This was done for the main study as well. 
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Despite the change in approach, the original interview guide remained appropriate 
as a basis to continue the research. This research approach, using the guide as a 
prompt to draw reflections from the interviewee, had worked well, and the 
interviews at the two pilot companies had unearthed a wealth of information about 
how companies determined their pay. 
1 
4.4.7 The main study 
Although it had been easy to access the two pilot studies, it was much more 
problematic to obtain another six companies for the research. For the pilots, I had 
initially attempted to telephone the chairmen of the remuneration committees, but 
had immediately been passed to the HR professionals as a more appropriate 
gateway. Accordingly, for the main study I was cold-calling the HR directors or 
compensation managers of the target companies. 
Cold-calling commenced in April 2002, but with little success. During that month 
12 companies were contacted, but of these only one agreed even to consider full 
participation29. In one company the HR director stated that his company would 
not participate, but agreed in a spirit of generosity that he personally would be 
interviewed (this became company 3 in the fieldwork). Furthermore, since the 
sample frame had been selected there had been mergers and acquisitions in the 
finance sector and particularly in utilities, reducing the number of companies 
available. By early July I had the provisional agreement of one other company, 
28 This work was published in Bender (2003). 
29 Varied reasons were given for non-participation. In some companies the HR professional 
professed to be interested but stated that he would not get the permission of his CEO/board; in 
some, time constraints were the reason. In one company the HR professional replied to the effect 
that his remuneration committee and executives would not discuss the subject openly between 
themselves; so there was no way they would do so with an outsider! 
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and had interviewed the HR director of company 3. Summer was approaching, 
when directors were likely to be on holiday. Consideration had to be given to 
whether access difficulties would prevent completion within the timeframe 
allowed. 
In early July another HR director was interviewed. He had agreed to participate in 
the research, but had stated that he would not put the project forward for 
consideration by the other target participants. However, during that interview I 
persuaded him to let me interview others at the company. Also during that 
meeting he mentioned the Remuneration Group, a group of remuneration 
professionals at FTSE 100 companies who met regularly to discuss what was 
happening in their field. I realised that contact with such a group could solve my 
access problems. 
The HR director was not prepared to allow me direct access to members of the 
Remuneration Group, but was prepared to distribute a letter to them. The text of 
that letter is set out at Appendix 6. 
In writing to the Remuneration Group, I was conscious that this meant two 
changes to the research design. The original design had involved companies in 
the utilities and finance sectors; this would broaden the sample to include 
companies in other sectors. Furthermore, the original design was to interview five 
people at each company; it will be seen from Appendix 6 that the invitation to the 
Remuneration Group offered the chance for just the HR professional to be 
interviewed instead. 
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Much consideration was given to these changes to the research design. The first 
change was the simpler. Having interviewed people at three utilities and one 
finance company, and within that having discussed remuneration with two 
consultants who had wide experience, I realised that utilities were different, not 
just from finance companies but from all other companies. Utilities form a unique 
subset both due to their history as privatised companies and due to the regulator's 
influence on profits. Accordingly, they are of interest as case studies for a 
particular context. However, finance companies are no different from other 
companies as regards the influences on their remuneration-setting processes; once 
this was understood there was no need to limit the sample base. A second reason 
for broadening the sample base was that access to the Remuneration Group was a 
one-off chance, and it seemed appropriate to take advantage of the opportunity 
that had presented itself This oppommistic practice is accepted in the research 
literature when access is difficult (for example Silverman, 2001: 249; Bryman, 
1989: 162; Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2001: 163; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 
28) 
As for allowing the Remuncration Group to participatc sclcctivcly in the rescarch, 
with just the HR professionals taking part, the reason was different. Many of the 
companies that had rejected the research had done so because although the HR 
professional was interested, he or she had stated that there was no way they could 
persuade the CEO or non-executives to participate. In the event that the research 
question and design might have to be changed to reflect lack of access to higher 
echelons, it was felt that allowing selective participation gave more flexibility. 
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By continuing with the original contacts, and using the Remuneration Group, the 
final research sample for company interviews is set out in Table 4-4. 





chairman NED Consultant CEO 












Total 12 5 5 5 4 
Company Company 










Of the 12 companies, four were utilities and eight were from other industry 
sectors; nine were in the FTSE 100 index and three from the FTSE 250. 
Given that the original design was five individuals in each of eight companies, it 
is worthwhile drawing attention to several issues in relation to this sample. 
In company 5 the company chairman played a significant role in the 
I 
process, and so was an appropriate person to interview. I could not 
interview the committee chairman in this company: over a 12 month 
period several diary dates were made and then cancelled. The committee 
chairman has since (amicably) left that company. 
*I originally had agreement for a full range of interviews at company 6. 
However, for nearly three months after the original interviews they failed 
to return my calls and emails, so the company was dropped. 
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9 For company 7 there were seven interviewees. The directors of this 
company were very interested in corporate governance, and asked that I 
interview more people there. 
e For company 81 originally had agreement to interview the full range of 
protagonists. However, after I started the research the company entered 
into a significant M&A transaction, and the directors had no time for the 
research. 
9 Companies 3,9,10,11 and 12 only ever agreed to one interviewee 
participating. 
9 The interviewees at companies II and 12 were approached after 
expressing interest in my research, following a paper I presented at a 
conference setting out the results of my pilot studies (Bender, 2003). 
* In some instances the interview was conducted with more than one 
interviewee at the same time. Where the individuals had very similar 
backgrounds and views, this was treated as being one interview; where 
they differed they were counted as individual interviewees. For example, 
in Company 10 the interview was actually with three people, but the two 
more junior deferred to the senior; the two interviewees in Company 6 
were part of the same interview. 
Given my philosophical approach, that the individuals' experiences are socially 
constructed, and that the interview process itself forms a unique context, how can 
I be certain that the research results are valid in those companies for which I had 
only one or two participants? The answer, of course, is that I cannot. However, in 
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the companies where I had several participants, their accounts differed in matters 
of nuance (and in some cases, in detail), but not in their fundamental thrust. 
Likewise, the narratives of all of the interviewees were similar in their accounts of 
how remuneration was set. From this I can infer that further interviews in these 
companies were likely to provide similar accounts, although a larger number, with 
more narrative strands, would have been preferable. 
I also had to consider whether the number of companies participating in the 
research was sufficient. For qualitative research where there is no intention to 
generalise into a population, 'sufficient' is not a clear concept. Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 30) ask the question: "How many cases should a multiple-case 
study have? ". They argue that there is no statistical justification for an answer to 
this question, and suggest that there need to be enough to give confidence in the 
results, but not so many as to be unwieldy. Pettigrew (1992a: 11) suggests 
between six and 10 studies is sufficient; Eisenhardt (1989b: 545) states that a 
number between four and 10 usually works well. 
As regards this research, I noted in my research diary in October 2003: 
"Yesterday I interviewed at [Companies 4 and 9]. 1 couldn't help feeling 'heard 
most of this before". With the same issues arising at each company, and much the 
same types of explanation being given, I became confident that I had reached 
saturation, and that although interviewing at more companies would continue to 
be fascinating, it would not greatly advance my understanding 30 . 
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4.4.8 Review of documentation 
The original research design included a document review. The published 
remuneration reports for all the companies were reviewed, for the current and 
previous year, as was any press comment on their remuneration arrangements in 
the past year. Biographical details of the interviewees were checked before each 
meeting. However, access to internal documentation proved very difficult. 
Surprisingly, although companies were prepared to make individuals available for 
interview, they were reluctant to let me review documentation, even on their 
premises. Those individuals who explained their reasons for this suggested that it 
was because minutes contained sensitive information3l: I have no way of 
knowing if this was the only reason, or if there was any difference between the 
companies that agreed to a review and those that did not. 
Ultimately, internal documentation was reviewed as follows: 
30 In using the term 'saturation' I refer to the raw data, not to the analysis thereof as discussed by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 136). 
3' For example, about individuals, often below board level. 
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Table 4-5 Documentation reviewed 
Company I Scheme legal documentation was made available to take away. 
One set of remuneration committee minutes and supporting 
documentation (including a consultants' report) was inspected at 
the company's premises, with the compensation and benefits 
manager present to explain the background to the discussions. A 
copy of the appendix to a consultants' report was made available 
to take away. 
Company 2 Scheme legal documentation was made available to take away, as 
was the CEO's service agreement and two consultants' reports 
(same consultants, at different dates). One set of minutes was 
emailed to me as an example of how they looked. 
Company 5 Minutes for two years were reviewed at the company's premises, 
with supporting documentation where attached, as were two 
internal reports on remuneration and one consultants' report and 
the slides from one consultants' presentation. The company 
secretary was present whilst I reviewed the documentation, and 
checked my written notes at the end of the meeting, to see that I 
was taking away no information that was confidential to 
individuals. 
Company 7 Minutes for over a year were reviewed at the company's 
premises, together full supporting documentation, consultants' 
reports, details of institutional shareholders' and professional 
bodies' views, and legal scheme documentation. I was allowed 
access to these documents without supervision; the main 
constraint was that less than two hours was available to review all 
of the documentation, so I had to be selective. 
Company 8 One brief internal HR report to the remuneration committee was 
emailed to me as an example of the documentation. 
The scheme details for directors' remuneration policies are of course public 
documents, available on request to the company secretary. Had it been felt to be 
necessary, the formal documentation for all of the companies could have been 
obtained through this route. However, having examined carefully the scheme 
details for companies I and 2,1 concluded that in terms of answering the research 
question there was little to be obtained from these legal documents. This was 
confirmed in the later review of documentation for company 7. 
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Additional documentation reviewed included the remuneration reports in the 
annual accounts published after my fieldwork. Thus for most companies I 
reviewed two sets of reports leading up to the fieldwork, and one subsequent. The 
advantage of reviewing the subsequent reports was that these were published after 
the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) came into force. Thus 
they contained a great deal of information, which I could check against what I had 
been told. (In most cases the published reports confirmed what had been 
discussed in interviews . )32 
The latest remuneration reports were also scrutinised to extract details of schemes, 
and of levels of potential and paid bonus, as well as information about directors' 
shareholdings. 
4.4.9 Additional interviews 
The Remuneration Group 
Having obtained access to the Remuneration Group, they asked if I would present 
my preliminary findings at one of their meetings. This I did in March 2003. 
There were about 26 members of the Group at the meeting, including HR 
professionals, corporate communications directors and company secretaries. 
used the meeting to obtain feedback on my initial ideas about the remuneration- 
setting process and about pay-for-performance. It provided clarification of some 
of the issues raised during the company interviews. 
32 One area of difference was in the number of remuneration committee meetings: not only did 
many of the interviewees recollect different numbers of meetings in a year, but generally these 
recollections differed from the published figure. Although at first this concerned me, I quickly 
realised that I could not actually recall the number of meetings I had attended on my own 
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Institutional professional bodies 
Although the main focus of the research was the companies themselves, it was 
always the intention to conduct some interviews with others involved in the 
process. In particular, shareholding institutions were seen as very important to the 
process (Holland, 1996; 1998). Accordingly, once the bulk of the interviews had 
been concluded, an interview was arranged with an institutional professional 
body. This interview was conducted in the same way as those with companies, 
but with the emphasis of the questions being on the institutions' role and that of 
the professional bodies. 
Headhunters 
Following a presentation I made at a corporate governance conference, a partner 
in a major executive search firm contacted me about the research. This led to my 
interviewing two partners in that firm. The focus of this work was primarily on 
the headhunter role, and on how companies tailored packages to incoming 
executives. This added greatly to an understanding of the process. 
remuneration committee (for the local Council), and this detail did not affect the interpretation of 
the data. 
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4.4.10 Respondent validation using afocus group 
Following the data analysis, I contacted selected members of the Remuneration 
Group to ask if they would attend a feedback session at which I would present my 
research findings. The purpose of this group session was to validate the research 
data once the theories had been developed (Flick, 1998: 116). 
The focus group session was run in February 2004 with three members of the 
Remuneration Group, who had considerable experience as remuneration managers 
and advisors. One of the participants had been an interviewee in the original 
research. A discussion lasting about 90 minutes covered all aspects of the 
research, and the participants were asked to explain areas for which I needed 
explanation, and encouraged to contest research findings that jarred with their own 
experience. This proved a valuable supplement to the research. 
4.5 Analysing the data 
In addition to detailed notes taken during the interviews, all but three of the 
interviews were taped, using both a cassette recorder and a digital recorder to 
ensure that a full record of the meeting would be available 33 .I transcribed the 
majority of the interviews myself, to protect the confidentiality of the participants. 
Transcripts were sent to the interviewees for confirmation, and errors corrected 
where requested. 
" One of the interviewees was not prepared to be taped, and one of the interviews happened 
'spontaneously' whilst reviewing documentation. For one interview, both forms of recording 
failed. In all cases, full notes were taken of interviews. 
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Immediately after each interview a brief write-up was done, from the narrative 
notes, that set out the key points of the meeting and my impressions of how it had 
gone. This served to capture initial impressions, and as a useful aide memoire 
during the course of the fieldwork and analysis. 
The transcripts, together with other research documentation (such as summaries of 
minutes), were analysed using NVivo to manage the data. An initial coding 
structure was drawn up (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 58), based on knowledge of 
the literature and the tentative theories held at the start of the process. The initial 
categories were Inputs (to the process); Theories (put forward by previous 
researchers, which included the components of L-C theory); Processes (of 
determining pay, including the roles of the different parties); and Policies and 
Packages (relating to the remuneration itself). This structure was extended 
significantly during the coding process, as new categories emerged. The final 
coding structure is set out at Appendix 7. 
Coding of transcripts was initially done manually. The transcripts were printed 
leaving a three inch margin to the right of the text, and then the documents were 
scrutinised word-by-word, line-by-line in order to determine relevant codes. 
These codes were written on the transcript. When the transcript had been fully 
coded, the data were transferred to NVivo, where the new codes were added to the 
original structure. This manual process was carried out for the first three 
transcripts, until I became more familiar both with the process of coding and with 
the use of NVivo. After that, the hand-written stage was omitted, and coding was 
done directly on screen. 
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In the early stages of coding, as each document was coded I revisited its 
predecessors to detennine whether the new transcript had added any ideas that 
were relevant to the previous ones. This activity became less relevant as coding 
progressed, as the number of new codes became fewer and my experience grew. 
The process was changed as coding progressed, in that I found that it helped my 
thought patterns to code 'chunks' of narrative - sentences and paragraphs - rather 
than individual words and phrases (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 56). 1 later went 
back and re-coded the earlier documents in this matter, to maintain consistency 
between the documents. 
Coding the transcripts and other documentation led to new ideas being developed. 
These were recorded in a Word document that I used as a research diary, in which 
were recorded the thoughts and issues developed over the process from the start of 
the fieldwork. This resource was my equivalent of the memoing technique 
suggested by, for example, Strauss and Corbin (1998: 218) or Miles and 
Hubennan (1994: 72). 
In March 2003 1 prepared a meta matrix (what Miles and Huberman (1994: 178) 
refer to as a "monster dog") to display all of the results so far. This matrix 
assembled descriptive data for each of the cases. In small print this ran to 28 
pages, using seven colours and two fonts. This schedule was used to gain an 
overview of the work. It was not updated for subsequent interviews, as the NVivo 
analysis was used for that work. 
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Once all of the documents had been coded, and the list of codes refined, I 
examined the content of each node (the NVivo term for a code). This was done 
by printing off the contents of each node and reading them through, to find the 
'story' behind the words (similar to the process discussed by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998: 148)). Narrative notes were made in the margins of these new documents, 
highlighting related themes, and differences. I then prepared a summary for each 
node of the themes occurring in it, and the ideas it suggested. I did not 
subsequently re-code passages to reflect these themes, as suggested by Strauss and 
Corbin, as I found that chopping up and rebuilding the data did not suit my way of 
thinking. Tbus, although I used some of the techniques of grounded theory 
suggested by Strauss and Corbin, I did not fully adopt their approach. 
Analysis was facilitated by the use of cross-case displays (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 174). After the two pilot studies were done, the similarities and differences 
between the cases were tabulated, and used to inform the later research. 
Additional displays were prepared after the fieldwork was done, to establish 
patterns (or otherwise) in the data. 
In analysing the data, I followed the seven-stage approach suggested by Easterby- 
Smith etal. (1991: 108), assetoutinTable4-6. 
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In' transcribing almost all of ýTe_ 
transcripts myself, I became very 
familiar with them both as aural 
narratives and as text. 
The coding structure drawn up 
during the literature review 
provided an initial platform for 
reflecting on the meaning of the 
data. 
Coding was facilitated using 
NVivo, and the range of codes 
changed considerably over the 
period of analysis as new concepts 
were unearthed and previously- 
coded documents revisited. 
Unless it was very obvious, each 
of the nodes set up on NVivo was 
given a description of what was - 
and what was not - included in the 
category. This helped ensure 
consistency in coding over the 
period of analysis. Consistency 
was also aided by re-visiting 
previously-coded documents at 
several stages, to check that the 
meaning had not drifted. 
Using a multi-theoretic approach, 
many different links to theory 
were found and pursued to 
determine which were supported 
in the data and which were not. 
The research findings were 
evaluated in the light of comments 
from other academics and from 
Research 
Rather than adopt a formal 
gmemoing' technique 
(Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 
193; Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 72) 1 found that the 
best way for me to explain 
and understand the data and 
manage the relationships was 
in the form of a narrative 
Research Diary maintained as 
a Word document. All ideas 
about the research (including 
draft models of relationships 
between variables) were 
captured in this diary in 
chronological order. The 
diary was regularly reviewed 
throughout the process, 
guiding interviews and 
analysis. 
4.6 Validity, reliability and generalisability 
It is important for any research project to be able to stand up to scrutiny. In 
undertaking qualitative research, the criteria for such scrutiny differ from those in 
the scientific, positivist paradigm. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 41) explain the 
three main questions as they relate to a phenomenological (interpretivist) 
viewpoint. Their meanings are set out in Table 4-7, together with the means used 
in this study. 
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Table 4-7 Credibility and rigour 
Easterby-Smith Work done 
Validfty Respondent validation via a focus group 
Has the researcher gained full access to the interview to gain feedback (Silverman, 2001: 
knowledge and meaning of informants? 236; Bryman, 1989: 164; Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 275) and with an academic 
audience. Also, participants were given a 
report containing the draft findings, on which 
they were able to comment (although none did). 
Triangulation ysing multiple data sources by 
having different interviewees in companies, and 
through documentation. (Given the research 
philosophy, the triangulation was not used to 
adjudicate between different versions 
(Silverman, 2001: 234), other than it being 
assumed that the audited remuneration report 
was more likely to be correct than an 
informant's memory. ) 
Reliabili Interviews were recorded verbatim rather than 
Will similar observations be made by different interpreted. They were transcribed by the 
researchers on different occasions? author. Field notes were systematically 
recorded. 
It is possible that different researchers would 
make different observations. As discussed 
earlier, the interview is a social interaction, 
influenced by the characteristics of both parties 
(Silverman, 2001: 225). Furthermore, in this 
ever-changing subject (see timeline in 
Appendix 3) it is likely that respondent's views 
could change over time. 
Generalisabili The ideas have been discussed with individuals 
How likely is it that ideas and theories (including some of the focus group) who were 
generated in one setting will also apply in other not part of the original sample. They have also 
settings? been tested with institutional professional 
bodies, for reasonableness. 
4.7 Summary of chapter 
In this chapter I have set out the philosophical underpinnings of the research and 
explained the methodology and methods adopted. This interview-based research, 
using the company as the unit of analysis, is generalisable into theory rather than 
to other companies and contexts. 
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5. HOW COMPANIES DETERMINE PAY 
5.1 Introduction 
The research question introduced in chapter I asks how companies determine the 
remuneration of their executive directors. It considers two aspects of this: the 
level of pay, and its structure. In this chapter I present data showing how, in 
practice, these issues are addressed. 
According to the Combined Code (2003), the determination of executive pay is a 
matter for the remuneration committee. Therefore, much of this chapter, and the 
discussions set out in the following chapters, is set in the context of the 
committee's decision process. The committee has to decide, or to make a 
recommendation to the board, what level of pay will be, to paraphrase the Code, 
'sufficient but not excessive'. It also has to determine an appropriate structure, 
using a substantial element of performance-related pay, that will drive appropriate 
performance in the company. 
What became clear from the research data was that, for any company, there is no 
objective right answer to these questions. This is not the nature of the game. 
Nonetheless, to end that game an answer must be found, and a remuneration 
scheme chosen that can, it is felt, be justified, both to the executives and to the 
outside world. Much of the data set out in this chapter is the story of that 
justification process, and the different paths taken by the case companies in 
arriving at their decisions. It shows how the committees actively construct their 
remuneration decisions, using data which are justified as relating to a 'market', 
albeit a market defined by the companies themselves. The decision is given 
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legitimacy by using these external data, and also by the use of remuneration 
consultants both to provide data and to advise on appropriate schemes. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I examine the roles played by the 
various protagonists in the remuneration-setting decision, putting the rest of this 
discussion in context. Following this I discuss how companies determine the level 
of their executive directors' pay, then consider how they define its structure. A 
I finding of the empirical work was that all of the case companies had changed their 
remuneration policies over the last few years, often making several changes. 
Accordingly, I end with a review of the issues that lead to changes in 
remuneration schemes. 
Given the necessary length of this chapter, it is useful here to summarise the key 
findings. This is done in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1 Key findings in chapter 5 
The roles of the protagonists Each of the case companies could 'tick the boxes' as 
complying with good governance practices. However, the 
relationship of the protagonists differed in each company. 
The remuneration-setting process appeared to be controlled 
by the non-executives in some companies, with much more 
influence by the executives in others. 
The level of pay The level of pay is set based on 'the market'. This 'market' 
is a social construction, being determined by using selected 
comparators based on company size, industry and/or 
geography. Each company may have a different view of 
appropriate market comparators. 
The structure of pay Pay structures are designed to reflect the company's 
strategic characteristics but also to be in line with schemes 
adopted by other companies which have gained shareholder 
acceptance. This shareholder acceptance is important, 
legitimising the remuneration decisions. 
Why companies change their Changes are made for a variety of reasons, chiefly: pay 
schemes levels being below market; schemes not paying out; 
I changes 
in company strategy, culture or personnel. 
In chapters 6 and 71 will return to these issues, analysing the data against a 
theoretical background. 
5.2 The roles of the protagonists 
The original research design, based on informal discussions and interviews, was to 
interview people in the following roles: 
s committee chairman 
9 another NED 
o CEO 
* HR professional 
o consultant. 
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In practice, interviewees included representatives from all of these roles, plus 
company secretaries, a company chairman, headhunters and institutional 
representatives. 
Although by and large each of the companies had an individual with the relevant 
job title, the nature of the relationships between the individuals varied 
considerably between companies. For example, in some companies the 
remuneration-setting process appeared to be dominated by the remuneration 
committee: 
This remuneration committee is quite particular about not involving the 
executives in the design and development of the incentive arrangements. I 
think they've drawn a line and said "we will not ask the monkeys to tell us 
what kind of nuts they want'. 
HR Director 
Indeed, in one company the HR director had practically no input into the 
remuneration committee; the work of servicing that committee was done by the 
company secretary with support from the company chairman, and the main role of 
the HR director was to provide market information. 
In other companies, the balance of power appeared to be with the executives 
rather than the non-executives. This was evidenced, for example, in statements 
discussing who was involved in the setting of the remuneration committee agenda. 
It was also seen in discussions of how the remuneration consultants were 
employed, and the input the committee and its chairman had into that decision. 
The following extracts illustrate the variety of practices encountered, both 
committee- and executive-driven. 
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Regarding setting the agendafor committee meetings: 
Q: Who is involved in drafting the agenda? 
A: Who would be involved would be [HR Director], the chief executive, and 
myself. The reason for that is that there's no point in the non-executives or 
the board having a view. 
Committee chairman 
The agendas are basically largely compiled by myself and the chief legal 
officer, company secretary. But obviously sometimes issues will be raised 
by other people, and they'll want something on the agenda. And that could 
be anybody from the chairman of the company to the chief executive... 
HR director 
Q: Who sets the agenda? 
A: Group HR. In a sense. When I say that we set the agenda, obviously we 
take a huge amount of notice of what the chief executive wants and if he's 
got issues. 
HR manager 
In that last company, no indication was given that the chairman of the 
remuneration committee had any input into the agenda. 
Regarding the employment ofremuneration consultants: 
And the committee's just changed its external advisers. They did that really 
without our help. We set up the beauty contest and the process, but they 
made those decisions on their own. Paradoxically they asked at the last 
minute if we were going to be involved. We said that we never envisaged 
that we would be responsible for selecting your external advisers. 
HR director 
The remuneration committee chose [the consultants]. Against a shortlist of, I 
think it was two, it could possibly have been three, that [HR director] came 
up with. We interviewed all three, and decided on [consultant name] 
Company chairman (who sat in on those interviews) 
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I think I had a meeting with [HR director and HR manager], in which I got 
from them an understanding of what the business issues were, why they 
were undertaking a review, why they decided to change advisers, the 
particular business issues that they were facing, because you always try to 
put the remuneration review in context. 
Consultant, discussing how and by whom he was briefed. 
In this last company, the consultant did have a relationship with the committee 
chairman, through the chairman's other company, although there was little 
indication of his involvement here. 
Q: I assume from everything you said, that you decided you were employing 
[consultant], rather than.... 
A: Yes, the remuneration committee aren't the remotest bit interested in the 
views. 
HR director 
The general tenor of discussions indicated that in some companies the views of 
the non-executives were treated with greater respect than in others. This is 
demonstrated again later in this chapter, in a discussion of the role of the 
committee in determining base pay. 
5.3 How companies determine the level of their directors' 
remuneration 
5.3.1 Defining the level ofremuneration 
An executive remuneration package generally comprises several parts: base 
salary, annual bonus, a long-term incentive, perks and pension. It was agreed by 
most interviewees that the package should be looked at 'in the round', considering 
the combination of all of the elements rather than examining each individually. If 
each element were taken individually, the overall package could end up excessive, 
or unbalanced. 
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I personally am very reluctant to discuss bits of the package outside the 
context of the whole package. 
NED 
At the moment, we're not changing the scheme at all. ... And, I mean basically what [consultant] said was that in the round our package was 
comparable with market practice in [index], all that sort of thing. They said 
that we were light on the bonuses side in that the bonuses that we were 
paying were up to a maximum of 50% of salary, and they said that 100% 
would be more common. On the other hand, our salaries they thought were 
up with the game, and our pensions were ahead of the game. 
Commiffee chairman 
However, one interviewee did believe that each element of the package needed to 
be considered separately. 
... confirmed the beliefs of the remuneration committee 
that you should have 
a reasonably market-competitive salary and bonus. In other words you have 
to look at each element of the package as being reasonably competitive. 
And if you give somebody a very low basic but everything else is at risk that 
might be fine in good times, but if the market turns sour then there's not a 
great deal you can do about it. [Salary should always be competitive by 
itself, as it drives other elements of remuneration such as pension and 
bonus. ]34 
HR director 
Given that there are various elements to the remuneration package, companies 
tend to benchmark an expected level of total remuneration that would be achieved 
if target performance were achieved 35 . Thus by 'level' I follow standard practice 
in referring to this expected level of remuneration, comprising base salary and 
anticipated incentive awards. However, because it is common practice for the 
level of incentives awarded to be a multiple of base salary, that salary is the focus 
of this section. 
34 This HR director requested that I seek approval for individual quotes used in the thesis. In 
Franting approval for this quote, he added the wording in square brackets. 
5 For example, Vodafone Group p1c, in its 2001 remuneration report (page 57), stated that its 
remuneration committee must benchmark "the expected value of remuneration" against the 
relevant market. It went on to illustrate that for expected performance, base pay would comprise 
circa 20% of total remuneration, and incentive payments circa 80%. 
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5.3.2 Sources of market information 
In later paragraphs, it will be seen that levels of pay are benchmarked on market 
data. It is thus appropriate to consider where the remuneration committee obtains . 
those data. 
In practice, it is likely that the committee will see comparative data from several 
sources. These could include: 
i. Bespoke reports prepared by consultants for this specific purpose. 
ii. General reports prepared by consultants showing market data. It is 
customary for data from more than one consultant to be obtained. 
iii. Data gathered by the HR professionals from various sources, including 
published surveys and other companies' annual reports. 
iv. Data gathered informally by the committee members and others. This 
could be based on other directorships they hold, or on conversations 
with directors of other companies. 
Survey data (both bespoke and general) are used extensively. The advantage of 
using surveys is that they do represent an external view, and can be used to justify 
the company's salaries: 
Our job is to act as the protectors of the non-executive directors' reputations. 
So they have to have adequate data on which to base their decisions, and 
they have to know that it is not adopting something indefensible. So 
providing the number chosen is within reasonably close touch of [numbers 
suggested by market surveys] ... 
HR manager 
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The shareholders have got to have that degree of comfort, that they aren't 
just getting information from the likes of me who, it could be alleged, has an 
angle to grind here. 
HR director 
However, many of the individuals interviewed expressed a level of unease about 
the use of survey data, particularly in the way that it was believed to cause 
executive pay to ratchet up year after year. 
You get these reports from the consultants saying 'look, the median salaries 
are now so much, and you are below it, and therefore you've got to go up to 
the median level or whatever you want to be'. And then of course you say 
'yes, of course, everybody does that, it just goes on and up and up'. And so 
you need to look well below, I feel, and [Committee chairman] will agree with 
this, you always need to look at those sort of arguments very sceptically. 
NED 
Several interviewees suggested that one reason for this ratcheting up is that many 
companies have a policy of setting remuneration at upper quartile levels. When 
that is done, each new survey shows a higher median than the previous one, and 
so pay levels have to rise accordingly. 
But I have an entirely different comment to make as well, which is 'me too' is 
such an important part of it, and this is what worries me about this kind of 
process. I'm not objecting in personal terms, but this business of 'the 
market's doing this so we better do this', there is this sense of ratcheting the 
stakes up. We do quite a lot of this because if we didn't, people would leave 
us for companies that did or we'd find it difficult to recruit people. 
HR director 
The way one every year is presented with statistics, which no doubt are 
genuine, and, you know, are produced by the high-priced help, 
demonstrating that this year there will be X or Y percent increase in 
executive remuneration, inevitably, you know, gives one some qualms. 
Because its easy to see how there can be perpetual leapfrogging. 
Commiftee chairman 
In one of the case companies, the CEO had effectively overruled the survey data 
presented to the remuneration committee, showing high pay increases, because he 
did not believe it. 
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I have grown very suspicious of surveys for remuneration. I have yet to work 
for a company where I was shown a survey that showed that we were 
meeting the standards that we had set.... Systematically, whenever there is 
a survey coming we say well our aim is to be say midmarket or third quartile; 
systematically, for whatever reason, we are always below what the market 
says we should be. ... So I've grown very suspicious, and usually will want to double check with a couple of specific companies who I would consider to 
be good indicators as to what their policy is. Now I am lucky enough to have 
good friends, chief executive officers or chairmen of many companies, so I 
have direct access to some of them and some of the things I would do is to 
say 'who is it out there who is inflating these numbersT. ... why I wasn't jumping immediately to the conclusion that everybody should be going up by 
that amount. 
CEO 
In the subsequent discussion I passed on to that CEO the explanation for this 
phenomenon that had been given to me by an HR director; this explanation he 
found totally plausible. 
I think this is one of the reasons why main board pay does tend to go up 
rather more rapidly than overall averages. One, you've got small samples. 
Secondly, often people come in, particularly if they're an internal promotion, 
there's a bit of a wait-and-see approach. And if they go in at below the 
market median, it's quite easy for people to say gosh there's still 20 or 25% 
to go, and they are paying 4 or 5% catch up each time. Now, I'm not saying 
that that is right or wrong, but that's what happens. 
HR director 
A further reason suggested was that individuals joining companies from outside 
are often offered above-market packages to attract them, and this too distorts the 
statistics. 
I mean a company thats had to bring in a lot of people from the outside will 
see a naturally higher-than-inflation movement. They are basically paying to 
attract people to a new, riskier environment. 
NED 
Nevertheless, survey data are universally used as a means to establish pay levels. 
The following sections discuss how they are used, examining how benchmark 
markets are determined, and considering how companies set their pay levels based 
on the surveys. 
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5.3.3 Determining the level of base salary 
If survey data are used to determine base salaries, remuneration committees need 
to address two questions: 
Against what should pay be benchmarked? and 
Where should our pay be set in relation to the range in the survey? 
This was summarised by one of the consultants interviewed for the research. 
Firstly let us identify what we mean by market practice. We use the phrase 
too carefully. We assume that there is one market position, lets take job X, 
that there is a market position for base salary, there's a market position for 
bonus opportunity, and there's a market position for either option grants or 
real share award scheme awards. There isn't. Typically, around the middle 
of a market, between the quartiles, there'll be something like plus or minus 
20 or 25. And you've only looked at a 50 percent distribution, You haven't 
gone from the minimum to the maximum, which is huge. 
And 
In determining market position the first argument is what is the market, or 
what are the markets? Because if you would select your CEO from the 
utilities sector and your FID from a much wider sector, and you've actually 
defined two markets. You might have more jobs or you might have more 
markets. 
Consultant 
In every company, a question about how the level of base salary was determined 
elicited an answer that discussed benclunarking against 'the market'. With no 
way of determining in an absolute sense what an executive is worth, some form of 
comparator is needed 36 . However, the choice of that comparator can 
have a 
significant impact on the level of pay in a company. 
36 Economists would argue that executive pay should reflect the marginal productivity of the 
executive; alas, this is not easily determined. 
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Generally, the market comparators for salary reflect the size of the company, and 
often its industry. In neither case is the decision about comparators obvious. 
These issues are addressed in the following sections. 
Defining the market by size 
For remuneration purposes, the most common determinants of a company's size 
are its turnover or its market capitalisation. Of the companies participating in the 
research, some used tumover as the sole measure, some used market capitalisation 
as the sole measure, and some used a combination of these, occasionally adding 
another measure such as number of employees. In discussions with the 
participants, sometimes an argument was given to explain why a particular size 
measure had been used, but at times it appeared that this had not been considered 
deeply. 
It is the view of the consultants that the salary guidelines based on 
[company's] market capitalisation of [EXm] provide a more appropriate guide 
to relevant market practice than those based on turnover. It is the guidelines 
based on market capitalisation which better reflect [company's] position in 
the FTSE [index]. 
Extract from Consultants' report which benchmarked one aspect of the 
company's business against turnover and another against market 
capitalisation 
Well you can look at it a number of ways, as you know from your work in this 
area - employees, turnover, market cap, you name it. As I understand it, 
and its going back a long time, turnover's a reasonably stable kind of 
measure, market cap can vary considerably - we mentioned dot. coms - and 
there is some kind of perceived relationship between turnover and pay. 
There appears to be some kind of relationship, as I understand it. Now 
you're going to tell me I'm wrong! 
HR director 
However, in one company, the HR director had clearly given the matter some 
considerable thought. 
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The reports I had, they covered market cap, turnover, profit and number of 
people. The reason that I think the number of people is important is 
because the challenge is the more people you manage, the harder it gets. 
Yes? If you've only got five people to manage, its a helluva different task 
than 500. [It is much harder to manage 500 people than 5 because of the 
need to align, motivate and direct layers of management. ]37 So therefore, 
what I did within that was to say in comparing us against other companies, I 
did a comparison by all four entities, and whether we were upper quartile, 
median, or lower quartile. And therefore the reports I provided for the 
remuneration committee showed these explicitly. So in other words, I didn't 
try to hide anything. I kept it very clear. So that if market cap was way out 
of line with everything else it was dangerous to align it to market cap. 
HR director 
It should be self-evident that benchmarking a company's salaries based on its 
turnover could give very different answers to a benchmark based on its market 
capitalisation. Thus the choice of 'market' has a big impact on base salaries. 
Discussions with the participants indicated that this choice of benchmark is often 
left to the HR support, or to the consultants 38 . 
Before leaving the subject of company size as an input into the pay decision, it is 
worthwhile considering what happens to pay when there is a step-change in the 
size of the company, through acquisitions or divestments. In the recent past, one 
of the case companies had undertaken a major acquisition: this had led to an 
upward rebasing of the executives' salaries. The director of another of the 
companies was involved in a similar merger, in one of the other companies for 
which he sat on the board. At the time of our meeting he commented 39: 
37 This HR director requested that I seek approval for individual quotes used in the thesis. In 
Franting approval for this quote, he added the wording in square brackets. 
8 8 One HR director, when asked why the consultants had chosen a particular benchmark, suggested 
that it was because they already had these data available, rather than for any reason particularly 
related to his company. 
39 In order to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees, occasionally no job description is given to 
support a quotation. 
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Just as an aside, we're putting these two big companies together now. And 
we end up with a much bigger company, obviously. ... And the remuneration committee then have got to sit down and say well we are a 
much bigger company, what should we do about pay and all the rest of it? 
Should we increase the directors' salaries, or shouldn't we? Some of the 
directors will be doing roughly the same jobs that they were doing before. 
The chief executive, certainly, has got a bigger responsibility. What should 
we do? And I honestly don't know what the answer is. 
A review of the remuneration report for that company, published several months 
after this interview, indicated that the CEO's salary went up substantially. 
Defining the market by industry 
It is common knowledge that the general level of pay in some industries greatly 
exceeds that in others. Indeed, the original design for this research study was 
based on utilities and finance companies, partly for that very reason. Hence, in 
benchmarking salaries it seems reasonable to use peer companies in an industry as 
an appropriate comparator. 
Several difficulties arise with this. Firstly, it can be problematic to define a 
company's industry. This is particularly true for multi-business companies, for 
example the regulated utilities in the UK, whose strategies often involve 
developing a substantial non-regulated business. Whereas executive directors 
responsible for the utility or the 'other' business may have a clear comparator 
group, deciding the appropriate base for the CEO or the finance director (FD), 
responsible for both of these, is more difficult. 
As an illustration, consultants for one of the case utilities prepared a report giving 
comparative information for two sets of comparators: other utilities, and 
companies in the related sector whose turnover was comparable with the utility's 
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non-regulated business. Consultants for another utility used three comparator 
groups: 
... we discussed with [HR director] the sort of companies we should look at both utilities and companies with a similar market capitalisation. And then 
companies who are in the kind of areas that they are moving into. 
And 
[Three peer groups] ... in the sense that we were comparing their remuneration with other jutility] companies, with [FTSE index] companies 
generally, and with other businesses of the similar nature to their non- 
regulated business. ... So we came up essentially with three different set of figures, I think we called them comparator group A, B and C. A, we said that 
"well the finance director's at median or below median, B is median and C is 
below median'. That was how we presented it. 
Consultant 
The second difficulty that arises in using industry comparators is that some 
individuals are mobile between industries. If one aim of using market-based 
salaries is to 'attract retain and motivate' the individuals, then the remuneration 
committee has to be sensitive to the different areas from which and to which they 
might move. 
That's an interesting question. In functional roles, you don't necessarily 
look at [our sector]. [Name] went off to [company in different sector], and 
other people in functional roles join us from other industries and move off to 
other industries. Albeit we would always try to look at [our sector]. 
Sometimes there isn't enough data to look at significant [companies in our 
sector] alone. 
HR director 
Defining the market by geography 
In addition to considerations of size and industry, some companies adjust the 
benchmarks they use to accommodate geographical issues. The most commonly 
knovm of these is the reported need for companies to pay globally competitive 
packages, to reflect the fact that their executives are 'globally mobile', as 
illustrated by the following quotations from published sources. 
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We should also remember that majorfirmsfishfor talent in a glohalpool, If 
UK terms and conditions are less favourable, management talent will go 
elsewhere. 
Digby Jones, Director-General ofthe CBI (2003) 
In his letter to shareholders, Sir Christopher Hogg, GSK's chairman, 
warned that global companies must remain competitive in the remuneration 
they offer to top executives. Yhe application of UK "cultural attitudes" in 
companies that are big in the US could leave them vulnerable in a count? y 
where traditionally pay has been higher than in Europe. 
Dyer (2003) 
However, there are many who believe that this argument is overstated, that the 
number of truly global individuals is relatively few, and that comparisons with US 
pay (the benchmark for 'global') are unmerited and serve merely to inflate 
remuneration packages in the UK. Alastair Ross Goobey, introducing a report for 
the International Centre for Corporate Governance, described the argument as "so 
much hooey" (Targett and Tassell, 2002). A couple of months later, a European 
compensation consultant was quoted as follows: 
Mr Booker believes international comparisons are becoming "a flimsy 
defence "for high pay. "There is somejustified cynicism about the idea that 
just because American pay is higher, pay elsewhere should rise. It is not 
uncommon to find chief executives paid less than the leaders of US 
subsidiaries - in investment banks, CEOs are not even in the 30 top 
earners. The national and industrial comparisons are the important ones. " 
Overell (2002) 
These comments were reflected by some of the interviewees. 
And the argument that we live in a global world and pay global salaries 
doesn't strike me as very valid. 
NED 
It is wrong. And there's the American thing which is I think for most 
companies a total red herring, just an excuse for paying more. It's the 
difficulty. The whole sort of global company thing. There's hardly any 
companies which are really global to the extent that their executives are 
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Of the companies studied in this research, one was clearly global, earning more 
than half its profits in the US, and having operations throughout the world. For 
this company, with several Americans in senior management positions, it was 
appropriate to consider US remuneration as a benchmark. Indeed, the HR director 
commented that by adopting UK-type policies the company had fallen behind its 
market, and had been obliged to increase its packages. At the time of the 
interview he opined that there was more work to be done in this area: 
No, I think really in (date] we sort of took a bit of adjustment for North 
Americans below the board, really. It wasn't really until [3 years later] that 
we began to improve North American packages generally at the executive 
level - not just at the board - in order to get closer. But I've got to say this, 
when we went to that route, [consultant name], who are our advisors, had 
said'[name], you're not really mid-Atlantic, you're more north of Ireland! '. 
HR director 
Other companies in the research sample had less of an American influence, 
although several did business extensively in continental Europe, and stated that 
they needed to keep policies and packages competitive for their European 
executives. 
At the other end of the geographic scale, one company was based solely in the 
UK, and mainly in a region in which pay levels are generally low. It was stated 
by the directors and by their consultants that pay levels in this company had been 
tailored to reflect the regional rates, being slightly lower than would have been 
earned in, say, London. This example, albeit an unusual one, indicates that 
geography can influence the pay market on the downside as well as the upside. 
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Settingpay at 'median' 
Having determined an appropriate market against which to benchmark, the 
remuneration committee then has to decide the level at which it wants to set its 
pay. For example, many companies aim to be at the median level based on their 
comparators; some state that they aim for an upper quartile rating. 
Of the case companies, all but two stated their policy was for salaries to be at 
median. One company related salary levels to individual performance, with a 
policy of paying upper quartile salaries for "superior" performance. One other 
stated in its published remuneration report that salaries were "competitive" - the 
interviewee explained to me that this meant upper quartile. The two paying upper 
quartile salaries did not state explicitly why this policy had been chosen. 
However, in one case it seemed likely that this reflected the company's 
international bias. Of the companies whose policy was to pay median salaries, 
most interviewees stated that they took median salaries so that they could weight 
incentives towards an upper quartile package for good performance. One HR 
manager in a major company explained why it was appropriate for that company: 
[In answer to the question: Why midmarket? ] 
Why not? To say that we're going to pay under the market would be silly. 
We're a long established company, and to be other than midmarket I tend to 
think that you would have to be in different point in your cycle. 
HR manager 
Even if a company has a policy of 'median' pay, median may not be seen as an 
exact number, but as a range of values. One HR manager interviewed in this 
research gave his opinion that 'median' was a range of +/- 10% around the 
mathematical median of the survey, but went on to point out that his remuneration 
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committee used a range of 15% to 20% above or below. However the respondent 
focus group took the view that median should be the arithmetic median itself. 
In addition, the point at which the actual pay is set may depend on several factors, 
as illustrated below. 
The competencies and experience ofthe particular manager. 
As I say, we look at the performance of the people. And you look at where 
they're at as well; you look at where are they at the moment - that has to be 
a significant factor. ... 
What we've done last year, at least, is look at the 
individuals as well, where they are in their roles. 
HR director 
The salary paid in the previous year. 
Also remember that once a salary has been established, then they tend not 
to go down. 
HR manager 
The committee's view ofappropriate pay rises. 
Generally, the committee chose to award a pay increase that left the 
executive at less than the suggested salary, less than median. [HR 
manager] reckons that the main reason for this is that they didn't want to 
have to justify high % increases in the remuneration report. (The [non- 
board] salaries went through pretty quickly, with little changes from 
recommended. ) 
From file note of untaped conversation with HR manager 
It is also worth noting that in two of the case companies, different individuals 
offered different opinions as to where the company was in terms of its salaries - 
ranging from just below median to upper quartile! I was unable to establish either 
the 'true' position (having no access to the underlying data) or why they held 
these views. It is possible that non-executives are not as close to the underlying 
data as are, for example, HR directors. 
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Mediatingfactors 
Accommodating individual characteristics 
When asked how remuneration levels were set, some interviewees replied that pay 
related to the job description. 
Well, it's tailored to the post first and foremost. Then to the individual. 
HR director 
That is also the inference to be made from the reliance on market surveys, 
benchmarking CEO, Fl) or other executive directors against similar roles. 
However, although this is apparently seen as standard practice, many instances 
were cited where the package had obviously been tailored in order to attract a 
particular individual to the company. 
I would say to them: if we believe this is the right thing to do and you're 
saying to me we need this set of skills, and we believe as a board we need 
that set of skills, this is what we're going to have to do, and this is what it is 
going to cost. 
Committee chairman 
We clearly in this particular case went beyond what we had established as at 
that level of the organisation. But given the strategic importance of the 
project he was going to lead, the value that he brought to the company over 
and above what the job specified, we said well there is clearly a premium in 
there and we want the man, so what is he worth? 
Company chairman 
The experience and talents of these particular executives were seen as such that 
they outweighed the influence of the company's existing remuneration 
arrangements. Given that absolute pay seems to be less important than relative 
pay, I asked if bringing in an individual at a scale above that of existing executives 
would distort the level of pay for the board as a whole. Two individuals (in the 
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same company) stated that it would have no influence. A third individual, in a 
different company, opined that inevitably it meant that salaries would rise over a 
period. (Tbere is of course no way of knowing whether the directors in the first 
company were being realistic in their views. ) 
In an interview with two headhunters, conducted several months after the bulk of 
the fieldwork, I obtained their views on this subject. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they 
strongly believed that the package was tailored to the individual rather than the 
role. 
... coming back to your question about if you've got two candidates on the final straight - what you might very well be saying to your client is that if 
you're going to have Candidate A, then you're going to have to be paying 
this, while Candidate B you will be paying a different sort of thing. You must 
make up your mind as to which you feel is going to be appropriate, and how 
that balance is going to be. 
Headhunter 
They also stated that companies have different attitudes as to whether incoming 
executives will be on a similar package to existing employees. In some 
companies, their client will advise that the package of the incomer has to fit in 
with the existing structure; others see this as less important. To some extent this 
is dependent on the client's needs. 
A high-profile company, particularly one facing quite significant challenges 
ahead, will only entice a high-profile, effective chief executive with an 
impeccable track record if they are able to satisfy that individual that they 
can compensate them for any potential loss of reputation for moving into a 
high risk job, where their untarnished record - with the best will in the world - 
might be in jeopardy. So that individual may well have fairly forceful views 
about the package which would entice them to move. By contrast, a role in 
a company which is in a less turbulent state, a strong position, may feel able 
to resist the pressure from a particular candidate over their package. 
Headhunter 
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Views of the NEDs 
Despite all of the data that can be brought to bear on the remuneration-setting 
decision, it is not a mathematical exercise, and involves considerable judgement 
Several of the interviewees made this point, some quite strongly. 
... you make it sound very black and white. But a lot of this is actually quite 
grey. 
NED 
... it's not a science, so you're still going to bring that 
knowledge along and 
say 'well, I feel comfortable' ... I think you're going to use your experience 
and make a judgement, but I don't think it's particularly scientific, it's a 'feel' 
thing. All you're getting in a remn committee report, somebody gives you is 
a few figures: upper quartile, lower quartile, median. You just pick out where 
you feel happy. 
Consultant 
So there's no kind of god-given objectivity to that kind of stuff. 
HR director 
I mean, I think that like all information its there [but] you don't just use it, 
you've got to apply judgement to it. 
HR manager 
I think one has to remember that this is, at least in part, an art; its not purely 
a science. 
HR manager 
It's probably not nearly as statistical and scientific as people would imagine. 
It's a lot more human and a lot more partly market-driven, but other factors 
come into play. 
CEO 
It seems inevitable that if judgement is being applied to the data in order to arrive 
at the final numbers, that judgement must be swayed by the prior experience of 
the individuals. To some extent, this was acknowledged to be true. Two of the 
interviewees had a non-corporate background and they discussed the difficulties 
of accepting the large corporate packages. The following quote illustrates: 
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... so I started from a rather different background from my other colleagues 
and they had to work quite hard to persuade me that these levels of 
remuneration which we now give to executive directors were actually 
necessary in order to retain and acquire the people we wanted. 
At the other extreme, one HR manager pointed out the difficulty of having NEDs 
on the board who come from a high-level financial services background: 
Well there is one who has some sort of merchant banking background, and I 
don't think he really understands anybody being paid less than about 
E50,000 a year. Which is always a problem, incidentally, for people at that 
level. I think that for almost anybody at the level of NED the thought that 
somebody is paid less than C10,000, they can't imagine 40 . 
HR manager 
So individuals do bring their own 'baggage' to this decision. Often this is seen as 
very useful - one chairman pointed out the advantages of using this knowledge of 
other companies in mentally benchmarking the packages on offer: 
And I think that's important. And most people's contribution to discussions is 
a kind of mental comparison with things. And people often say 'well in 
another company I'm involved in we're doing X, Y and Z. So that is very 
useful, to have at least some other thing. 
Committee chairman 
Having said this, it would be very difficult to determine whether or how any 
particular individual's personal comparisons affected the level of pay of 
executives. A board is made up of many people, often with widely different 
backgrounds. Each of these will have different referents, different experiences. It 
would thus be a challenge to say that a particular remuneration package arose 
from one individual's Personal benchmarks. This point was emphasised by 
several interviewees in discussing this issue. For example: 
We draw our non-executive from [five industries mentioned]. So we've got a 
pretty wide spectrum of interests represented in the non-executives. I just 
about find it inconceivable that they would see anything. The opposite is 
40 Needless to say, the salary of f 10,000 did not relate to any of the board executives in the 
company! 
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probably true. I mean, we've got [name] who is well used to signing off 
whacking great packages for people in [financial services]. But he is as 
stern a critic of excessive rewards in [company] as anyone. Unless people 
could convince me that there were these links and the evidence did exist, I 
tend to dismiss that kind of debate as pretty hollow. 
HR director 
5.3.4 The role of the committee in determining base salary 
It is useful to consider the role of the committee in determining base salary - how 
the ultimate decision is actually made. There were some characteristics common 
to each of the case companies: 
9 Base salaries were determined formally at a meeting of the remuneration 
committee. 
* Survey data (or summaries thereof prepared by the HR support) were available 
to the committee to assist in the decision. 
o The CEO had input into the decision, in particular as regards the perfonnance 
level of his direct reports 41 . In some companies 
he also gave a view as to the 
level of satisfaction of his executives with their pay, and the likelihood of their 
being poached by competitors. 
However, it was clear from the way that people discussed the meetings that in 
some companies they were seen much more as a formality than as a decision 
forum. 
41 In all cases I was informed that the CEO left the room when his own pay was being discussed; 
this appears to be standard practice. The company chairman, as the CEO's line manager, would 
provide input as to his level of performance. 
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There's normally a quick [committee meeting] in December, which will deal 
with things like annual salary increases so that, to focus on practicalities, any 
changes can be put into the payroll for January. ... The meeting itself is deliberately organised as a set piece. Although one will genuinely not know 
exactly how the non-executives will feel about a particular item. But the 
margin for decision is not all that great. 
HR manager 
In other companies the issue was debated fully. 
Some of the key [meetings] that made decisions about this were quite 
protracted. The longest ones tend to be around annual review time for the 
executives. In the early days when everybody was getting inflation, that was 
a rubber stamp job. In later years, where we were really trying to correct 
some of the anomalies which were caused by that, the meetings were pretty 
extended. The pay settlement last year was three and half hours plus. 
HR director 
In this latter company, the HR director had presented a paper to the committee 
setting out a summary of all of the survey data, including his own views of where 
pay should be set to be at median. This recommendation was rejected by the 
committee as being bad governance practice; they believed that it was their job to 
assess the data and surface recommendations. In one other company the HR 
director took the view that his role was to give the data to the committee and to let 
them make judgements. In other companies either the HR personnel made 
suggestions, or the HR personnel in conjunction with the remuneration committee 
chairman presented suggestions to the committee for its consideration. 
S. 3. S Inputfactors to the decision on pay levels 
In chapter 41 discussed a questionnaire soliciting participants' views on factors 
affecting remuneration. Table 5-1 below sets out the factors affecting pay levels, 
ranked in order of their average score. 
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Table 5-1 Factors affecting the level of pay 
Score (max 5) 
Company size 4.43 
Shareholder returns 4.38 
Company profitability 4.29 
Individual directors' experience and qualifications 3.57 
Investors' views 3.55 
Company strategy/industry 3.38 
Cash flow 2.57 
Financial accounting considerations 2.10 
Tax (for the company) 2.10 
Tax (for the individual) 1.71 
From the questionnaire, company size has the most influence on pay: this was 
bome out in the interviews. It is notable that shareholder returns and perfoimance 
were said to play an important part in the decision, as these did not feature 
significantly in the discussion. In the focus group discussion conducted to 
validate the research findings, the participants confinned the questionnaire results. 
They stated that if a company is not making good returns it cannot afford to make 
high payments to executives. Furthermore, a poorly-performing company would 
be very conscious of the impact with external stakeholders of being seen to make 
high payments. 
5.3.6 How companies determine the level ofremuneration: summary of 
section 
It is appropriate to conclude this part of the chapter with a summary of how 
companies determine the level of their executive pay. In simple terms, pay is 
based on 'the market'. However, the determination of that market is particularly 
complex, being based on the company's size (however measured), the relevant 
industry(ies), and its geographical situation. Having established appropriate 
benchmarks, the remuneration committee then has to determine whether it wishes 
to set its pay at median, or above or below that level, and how that is calculated. 
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Finally, committees differ in their approach to setting base pay, with some being 
more proactive and others leaving much of the work to the supporting HR staff. 
5.4 How companies determine the structure of their directors' 
remuneration 
Figure 5-2 Decisions relating to the structure and form of pay 
Measures Targets 
Fixed 






















Figure 5-2 sets out the decisions that a company needs to make regarding the 
structure of its executive p2. These are: 
1. The level of gearing of the package, i. e. the balance between fixed and 
variable (performance-related) pay. 
2. The balance of the variable elements between short-term and long-term 
incentives. 
42 In practice there are more decisions than this. Total reward has both extrinsic and intrinsic 
elements (American Compensation Association, 1999) and could also include a large pension and 
benefit-in-kind element. However, these fall outside the design of this research project and are not 
considered here. 
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3. For short-term schemes (annual bonus) 
a. the level of bonus for target and maximum performance 
b. the type of scheme to be used (e. g. whether there is immediate cash 
payout, or a deferred element) 
c. the performance measures and targets to be used. 
4. For long-term schemes 
a. the scheme design - for example, a share option scheme or another 
form of Itip 
b. the performance measures and targets to be used 
c. the period to be covered by the scheme 
d. the amount of options/shares to be awarded. 
In this section each of these decisions is discussed, in terms of the aims of the 
remuneration committee and the way in which they make their choiceSý3. 
Appendix 8 puts this discussion into context, setting out the range of schemes and 
measures used in the companies. 
5.4.1 Why use performance-relatedpay? 
Every company in this research study used a significant element of variable pay, 
adopting both short-term and long-term schemes. Of those companies that 
disclosed a pay structure in their published remuneration reports, the level of fixed 
pay varied between 35% and 50% of the total pay for on-target performance. This 
reflects survey data presented by consultants, for example New Bridge Street 
(2003a) showed that almost all companies in the FTSE 350 use performance- 
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related pay (PRP). One of the main issues researched in this study was to 
determine why companies do Us. 44 
The responses to this line of questioning could be categorised into two broad 
areas: PRP is used for strategic HR purposes, and it is used to confer legitimacy. 
These are discussed below. 
HR reasonsfor usingperformance-relatedpay 
Pay as a motivator 
I'm not motivated by money. The bonuses are a large amount of money, 
but the [Skandia] boardput the schemes in place to incentivise people. 
Alan Wilson, chief executive of Skandia UK, (Orr, 2003) 
The first issue discussed by the participants was the use of PRP to motivate 
executives. It is a basic assumption of agency theory that paying individuals to 
achieve results will encourage them to work harder and result in better outcomes 
for the organisation. However, when this point was put to the interviewees, their 
responses were mixed. Several took the view that pay did indeed motivate 
performance; others argued that it did not. Some, reflecting the quotation that 
started this section, appeared to argue both views at the same time - that pay does 
not 'motivate' but is used to 'incentivise 45 . Although some of the HR 
professionals referred to research on the motivational impact of performance- 
related pay, many of the arguments made seemed to come from the interviewees' 
experience and belief. The points raised reflected issues such as whether pay ever 
43 Remuneration committees will not necessarily take these decisions in the chronological order in 
which they are set out here, but this is a convenient way to approach them. 
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motivated, or whether it motivated at the executive level under consideration in 
this research. 
Some took the view that performance-related pay was a motivating factor, and 
that it did incentivise people to perform, inasmuch as people needed an incentive 
to outperform. 
Why should people take risks - because there is some reward. 
NED 
There's a risk [if pay were at a flat rate] that they may not be focused on 
extending the business as far as they could, in the knowledge that the fee 
was achievable irrespective of performance. There's a possibility that 
psychologically they could under-perform and not stretch themselves. 
There's a risk I think from the individual perspective that potential for 
improvement through salary would be lost. A lot of our people at the top of 
the organisation are quite driven by the prospect of personal wealth, and flat 
fees, and the level of them, seem to us to remove one of the carrots, 
incentives to get people to do more. For some people there's a tendency to 
slide back into average behaviour if they know that their pay outcomes are 
not rewarding extra effort and extra success. 
HR director 
... we unashamedly believe that people are motivated 
by pride and by 
money. 
Commiftee chairman 
Paying everybody the same base salary with no additional rewards, you will 
do what you've always done and get what you've always got. 
HR director 
However, other interviewees did not believe that pay influenced effort at a senior 
level of the business. 
I'm not sure that anyone believes in practice that it makes very much 
difference. Especially at the very senior level of the organisation. Senior 
managers are motivated by something other than pure salary. 
Company secretary 
44 Much of the discussion in this section was published in Bender (2004). 
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I'm highly sceptical myself as to how much extra people really put in. It has 
an impact, it does have an impact. But I think... it depends on the market 
you're in, but I think it can be overplayed. 
And 
Q: If they were on flat salaries would they work the same? 
A: I think it is very marginal, particularly for people right at the top of the 
organisation. Because they are just highly motivated people who wouldn't 
be there otherwise. 
CEO 
And 
I wouldn't want to feel exploited. ... But I don't come to work every day and think 'if I work even harder do I get paid even more? '. It just doesn't work 
like that. 
CEO 
And one participant summed up both sides of the argument: 
And obviously there is always a moment in time where probably you put in 
that little extra effort because you might get additional reward. But I very 
seldom see people, say, work longer hours or work differently or become 
suddenly more intelligent because they are performance-related. 
CEO 
Outside of the simplicity of the argument that says 'pay does motivate' or 'it does 
not', some comments were made which indicated that the influence of 
performance-related pay was more subtle, and context-dependent. Some argued 
that it would influence some individuals more than others. 
So we have an aggressive bonus, which is only ever paid on a profit-sharing 
scheme. So this of course attracts a certain sort of person. 
NED 
We have some people whom I have heard being described as "coin 
operated". They're here for the money, and that's it. You get those sort of 
people in marketing. Given a big bonus to go for and bam! But you get 
other people, for example - I'm generalising now - and this is below 
executive level, guys who work in [business area]. Yes, you've got to get the 
hygiene factors right, but they don't particularly want to earn socking great 
45 The difference between these concepts is not necessarily clear. 
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amounts of money. These are people who have very strong vocational 
interests, and as long as they are earning a reasonable amount, that's it. 
CEO 
A consultant suggested that interview responses would suggest that performance- 
related pay did inspire effort - but not for the individual himself. 
If you ask most people on the impact of performance linked pay you get a 
very typical answer. I suspect you get it from all of us. "No, it doesn't 
influence me. I am a professional manager with a very, very high level of 
commitment, and I'm not going to be influenced by anything as lowly as 
material gain. However, in managing the part of the business that I manage 
I find that incentive pay to the people within that business really has an 
impact. " (Laughs) And you can go down through an organisation and you 
get broadly similar comments. 
Consultant 
In this he was correct: none of the individuals interviewed stated outright that he 
personally worked harder because of the incentives he was offered. 
It can be seen that the interviewees were divided as to whether money was indeed 
a motivator. But, as will be seen later in this chapter, in the discussion of changes 
to schemes, they were clear that the lack of money was a de-motivator. That 
being so, it was apparent that the pay represented something beyond its cash 
value, and the symbolic value of pay is now considered. 
Pgy as a syMbol of worth 
Teachers in schools do it with gold stars; in business you do it with money. 
CEO 
This comment illustrates the power of money as a symbol of success. One of the 
other interviewees, a remuneration consultant, suggested that once a director 
reaches the top of the company there is less formal appraisal and feedback, and so 
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the amount of money earned is the main indicator he has of his value 46 . This is a 
symbol to him, to the rest of the company, and also to his peers. It is a clear way 
by which he can benchmark himself against his peers and rivals -a measure of 
success. 
... the majority of directors that I know are egotistical and have a personal 
pride in success. They are peer-conscious. They want to be seen to be 
doing better than the others. 
NED 
The amount earned - which, of course, is publicly disclosed - thus becomes a 
matter of ego for the executives. This can be seen in following extracts, 
discussing this aspect of the use of PRP. 
And the ego of the senior corporate man is a well-known fact of life, and its 
a very good way of using that to get very focused achievement. And that's 
perhaps the most effective way in which you align an executive's 
performance with the chosen strategy of the company. 
HR manager 
And there's absolutely no doubt that some of this pressure, particularly at the 
top, the very large rewards, comes from a tendency of businessmen to 
compare themselves with other people. And I would describe it as a sort of 
macho desire to be seen publicly to be a success. And part of being a 
success is not only the job you hold, its the effectiveness with which you 
have negotiated your reward. 
Committee chairman 
At senior level, it's not the E50,000 plus or minus that counts, its the fact that 
it's a communication of performance. 
Consultant 
Thus the level of pay, and particularly the performance-related award, serve a 
symbolic purpose over and above their monetary worth. By the same token, 
should an executive receive an award substantially less than his peers, the damage 
to his self-esteem may outweigh the monetary disadvantage. 
46 Board and director appraisal is now a requirement of the Combined Code (2003: A6). 
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... if you get it wrong, if there is a problem or crisis and you don't handle it 
properly, you will find, and you'll see it in the end, that you're earning far less 
in that year in incentive terms than your peer group. And that is a 




A standard agency theory explanation for using PRP is that it makes the agent 
work harder, preventing 'shirking'. That explanation was not accepted by any of 
the interviewees. 
Q: What I'm curious to understand, as everybody seems to take it for 
granted, is do people work harder for performance related pay? Or better? 
What's the advantage of it? 
A: I don't know that people work harder. I can't actually prove that they 
work better. I think what it does do, because performance has to be related 
to measurement, is it does enable you to provide very clear, measurable 
targets/objectives against which people get rewarded. 
Commiffee chairman 
As illustrated above, the most common explanation given by interviewees for why 
companies use PRP was that it provides a focus to executives for their work 
efforts. They pointed out that the performance measures were a signal of what the 
organisation saw as important, and what they should be concentrating on in the 
short-term. The word 'focus' was used a lot in discussing these issues. 
Its certainly going to focus you on the things which are seen by the 
company to be important. 
Consultant 
I think that they focus minds if they are well-designed. 
NED 
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So I don't doubt the fact that they work hard. I actually think that if the board 
and the management get it right then it delivers a focus to what they should 
be doing; i. e. they don't have flights of fancy in terms of extra-core 
acquisitions and things. It actually applies a focus to the way in which they 
do their business. I think that that is what it gives, rather than working any 
harder. 
NED 
So its a too[ to assist the chief executive in getting very focused 
performance out of his reports. 
HR manager 
Other points raised along the same lines related to the need to provide a clear 
message to the executives and throughout the firm, using the variable pay (and 
particularly the annual bonus) to communicate a message throughout the 
organisation. It sends a clear message to the CEO about what the board thinks is 
important, and to the rest of the company about what the CEO believes to be 
important. Indeed, it was suggested by one HR manager that there was little point 
in setting objectives in the organisation if the reward system did not recognise 
them - they would not be seen as serious. In this respect, the variable pay is a 
way of communicating strategy. 
Faimess 
Many of the interviewees referred to the need for fairness as a reason for awarding 
performance-related pay. However, meanings of 'fair' differed. One aspect of 
fairness was fairness between employees in the same company, so that higher- 
performing workers received higher rewards. 
I think performance measures that fairly incentivise people - and being fair is 
the key - ... incentives that are fair and recognise the exceptional performer for going the extra mile is entirely appropriate in the business. 
HR manager 
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We want rewards to encourage people to do better, to do as well as they 
can. And we wish in some way to distinguish between those who are 
performing and those who aren't. 
Commiftee chairman 
Another aspect of fairness was fairness between the director and his peers in other 
companies. The argument was put that directors had to have the same opportunity 
to earn large sums as did their peers. This was considered necessary in order to 
attract good people to the company, and to retain their services. 
What [CEO] wants and expects is to be paid fairly. He would regard being 
paid fairly in two ways. One, that the basic amount he gets is reasonably 
comparable with those that he regards as his peers outside. And the second 
thing he'd expect is that if he and the company perform better, he gets paid 
more. Now that is what he would regard as being treated fairly. So if he 
didn't get that he would regard himself as being treated unfairly. Whether 
that would have the effect of him working less hard, I don't think it is that 
simple. Because I think he'd probably still work as hard, but if somebody is 
less happy, less content with life, their performance would tend to go down. 
And he might also look for somewhere else, or have looked somewhere 
else. Because the other thing is you want to retain someone. And if they 
are unsettled... . Most of pay, 
in my view, is hygiene. And that includes 
performance, its not just the base. But it's very easy to lose it. You're most 
certainly not perfect, so it's how little imperfect you can be. 
HR manager 
What I think is probably more important than absolute reward is relative 
reward. And I think that people are conscious of what's going on out there, 
and that they don't want to feel undervalued if they think that they are a 
good, if not an outstanding, performer. So I think that that again has had 
some impact on what people now expect at senior level. 
HR manager 
This comment about relative reward, reflecting back to the symbolic value of the 
PRP, was echoed again in comments on fairness: 
Q: If I can turn it around, forgive the impertinence, do you work harder 
because you get more money? 
A: No. I don't. But it comes back to a very different element, which is the 
value you consider yourself to be worth for a job well-performed. 
CEO 
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One final aspect of this discussion was fairness to shareholders - not paying large 
amounts to executives when shareholders had suffered a loss in the year. This 
was commented upon by participants discussing alignment of executives and 
shareholders (for example through long-term schemes or share ownership). It was 
also mentioned in the context of PRP: 
Because generally I think people do feel that they should not be paying the 
highest level of salaries or total income without there being some 
relationship to delivery to shareholders. I think those are the key reasons. 
It's not about motivation. Yes, there will be the weasel words in their 
proposals to shareholders, but it is not about motivation. The people that 
they are directing these plans at are self-motivated; it's not going to come 
from the opportunities of big payouts. 
Consultant 
Performance-relatedpay and legitimacy 
The reasons discussed above suggest that performance-related pay is used in order 
to motivate certain behaviour from the directors. This is a matter internal to the 
company with, as one committee chairman stated, remuneration being "the 
principal link between the individuals and the company". However, the results of 
the research indicated that external factors also came into play when companies 
were deciding whether to implement a performance-related reward scheme. The 
two main such reasons, which are inter-connected, were market practices and the 
need for legitimacy. 
Many of the interviewees mentioned that they had a PRP scheme because it was 
market practice so to do. The explanations for this were two-fold. One, related to 
faimess, came back to the idea that the directors have to perceive pay structures as 
being fair between themselves and their peers in other companies, giving them the 
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same earnings opportunities, and being a structure to which they were 
accustomed. 
I think most of our senior executives would never have worked anywhere 
where a flat fee reward structure would be the norm for them. So it would be 
kind of out of left field really for them. I don't think any of the current top 
team would have worked anywhere where that was the reward regime. 
HR director 
A second matter raised in this area by many participants related to the perceived 
need to be in line with other companies because that was 'best practice' and good 
corporate govemance. 
I think because corporate governance says is that an element of salaries 
should relate to performance. I'm highly sceptical myself as to how much 
extra people really put in. 
CEO 
It's seen to be a good thing. That's the cynical answer. 
Consultant 
But you need a bonus structure, because everybody else has a bonus 
structure, and it's conventional wisdom that's the best way to pay people. 
NED 
Because they're directed that way by corporate governance standards; 
because they think it's the right thing to do. 
Consultant 
... because a third of the total remuneration is'performance related'. So you 
can write that down in the report and accounts, and when anybody questions 
you, you say 'we're complying with best corporate governance of the 
moment, and we have a substantial part of pay which is variable and subject 
to performance, etc etc!. 
Consultant 
Other respondents also mentioned that PRP was used because 'the government 
likes it'. Certainly, this is the case: both the DTI (1999,2001) and the Combined 
Code (2003: BI) have emphasised the importance of a link between directors' 
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particularly with equity-based schemes. One ftirther issue is that it is notable that 
the PRP element of the remuneration is expected by the executives. Indeed, later 
in this chapter I show that if the variable payout is not awarded, the scheme is 
often changed. One of the interviewees summed this up: 
It's not linked to performance. It's all 'pay'. Its just different ways.... I 
mean, there is a question about whether there is such a thing as pay for 
performance, and what performance is, as opposed to profit sharing. 
Consultant 
Such comments reflect a debate in the academic literature. For example, Fernie 
and Metcalf (1995: 383) set out the ways in which PRP is meant to lead to better 
performance, and state that it reads "more like a wish list than a coherent theory of 
why performance might improve". 
5.4.3 Level ofgearing 
Having established why companies use PRP, the remuneration committee still has 
to decide the level of PRP to adopt. As most schemes, both short-term and long- 
term, base the potential variable award on a multiple of salary, the gearing 
decision is about selecting appropriate multiples for the annual bonus scheme (in 
terms of on-target performance and the bonus cap) and the long-term scheme (in 
terms of the numbers of options or shares potentially made available). Yet again, 
this decision tends to reflect 'the market'. For example, one consultant 
commented that the 40% bonus cap on a particular scheme was "not generous". 
In explaining why he took this view he commented: 
You can only measure these things relative to other companies. [Pause] Its 
a very difficult question to answer. 
Consultant 
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His comment about the difficulty of setting bonus levels signals how people 
recognise that there is no 'correct' answer. As another consultant said, "It's just 
convention", and as market practices change, the level of acceptable bonus 
changes. Over time, the level of bonus cap, and bonuses paid out, has risen (New 
Bridge Street, 2003a). This was explained as being because companies have 
followed the market up: in the same way that base salaries have ratcheted up, so 
have bonus levels. 
Well again, [the level of bonus is] driven more by market forces and looking 
at what seems to be competitive levels of annual incentive. And 60% we 
know is between the median and the upper quartile of the major [sector] 
companies in the UK. 
HR manager 
Having made this point, different companies do take different stances on the level 
of gearing. One interviewee commented that his company, in a fast-moving 
business environment, had an aggressive scheme in order to attract a particular 
type of employee: 
... need to hire combative people, who are aggressive, passionate, prepared to put in 60-70 hours a week, and who are certain types of personality. And 
you simply cannot attract those people without very significant performance 
upsides in their pay. 
Company secretary 
A non-executive pointed out that in the utility that was the subject of our 
discussion there was a relatively low level of gearing, which was appropriate for 
that business. However, in another company of which he was a director there was 
a relatively low base salary and an "eat what you kill" culture of very high bonus 
potential. He stated that the cultures of the businesses were very different, as were 
the operating conditions, and the highly geared scheme would not work 
successfully in the utility. 
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A further issue concerning the level of gearing is how it links to a company's 
choice of base salary position. It was stated earlier that companies appear to set 
base pay at median or upper quartile, rarely below. This was explained by one 
HR manager as follows: 
... and had made the decision at that time that we wanted pay to be median for a few reasons. One, we actually wanted to ensure that we did introduce 
this element of variable pay to incentivise people, and therefore we wanted 
to ensure that we paid everybody a fair rate for the job, but that those who 
achieved most had the ability to increase their reward. 
HR manager 
It is interesting to dissect this argument. The company is paying median, in order 
to be fair to its employees. It is introducing a highly incentivised package, giving 
plenty upside if performance is good. However there is an argument that 
employees are protected from bad performance, as they never fall below median. 
This can be related to the argument, expressed earlier, that the PRP payout has 
become expected. In most FTSE companies a high level of executive pay is 
expected. 
5.4.4 Balance between short- and long-term elements 
Having established that a certain proportion of pay should be perfonnance-related, 
the remuneration committee has to determine the mix of short- and long-term 
elements. Both are important. Short-term bonus is useful to focus executives' 
attention on immediate operational issues, whilst the long-term element is seen to 
provide a balance, and aligmnent with the shareholders' interests. 
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And again, going back to why we chose to introduce the Itip. So they have 
got three elements now of variable pay: their annual cash bonus scheme, 
that measures group profit; you've got our [share option] scheme which has 
earnings per share; and the [share matching scheme] which has total 
shareholder return. So its the mix of those measures that helps ensure that 
the decisions aren't skewed in a particular direction. Because if you like, 
they can make a decision this year that would ensure that they got their 
annual cash bonus. However, it would probably mean that they might not 
get one of the other two bits. And therefore because of that balance it helps 
make that right decision. 
HR manager 
I think that if you were to try and cut [bonus] opportunity massively, that 
there could be an adverse impact on the performance of companies. I think 
maybe not because people would work less hard, but actually what may 
happen is that that they may actually stop focusing on the short-term, but 
actually allow results to be less positive in the short-term, on the basis of 
twe're going to produce in the future'. But if people say 'ah yes, but I don't 
believe that' and prices get marked down because they are not delivering 
today. There's this whole thing that the City only think as far as the next 
quarter, and yet managers are trying to think longer term, so in the end we 
all end up thinking short-term. 
HR manager 
Generally, the interviewees saw the short-term bonus performance targets as 
influencing behaviour more than the long-term ones. Although useful for aligning 
executives with shareholders, the long-term incentives were affected more by 
external forces ('luck') than the bonus. This characteristic has been recognised in 
the academic literature: March (1984: 56) referred to such incentive schemes as 
"Partial lotteries", as the performance criteria created unreliable distinctions 
between employees. 
5.4.5 Issues relating to annual bonus schemes 
In setting up an annual bonus scheme, the remuneration committee will have 
regard to the short-term and strategic objectives of the company. 
[CEO's measures and targets] are set in conjunction with the remn 
committee, so they're signed off by the remn committee through our 
operating plan process and strategic process. 
HR manager 
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Decisions to be made include those relating to the level of bonus available, the 
type of scheme to be used, and the selection of performance measures and targets. 
Key points relating to these will be discussed in turn. 
Level ofhonus 
There are two bonus levels that the committee needs to decide: how much will be 
paid for on-target performance, and how much will be paid for 'superior' 
performance. Similar factors affect each decision, and it is common practice for 
each of these levels to be set as a multiple of base pay. 
As stated earlier, bonus levels are dependent on 'the market', i. e. on the levels 
paid by comparable companies. In this instance, 'comparable' is often taken to be 
companies in the same FTSE index rather than in the same industrial sector. 
Market pressures are ratcheting up the level of bonus, which is tending to increase 
each year. Companies choosing highly geared schemes will set their bonus levels 
higher than others, where incentives are seen as less crucial to performance. 
Because it's got to be important enough so that you feel as if there is enough 
differentiation. If I put it at 20%, lets take it to extremes, probably it wouldn't 
enable me to make enough differentiation between an excellent and an 
average performer, if it was only 20% of base pay. But there is no science 
that tells you why it should be 50.1 mean, to be honest I think you go by 
most commonly accepted practices. 
CEO 
In examining a remuneration scheme it is insufficient merely to consider the levels 
of bonus available, one must also examine the levels historically paid. As one 
consultant pointed out, a scheme with a potential payout of 80% that historically 
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has only paid about 30% is not nearly as attractive to executives as one with 
potential for 40% that pays out fully. This is illustrated in the following extract. 
I think the main thing which came out of it was that there was a complete 
misunderstanding or mismatch of what the short-term bonus was there to 
achieve. In the sense that we had designed, we the committee, had 
designed the short-term bonus on the basis that only 50% payout would be 
achieved for the expected performance. Whereas clearly in the mindset of 
the executive, they wanted 100% every year. And they hadn't really 
appreciated that our design was designed for an average payout of 50%. 
Q: So they were feeling cheated and underpaid? 
A: They thought that if they got less than 100%, something was wrong. 
Whereas we think if they get more than 50% on average, something is 
wrong! 
Commiftee chairman 
This mismatch of expectations and payout is discussed again in, the section on 
why schemes change. 
Type of scheme 
It will be seen from Appendix 8 that the case companies used cash bonuses, and a 
variety of devices to provide a share-based element to those bonuses. One aim of 
this share-based element was to provide longer term alignment with shareholders. 
Another was to act as a retention device for valuable executives. 
There is no right answer as to which scheme is best, and there is a wide variety of 
bonus schemes, albeit all sharing the same broad characteristics. One question 
asked of all the participants was whether, if they came up with a scheme that was 
totally original but ideally suited to the company's circumstances and strategy, 
they would implement such a scheme. Responses to this were mixed. Several 
intcrviewees (particularly in utilities) stated that they would not wish to do this, as 
it could draw adverse attention from the shareholders and the media. Some HR 
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support staff indicated that they would be reluctant to put an unconventional 
scheme forward to the remuneration committee for this same reason. 
And the nature of our business, utilities, is not that it's leading-edge in terms 
of innovative approaches to rewards. So we would think very carefully about 
being first in the queue to be imaginative about reward for executives. 
There's a caution and conservatism about utilities in general, I think. And in 
our particular case, driven by some of our not-so-recent history, there is a 
conservatism about fat cattery and not making the mistakes of the past 
again and doing something idiosyncratic and a bit off the wall would likely 
draw attention to us in a way that we don't want. So, yes, I think that the 
psyche of picking relatively dependable, conservative, predictable reward 
strategies is partly a response to where we were in the past. 
HR director 
No, I would go for it. But the issues that you would face with the remn 
committee would be partly 'do we dare to be different? '. Because I think 
there is a reluctance amongst non-executive directors to be different. 
Because you can be blamed for it. They've got a higher profile. And they're 
still ... the non-execs are still a bit of a nervous bunch, I'd say, at the moment, because of history. 
Company secretary 
And the [utility] remuneration committee is actually quite strong-willed in not 
wanting to be leading-edge. 
Consultant 
But I would have thought that there's a lot of companies out there, and if 
there were these sort of novel things around, people would have thought of 
them by now. 
Company chairman 
Interestingly, relating to this last extract, the secretary of that company, in a 
separate interview, mirrored this wording exactly, which might indicate that the 
matter had been discussed at some time. 
Surprisingly, some non-executives seemed more prepared to consider an original 
scheme than their advisors might have imagined. They indicated that most 
remuneration schemes look similar, and they would have liked their consultants to 
suggest something more unusual. However, all agreed that the big issue would be 
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persuading the institutions to agree the proposals. I discussed this with an 
institutional representative, who pointed out that although in principle they and 
their members have nothing against innovative schemes, there is "an instinctive 
tendency to mistrust new measures" as often they are too easily manipulated and 
can lead to schemes being too rich. 
Before leaving this section, one quotation from an HR manager both explains their 
attitude to this issue, and illustrates where the power lies in the company: 
In some ways it's unlikely [that they would adopt a novel scheme] I've got to 
say. Because we have the strategy of linking with the market. But it 
depends what it was. The NEDs might struggle with it in the first place. The 
real person we'd have to convince is [CEO]. He does run the company. 
We're less worried about the outside world than you might think. [CEO's] 
view, and therefore our view, is that if we believe it is the right thing to do we 
should do it. He would be quite prepared to fight the ABI. He would be 
prepared to break the ABI guidelines if he felt it was the right thing to do for 
[company]. And we would expect to win the argument. 
HR manager 
Performance measures and targets 
Companies use the measures and targets in their short-term incentives as a means 
to focus executive attention on what is seen as important. The schemes can be 
adapted each year, the choice of performance measures and targets changing to 
reflect current business issues. 
As set out in Appendix 8, in their desire to create focus on key objectives, 
companies had used different types of performance measures, to accommodate 
differences in their cultures and structures, and in their aims. Some implemented 
both financial and non-financial measures, others used just financial ones. Some 
rewarded individual targets, others tried to inculcate a group sense of shared 
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responsibility by adopting solely group targets. It was accepted that the 
performance measures and targets needed to be appropriate to the business 
circumstances, linked to strategic plans. 
Some of them will be about the things that will back up delivery of the 
operating plan. Some of them will be about actually bringing about the 
cultural changes within the business. So how we are expecting him as our 
leader to operate and bring about some of those changes. So some of 
those are sort of the more subjective ones, obviously. They have to be. 
HR manager 
In setting targets, companies often use their operating budget as a standard. Given 
that the budget is set by executives, and the remuneration packages are approved 
by NEDs with less detailed knowledge of the business, one question asked of the 
participants was how the non-executives knew whether the targets were 
reasonable in the context of anticipated perfonnance. A couple of non-executives 
(both in the same company) argued that their business experience facilitated this. 
But take me for example. I've been the chief executive of [company]. I 
know all about setting budgets and what the key drivers of a budget are. I 
think I have enough experience to ask the right questions and make 
judgements. [NED], for example, was finance director of [company]. So he 
again is well equipped for experience to get inside the budget quite quickly. 
Committee chairman 
... has been particularly difficult on this score, when we come to setting budgets, they tend to set soft budgets at [company]. 
Q: How do you know that they set soft budgets? 
A: Because they found them so easy to achieve them. 
NED 
However, most of the other non-executives admitted that this was an issue, and 
that they could not possibly know as much about the businesses as the executives. 
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Many of the participants stated that there needed to be an element of trust between 
the parties in order for the process to work 47 . 
I think the overall integrity of senior management is such that you have to 
have a target that the remuneration committee can live with. This is where 
the remuneration committee can't have the same sort of feel; they have to 
trust what the target is that is given to them from the organisation. They can 
push it a bit, they can say... But at the end of the day they don't have the 
hands on executive contact that would allow them to say I think this is a fair 
profit target for the year', or I think you're making it too easy'. 
Company secretary 
Well the conclusion you come to is that that's a role for the non-executives, 
to prevent it setting easy targets. But, you know, it's not necessarily all that 
easy to do. ... So there 
is that problem, I agree. But there are many other 
problems in all this. For example, the bonuses, how do you prevent short 
term arrangements made to achieve certain profit levels in certain periods, 
and all that? ... 
The answer to that question is ultimately, I don't think you 
can. But as part of the sort of... this kind of vague thing that non-executives 
do, you have to try and monitor that. And it's all about... everything about 
being a non-executive is about trying to know your company, know your 
executive colleagues, try to get a feel for how they are behaving. If you have 
confidence in them, then you need to worry less about that; if you don't, then 
either you need to go, or change them, or something. But there's a lot of 
, instinct and feel and such like. 
Committee chairman 
I think to a degree it's a question of having faith in the FID to start with. 
Because he or she is charged with making sure that the company is acting 
honestly, if you like. And the non-execs have to trust him or her. At the end 
of the day there's no shortcut, there's no way round that. 
HR director 
One company secretary indicated his belief that budgets were set with half an eye 
on the performance targets they would entail: 
47 It must be noted that the nature of the research sample - all of the companies were volunteers for 
this study - implies that there might be more trust between executives and non-executives on 
remuneration matters in these companies than there is in the population generally. 
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So when the operating plan is set, you will end with, in very loose terms, a 
profit target for the year end. And that profit target will be the one against 
which your achieved level of bonus will be, and then there will be a sliding 
scale up from that, in excess of that. So there is a disincentive to have too 
stretching a profit target, because it will very quickly be potentially 
dernotivating if you know you've not hit it. But it does mean that if you just 
took away all thoughts of reward, if suddenly you could change somebody's 
mind and say I only want to operate for the good of the company and the 
shareholders, then I'm not sure you'd come up with exactly the same 
operating plan. I don't think it's been particularly harmful, but I think I'd come 
up with a different operating plan, where you'd put more stretch in it. 
Company secretary 
5.4.6 Issues relating to long-term incentives 
Underlying the use of a long-terin incentive are issues of aligmnent of executives' 
interests with those of the company, and of retention of good executives. 
Committees also have a fundamental choice to make between options and Itips. 
That choice is the starting point for this section, which will then move on to 
consider the other issues. 
Schemes, measures and targets 
Figure 5-3 Characteristics of long-term schemes adopted by case companies 
* Of the 12 companies, seven had option schemes and 10 had Itips (five had both). 
Of the options, two used TSR as a performance measure and five used eps growth. 
The targets for eps growth ranged upwards from RPI+2%. 
Of the Itips, two used eps growth as the performance measure and eight used TSR. 
Of those using TSR, four supplemented it with another financial measure. 
In the section on annual bonuses, types of scheme were considered separately 
from the choice of measures and targets. In considering long-term incentive 
schemes this distinction is not appropriate, not because it is not a valid distinction, 
but because often the participants appear not to make the distinction themselves. 
Regularly in the interviews, a question about why a company had adopted an 
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Itip/option was answered initially by stating why TSR/eps was an appropriate 
measure. 
There's been a big debate on Itips versus options. Ups, I suppose for two 
reasons, none of us were particularly happy with. They were spawned in the 
time when options for utilities were being decried in the media. But the 
problem first of all is, what is an appropriate peer group to measure 
shareholder return against? ... And the second thing is, if the whole sector does well and you create value for the shareholders, but you happen to be 
No 5 out of 10, you don't get anything. You've created value because you 
performed well, but because the whole sectors performed well you finish up 
with nothing. Whereas a share option, at least if you've created value it's 
reflected in the share price so you benefit. The disadvantage of the option, it 
is said, is that you piggyback on the whole market going up without 
necessarily improving performance. So there are pros and cons. But I think 
it is fair to say that the members of the remuneration committee all favour 
options... 
CEO 
Q: You moved from an Itip to an option scheme. What happened? 
A: ... It is a matter of philosophy, 
isn't it. Both in terms of your view on what 
the most appropriate performance indicator is: is it total shareholder return 
or EPS? - and we could sit here for the next two days arguing about it and 
not come to a conclusion. So I think you have to start from that position. 
But it's my view that earnings per share is a measure which the executives 
can have a fair degree of influence over, and therefore it's fair and 
reasonable that they should get measured against it. 
Committee chairman 
This chairman did then go on to discuss other reasons why an option was more 
appropriate than an Itip. However, because of this mingling of ideas, schemes, 
measures and targets are all considered together in this section. 
Ups and options 
Long-term incentives will take the form either of an executive share option 
scheme or of a share-based long-term incentive plan, an Itip. Prior to the Myners 
and Greenbury reports in 1995, UK schemes were mostly options-based. This 
changed after 1995, and Itips became more popular. However, in recent years the 
market has seen a trend back to options, or to the use of both options and Itips. 
The following quotations illustrate this. 
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Also, you've got to look a little bit back in history. Share options were the 
flavour of the month, certainly at privatisation. And we all had a share option 
scheme. 
Company chairman 
But clearly you're right to the extent that TSR-linked Itips were fashionable, I 
suppose, and not surprising given the output of the Myners committee, the 
Greenbury committee, and the published guidelines of some of the 
institutional representative bodies. We then saw a swing back towards 
options, that's true. 
Consultant 
[Regarding the use of both Itip and option. ] Both Mid 250 companies 
generally and within their own sector it was either one or the other. It's 
becoming much more common among the FTSE 100 companies and we 
may see it in future drift down. 
Consultant 
The arguments for and against options and Itips are set out in chapter 2; there is 
no clear advantage of one type of scheme over the other in all circumstances. 
Companies looking for a steer on this from their shareholders would be 
disappointed: institutional pressures have not been consistent as regards whether 
options or Itips have been preferred. 
For instance, in the UK in the early 1990s, the Association of British 
Insurers and the National. Association ofPension Funds could not agree on 
the favoured structure of long-term incentive plans. Yhe ABI favoured 
share options with earnings per share hurdles, the NAPFfavoured L-TIPs 
based on total shareholder returns against a suitable peer group. It is no 
wonder that companies threw their hands up and simply designed schemes 
that they believed would command enough supportftom both bodies to he 
carried through. 
International Corporate Governance Network (2002) 
This being the case, the decision to use an option or an Itip appears in some cases 
to have been somewhat arbitrary: 
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I don't think there was a great deal of debate. I think there was a general 
feeling round the remuneration table that share options were not what 
people were going for at this point in time, that they were going more for 
things that demanded a long-term performance against some agreed 
hurdles, performance targets which needed to be achieved. And I suspect 
that you're going to tell me that even share options now can have hurdle 
rates. 
NED 
Other participants did state a view as to why they chose one scheme or another, or 
indeed both. The chairman cited earlier went on to say: 
But why options as opposed to Itips? Especially for the senior people, in my 
view, they should share in the rewards of the company in terms of their 
medium-term to long-term incentive in the way that shareholders benefit. 
And therefore if there is growth in the value of the share price and our 
shareholders benefit, as they should, so should our executives. 
Committee chairman 
Of course, although options are a more geared instrument than Itips the argument 




Other reasons given for choosing one scheme over another included49: 
* Options are used extensively in the US. 
o Options have a tax advantage over Itips in that under current Inland Revenue 
regulations the first E30,000 is not taxed. 
* Options, under current rules, may not show as a charge against profits. (Few 
of the participants said that the forthcoming change in accounting regulations 
would lead to a change in their remuneration policies. One of the companies 
48 For the same cost to the company, more options can be issued to an executive than can shares 
under an Itip. Option values are more volatile to share price changes than are Itips, their value to 
executives falling dramatically when out-of-the-money. 
49 These reasons are deliberately not analysed between those in favour of options and those in 
favour of Itips. Because the balance of power in some companies is with the committee and in 
some is with the executives, it is difficult to state whether the interviewees saw some of these 
features as advantages or disadvantages! 
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has since changed its scheme away from options, citing accounting issues as 
one reason. ) 
* An Itip delivers value to executives even if the share price falls, so options are 
more aligned. (Some saw Itips as effectively options granted at a nil exercise 
price. ) 
9 It is a powerful signal for executives to hold shares, and retain them, whereas 
shares are generally sold on exercise of options. 
9 Options carry the risk of being underwater. 
* In a bull market, options give the executive more value, merely from the 
'rising tide'. 
The timescales for options are longer than Itips. 
9 Ups are more complex than options. 
Very little intellectualising over this subject was noted, even when reading 
consultants' reports recommending one or the other scheme. However, one HR 
professional, whose company used either options or an Itip in any one year, 
explained clearly the advantages that he saw of each scheme under different 
circumstances: 
... they actually do have a different sort of shape. One is more heavily 
geared on how the share price is doing. The other is more heavily geared 
on how well we are doing compared to other people. 
And 
Because the other thing is that with share options you [the executive] get the 
best value, probably after ten years. Whereas the performance shares it's 
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Perfonnance measures and targets 
In the UK, it is common, although not universal, for share option schemes to use a 
performance measure based on growth in eps relative to an inflation index, and for 
Itips to use a performance measure based on TSR relative to a comparator index. 
As stated earlier, many of the participants appeared to make the assumption that if 
a particular type of measure was most appropriate for their needs, then they should 
adopt the relevant type of incentive. 
Reasons given for using eps-based measures rather than TSR measures mostly 
revolved around the problems associated with TSR. Being measured against a 
comparator group, it is important that the group selected is appropriate in terms of 
size and composition. There is an immediate issue as regards the size of a 
comparator group, particularly with utilities, as there has been so much M&A 
activity in that sector in recent years. Each merger or takeover reduces the pool of 
comparators. Furthermore, a weak company may be taken over at a premium - 
which increases that company's TSR, unfairly distorting the comparator index. 
Several interviewees reflected on this issue. 
Let's say you start off with ten companies in a comparator group. Within six 
months a couple of them have been taken over. You then get down to three 
or four. Now, how do you measure median and upper decile with three or 
four comparators? It just becomes meaningless. 
Consultant 
A related issue was the decision on whether to use a comparator group of similar 
companies, or an index, for example FTSE 100. 
The difficult area is the comparator group. Everybody's got a different idea, 
from 'it should only be utilities', to 'it should be the whole FTSE index', and 
anything between those two. 
Committee chairman 
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The advantage of using an index is that there are always enough companies in it 
for a realistic median to be taken, which addresses the points made earlier. 
However, if a particular sector is out of favour with the City, share prices in that 
sector will be depressed relative to the index, with the result that Itip payouts will 
be penalised. 
For these reasons, many companies prefer an eps growth target. In adopting an 
eps measure, most of the companies used RPI as a performance benchmark, taking 
an RPI+X% formula. Decisions then had to be made as to the level of X, both for 
the minimum payout to be triggered, and for maximum payout. The majority of 
companies in the sample (and indeed, in the FTSE 350 - New Bridge Street, 
2003b) took a base level of X at 2% or 3% per annum over three years. I pointed 
out to many of the participants that growing earnings at this level would not 
generate shareholder value, as it would not cover the cost of equity. This, 
however, was not seen as an issue. The general response was that the benchmark 
was set based on 'the market'. 
However, in some companies the level of X required to achieve full payout was 
significant, with companies having considered their industry dynamic 50 . 
50 Although many companies are now modelling expected payouts from their schemes at various 
levels of performance, there was no indication that the performance hurdles were closely linked to 
companies' costs of capital and price earnings ratios. 
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... and my view of RPI plus 3 is that if you don't get there you should be 
shot. You shouldn't be in business, you should put the money in the bank. 
The fact that that should be around is, I think, terrible. But it doesn't matter. 
What we very much wanted was something which was tiered. That said this 
is the threshold where you get something, I think 33% at RPI plus 3, and 
then you get the maximum at RPI plus [XI %. So it was a matter of setting a 
scale. So the first point was we didn't want something which the light switch 
was "on or off', we wanted something which was tiered, and we wanted 
something that rewarded them for well above average performance. Again, 
fitting into the philosophy that I talked about. 
Committee chairman 
Several interviewees mentioned the problem of setting aggressive eps growth 
targets in technology-related companies which had appeared achievable a few 
years ago, and were impossible under recession conditions". Another problem 
raised on the eps measure was the situation of regulated utilities, where the 
regulator has significantly reduced the companies' profits every five years. This 
has led to many schemes which are not paying out - as discussed later, in the 
section on changes in schemes. 
One final comment in this section, made by many of the participants, was that 
TSR is a very complex measure and it is difficult to incentivise people on 
something they do not understand. With a share option scheme based on eps 
growth, executives can look at the Financial Times every day to see if their 
options are in-the-money, and have a good idea what the profits for the business 
are likely to be, to evaluate whether performance conditions are likely to be met. 
With TSR, a complex calculation has to be done to average out the company's 
share price and dividend return over a period, then do the same for each of a group 
of comparators, then determine the median and upper quartile positions. Even if a 
51 And one consultant asserted that what usually happens in such cases is that the company sacks 
its consultant and takes advice from another about a new scheme! 
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company is doing well, it is not intuitively obvious to the executives whether, or 
indeed why, their scheme will pay out. 
All this adds complexity. And I think most participants would say that it lacks 
in transparency. You don't particularly know on any day where you are. 
You really don't know where you are until you're past the goal posts. So on 
that basis it becomes a reward rather than an incentive. 
Consultant 
Aligmment 
One of the main reasons given for using a long-term scheme is to align executives 
with shareholders. Alignment tends to come through the long-term scheme rather 
than the short-term bonus, if only because long-term incentives involve a form of 
equity-holding. 
And basically we felt that identification and primarily share ownership - not 
options really but share ownership - was probably the best way of getting 
alignment between shareholders and the company management. 
HR manager 
And the last one was to put in an arrangement which encouraged people, in 
fact required people to invest some of their bonus in the company's shares. 
And that gave them a better alignment with shareholders, but gave them an 
awful lot of upside if they did well with the business. 
Consultant 
This requirement for executive shareholding was met in some companies by 
linking to the short- or long-term incentives, and in others by demanding that 
directors build up a shareholding equal to a multiple of their base salary. 
However, although it is seen as best practice to align executives through a 
shareholding, at least one interviewee took the view that this technique may not 
always achieve the desired results. 
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Does it make people behave differently? I wish I could say yes. So yes they 
behave differently when it comes the time to move somewhere else, but 
does it make them make wiser management decisions? Individually, the 
unfortunate answer is no. Collectively though, you can. So when I will sit in 
front of, which is going to be in a couple of days from now, the 30 top 
managers, and when we make strategic decisions as to what we should or 
shouldn't be doing, then the alignment is much easier. And I don't have to 
remind everybody that they are all shareholders and potential shareholders. 
I think that it is probably easier to align them to the shareholder interest 
when in the back of their mind they know that they've got their own shares 
outthere. 
CEO 
Another interviewee pointed out the impact of 'downside alignment' as well as the 
upside: 
Now not only have your executives got no upside left in their [incentive 
scheme], they've also lost a significant amount of personal money in their 
matching contribution in the restricted share plans. And then you're 
reaching the stage where as a remuneration committee you have to do... 
well our remuneration committee basically takes the view that the object of 
the exercise is to align the interests of executives with shareholders, and 
they are now aligned. The executives have lost money, so have the 
shareholders. 
Company secretary 
In the respondent validation focus group I asked if PRP aligned directors' interests 
with those of the shareholders. Following this question there was silence for 12 
full seconds, before one of the participants answered "not necessarily". This, and 
the discussion that followed, indicates that the alignment may be more sought 
after than achieved. 
Retention 
Another reason given for using long-term incentives was the need to retain good 
executives in the company: if they have an equity payout due after, say, three 
years, they are less likely to leave. 
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Because what shares do not do is create a retention possibility. And the 
reason why we give options is that you have to be there to get them. So its 
a retention tool, whereas shares, like restricted shares in my case, basically 
align you immediately but they are mostly yours. And if you make them too 
restricted, then they become options to a certain extent. 
CEO 
Two issues arise from this: one relates to 'jumping off points', and one to the 
practice of companies 'buying out' executives' contracts. The comment on 
jumping off points was raised by the secretary of a company that had made very 
substantial grants of options in one particular year; all of these options would vest 
at the same time. 
The issue of course that that can potentially bring is that as soon as you do 
something like that, in my view, you set at date by which someone knows 
they've got to stay until, but it gives them a leaving opportunity. And I think 
that's part of why you need to have a smooth retention plan in relation to 
people, because otherwise you get jumping off points. 
Company secretary 
As regards buying out executives' contracts, options and restricted equity act as a 
'handcuff to the extent that the executive will lose financially if he leaves the 
company. If his new employer agrees to a 'golden hello' which gives him 
equivalent value to what he is foregoing, then there is no retention effect. 
Effectively, the handcuff is merely a transfer fee paid by the other company. 
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I think to get to the same point with an earlier question you had - 'does it 
make people act differently? ', which is the real question. Because it makes 
them probably... Before they move to another company, yes. There is a 
moment in time when they have to make an assessment 'are my options 
worth so much that I can't possibly afford to lose them? '. And today that is a 
true obstacle for moving to another company. Not if they are underwater of 
course, so we have a regular check on how much our managers have 
invested and vested in [company], so therefore how difficult is it for them to 
move away, or to be tempted to move away, on the basis of the capital they 
have invested in our company, and that they would lose if they move 
somewhere else. Then you judge as to, okay, but would any potential new 
employer, would they be capable to buy them out? And we bought out some 
people. But there's a pain level where you will probably not do it. So 
depending on the value of the individual, it has its limits. And I remember at 
least two people whom I said no thank you, because its just simply too 
much, the cost is just absolutely astronomic. So that's one piece of it, the 
retention issue. 
CEO 
It should be pointed out that the headhunters interviewed for this research argued 
that quite often the new company is not prepared to buy out the package, and so it 
does act as a retention device. 
Choice ofperformance period 
A particular challenge relating to longer term perfonnance-related pay is that 
conditions when the award period ends may have changed considerably from 
those which pertained when the performance measures and targets were set. 
External conditions - perhaps simplistically described as 'luck' - could impact on 
performance positively or negatively, thus meaning that executives could claim 
unearned awards, or fail to achieve ali award despite good performance. It is 
perhaps fair to state that none of the people interviewed appear to have taken issue 
with high awards being made for good luck, although several mentioned the 
negative impact of factors outside their control. This is in line with the findings of 
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) who suggested that companies are more concerned 
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with the retention risk of losing executives who do not receive an award due to 
'bad luck' than they are with the risk of overpaying executives for good luck. 
I think again the same is true of the long-term. The average employee can't 
affect the share price performance, whereas your top executive can. But the 
longer you go out, I think the less sharp an incentive it is. Particularly when 
it's share price, there are so many different factors that are going to 
influence what the share price does. 
Consultant 
All of the companies in the sample, and indeed the majority of large listed 
companies (New Bridge Street, 2003b) use performance-related long-term 
rewards as part of their directors' remuneration packages. However, despite the 
diversity of the industries in which they operate, it is almost universal that 'long- 
term' is defined as three years. This in part reflects the sentiments discussed 
above, that the performance targets are difficult to judge over longer periods. 
... no plan is going to work if it goes beyond the time 
horizon of an executive 
participant population. And in my view it's very difficult to see that beyond 
three years. ... I think you would also have to say that if we're talking about 
meaningful performance targets, and I don't believe that plans adopted for 
five or ten years should actually incorporate a defined performance measure 
along with targets... 
Consultant 
There is another explanation for the ubiquity of the three year perfonnance period. 
One of the consultants explained that a statement from the ABI in the early 
eighties had used a period of three years as its example of a longer term scheme, 
and that this had been universally adopted. Furthermore, the consultant suggested 
that the three years had been chosen as an example because it fitted in with Inland 
Revenue rules for share options at that time, so there was little business logic 
behind it. Since then, as more companies have adopted three year performance 
measurement terms it has become accepted practice. - Furthermore, it might be 
disadvantageous to a company to use a longer performance period, as companies 
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are in competition to attract and retain good executives, and a longer period could 
be seen as a negative by the executives. 
Amount ofaward 
Remuneration committees have to determine the amount of options to grant or Itip 
shares to award each year. One of the research questions was to ask the 
participants how this was determined. As with many of the research findings in 
this study, the answer came down to 'the market' - generally companies awarded 
about the same multiple of salary as they saw their comparators doing, and with 
much the same ratcheting effect. Awards were also made dependent on 
performance in the year - for example, the amount of options awarded would be a 
function of (a) salary and (b) the performance bonus. 
5.4.7 Inputfactors to the decision on pay structure 
In chapter 41 discussed a questionnaire survey given to the participants, soliciting 
their views on factors affecting remuneration. Table 5-2 sets out the factors 
affecting pay structure, ranked in order of their average score. 
Table 5-2 Factors affecting the structure of pay 
Score (max 5) 
Investors' views 4.25 
Shareholder returns 3.95 
Company strategy/industry 3.86 
Company profitability 3.71 
Company size 3.38 
Financial accounting considerations 2.86 
Tax (for the company) 2.81 
Cash flow 2.52 
Individual directors' experience and qualifications 2.43 
Tax (for the individual) 2.43 
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It was clear from the interviews that investors' views (and good governance 
practices generally) are an important influence, as are the company's strategy and 
industry. The issues of strategy and industry were discussed in chapter 2, and 
these findings support that literature, in that the choice of pay levels and schemes 
appears to reflect industry and lifecycle characteristics. The influence of 
institutional investors is worth considering further here. 
The private disclosures made by UK companies to their institutional investors, and 
the influence of said investors, particularly during periods of corporate difficulty, 
have been well documented (for example Holland, 1996,2002; Pye, 2001). It is 
interesting to note how the relationship has changed over the past decade. 
Holland and Doran (1998: 145) reported on interviews conducted in 1993/4 
(before the Greenbury report) with fund managers and senior directors, and stated 
that: 
The case FIs [financial institutions] also identified areas such as executive 
remuneration where they were careful and sometimes avoided influencing 
management. 
The argument made was that it is management's 'right to manage' and this is 
outside the FIs' area of competence. However, they then went on to state that: 
Despite these FI comments, it may prove difficult in the political climate of 
the late 1990s for the case FIs to maintain their view that their corporate 
agents can determine the size and structure o their own remuneration. )f 
(1998: 145) 
This indeed proved to be the case, and institutions have become far more active in 
commenting on, and demanding changes to, executive remuneration policies and 
packages. 
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The majority of interviewees made reference to the way in which they interacted 
with the institutions in determining the pay of the directors. It is a regulatory 
requirement to seek shareholders' approval for long-term, share-based 
remuneration schemes (Combined Code, 2003: A). However, the interaction 
often goes further than this, with companies seeking institutional comment in 
advance of finalising a scheme, in order to ensure that the scheme will gain 
acceptance. This is considered very important, as illustrated by one NED 
reflecting on institutional liaison: 
And, you know, is it in accordance with best practice and good governance? 
Because the one thing you don't want is a row with the ABI and the Financial 
Times and Patience Wheatcroft and Niall Collins all in one season! 
NED 
This point was also made by one of the consultants: 
We would liaise with the ABI. That is a very important part of the project, 
because different investors have different views and it's a question of 
knowing what the sensitivities are, where they are coming from, and trying to 
take some of the heat out of the process. Getting it done before the circular 
hits the press is obviously something we'd recommend. A lot of the 
problems come in this area because you leave too little time for that, and 
then the shareholders start doing their talking through the press, and that 
doesn't help anybody. 
Consultant 
The participants referred to the liaison with institutions taking place in a variety of 
different ways. These included: 
* letter sent in the name of the remuneration consultant; 
* letter sent in the name of the chairman of the remuneration committee (often 
drafted by the consultant or the HR professional); 
e telephone contact, with either the chairman of the committee, the HR support, 
the company secretary or the consultant; 
* face-to-face meetings, with any of the above. 
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From the interviews, it seemed that the consultants preferred the dialogue to take 
place through them, and saw themselves as having the technical knowledge to be 
able to 'translate' between the parties. 
It's mostly us [who do the liaison]. But it is changing. There is a pressure 
from the institutions that they want to see the company, really, rather than 
us. Which in some ways I understand. But then you have the issue of how 
well-versed is the person who actually goes along, in terms of actually 
talking to them... That dynamic is changing. But I think it's in a bit of a 
development phase. I think it's a bit like the consultants. You're holding, 
actually, all the cards. One, you understand the arrangement better. You 
understand what each party doesn't know, and you are able to piece it 
together. Whereas if both parties on both sides had more knowledge to start 
off with, they would be able to talk more readily. But remn co chairmen, it's 
one of the things they do, and they are not experts in the whole thing. And 
therefore the conversation doesn't go... you're not talking at the right level to 
start off with, so how can you cover the breadth if you haven't got enough 
knowledge? Whereas the consultants can go from here to there easily. 
Consultant 
However, the institutions preferred to be able to discuss matters with the 
committee chairman himself, or at least with members of the company. The 
following extract from interview notes surnmarises the view of an institutional 
respondent: 
The company can put forward the chairman of the committee, the HR 
professional or the consultants. At different stages in the process, each 
could be acceptable. But for the set piece meeting when they are explaining 
to [institution] what they are proposing to do, that should be led by the 
remuneration committee chairman. And it's good if the chairman can come 
without the consultants - looks better. 
This was reflected in the practice of one company, where the dialogue was at 
different levels depending on the matters being discussed. For technical issues, 
the consultants were involved; for matters of principle the committee chairman 
and the SID (senior independent director) conducted the meetings on their own. 
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5.4.8 How companies determine the structure ofpay. - summary of 
section 
It is now appropriate to summarise how companies determine the structure of their 
executive pay. The use of PRP is ubiquitous - partly for HR reasons such as 
providing motivation and focus, and partly for reasons of legitimacy with the 
investment community and regulators. However, not all participants believe that 
PRP 'works'. Nonetheless, there is a perceived need for PRP; accordingly, 
schemes are structured to align with the company's strategy, and based on 
schemes adopted in similar companies, which are seen to be acceptable to the 
investing institutions. 
5.5 Why companies change their remuneration schemes 
5.5.1 Raising the issue 
In arriving at the original research question, how companies determine the pay of 
their executive directors, the issue of why companies change their policies did not 
arise. It has not featured particularly in the academic literature (other than to note 
the continual rise in pay and the increased levels of PRP). However, in 
conducting the interviews it became apparent that most of the companies in the 
sample had made changes to their policies and packages during the period under 
discussion 52 , and that the reasons 
behinds these changes were relevant to an 
understanding of the remuneration-setting processes. Hence in this section I 
discuss the changes that were made and the reasons given. 
52 Most of the changes discussed had taken place within the last two years. In one company, one 
change was five years earlier. 
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To place this in context, Appendix 9 sets out a summary of the reasons given for 
changes made over the past few years by each company. 
5.5.2 Changes made to remuneration policies andpackages 
The main changes made by the case companies are summarised in Figure 5-4. 
Figure 5-4 Main changes to remuneration policies and packages 
Performance measures changed (short-term and long-term) 
Type of scheme changed (short-term and long-term) 
Choice of comparator changed for long-term schemes 
Introduced a shareholding requirement for executives 
Salary levels increased 
Perks increased 
Level of bonus available increased 
Level of long-term incentive available increased 
None of the changes led to a decrease in executive pay: all resulted in an actual or 
potential increase. This was reflected, indirectly, in a comment of one of the 
interviewees discussing why the changes to their scheme had taken place when 
they did, and not several years earlier. 
As far as options is concerned, options had been very popular with 
management, as you can imagine, during a period of a constantly rising 
share price, and no performance conditions attached to them. And I think 
that it would have been a very brave management that would decide to take 
away something that was delivering significant rewards to people and 
replace it ... 
Company secretary 
Some of the changes made were significant, and came about as the result of an 
extensive review, often commissioned from consultants. Other changes, such as 
adapting performance measures or increasing bonus levels, were considered (by 
the parties) to be more minor. The explanations given by the interviewees for 
making the changes are set out in the next section. 
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5.5.3 Why change? 
There were many different stimuli for change. The analysis in Appendix 9 sets 
out some detail of these; here I summarise them under broad headings, to show 
the key themes. 
Market-related changes 
Several of the case companies made changes (for example, increasing the level of 
salary or bonus) because their existing schemes were considered to be below 
market. In only one of the companies was it specifically stated that this had led to 
executive dissatisfaction; there was generally just a desire to remain in line with 
'the market'. 
The thing was that we hadn't had to recruit anybody into those senior 
positions for a long time. Everybody had been in post for quite a number of 
years. So there was never a need to test whether those levels were 
attractive to get people in. So we adjusted those, and we adjusted certain 
other things, for example things like cars. ... I mean, the whole thing... the bonus scheme was pretty poor in terms of the potential rewards. There was 
a share option scheme at the time, but no Itip. So all in all it was the whole 
remuneration package was a long way out of line with the rest of the world. 
Company chairman 
Market factors related not just to the level of salaries, but also to the level of 
bonus award available for on-target and maximum performance. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the level of PRP is increasing. Companies are making these 
changes as they see other companies increasing the potential awards. 
... if you took the fixed and variable mix of cash, 80% was fixed and 20% 
variable. We felt that was totally out of kilter with competitive companies, as 
it was. ... I mean, the role of the non-executive is to bring independent advice to the executive. And when we were talking with the then chairman 
about the company we asked him to consider the mix of fixed and variable, 
because we thought it was out of line with all of our experiences. 
NED 
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Well the reason we're increasing it [long-term incentive] is that we think the 
marketplace again has gone more towards a greater than 100% basic. 
HR director 
Changing schemes because they do notpay out 
Another ma or reason for making changes to executive remuneration schemes was j 
that the performance-related elements were not paying out, or not paying out to 
the extent expected when they were set up 53 . The interpretation of this fact in the 
companies was* that the schemes (either short-term or long-term or both) were not 
working, and so they needed to be amended. In some cases this seemed eminently 
fair - for regulated utilities, whose profits are reduced by the regulatory review, 
targets set several years earlier would be unattainable. 
Well, basically the reason we decided that it needed to change was because 
the commercial environment in which we are operating had changed 
significantly due to the last price reviews in [utility sector], to the extent that it 
was impossible to pay out anything at all under the Itip because 
[performance measure] could never be achieved. Because the income of 
the company had been reduced by about 25%. Therefore you are on a 
loser. And so with that background it was decided that we needed to 
introduce another Itip, another long-term incentive scheme which had the 
potential to pay out and would have different tests... 
Commiftee chairman 
It could be argued that it is the role of executives to negotiate an appropriate 
agreement with the regulator, and so their pay parameters should not be changed if 
the review is penal. This, perhaps, is a bit harsh, and although one NED hinted at 
it, none of the companies implemented this. However, the tendency to change 
schemes that were not paying out was consistent over all sectors, and related not 
just to the regulatory impact. The following quotations illustrate this. 
I know we certainly came to the conclusion that the bonus scheme was not 
operating effectively for a number of reasons; we didn't have the correct ... 
53 For example, one bonus scheme was changed because the anticipated payout of about 40% of 
salary had turned out to be an actual payout of about 15%-20% of salary. The performance 
measures and targets were unchanged, but the effective payout limit was doubled. 
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targets for individual executives. And because of the regulator's settlement, 
we knew that the total shareholder return target we had was quite useless. 
NED 
But what it really basically meant was that we were sitting there with no long- 
term incentive plan that was worthwhile having, with anybody having 
anything in the bank, if you like. So we had to sort of look at it anew. 
Company secretary 
It clearly wasn't much of an incentive; its been running [for a number of 
years] and hasn't actually paid out anything yet at all. So they thought that it 
was being almost disregarded by the senior management as an incentive. 
Company secretary 
But every time we put a report in, there's a summary that says "if that was 
the end product, if we were now at the end of a three-year performance 
period, then these are what the awards would be. i. e. nothing. " And when 
you get a quarterly report - because our remuneration committee meets five 
or six times a year, perhaps more frequently than most would do - and 
every time they're meeting they're getting a report that says 'no payout if it 
stays like this', and it did tend to stay like that. Then the message is coming 
through loud and clear that they have the long-term incentive that is not 
incentivising. So when you then get a response from the executives which is 
reinforcing those sort of messages, you don't have to be a rocket scientist to 
work out that you need to do something. 
HR manager 
So the combination of the dissatisfaction with the construct of the schemes, 
the doom and gloom about their ability to pay out, and the general unease 
coming from the executives about pay levels in general combined really to 
start the engine running which was to produce the new incentive 
arrangements. 
HR director 
Really, it fell into disrepute as a means of remunerating people, because it 
did not pay out for two, and then three years. People just looked at it 
negatively. The fact that the company had not performed even at median 
level when compared with its peers in terms of total shareholder return was 
not something that they were focusing on. 
HR director 
In an earlier section it was noted that many interviewees argued that variable pay 
may not motivate. However, they all argued that a lack of pay can demotivate (as 
discussed by Herzberg, 1968). This reason was specifically given for the changes 
in some schemes. An interviewee in one company whose share options were 
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considerably underwater commented that the options being out-of-the-money was 
a significant demotivator. 
... if they are miles underwater the disincentive - it's not as if it's neutral, its 
actually almost a negative. 
Company secretary 
Changes in the schemes for reasons relating to non-payment included changes to 
the level of short-term award available, to the performance measures and targets 
(both short- and long-term), and to the type of long-term scheme. From the 
interviews, it was very clear that both executives and non-executives, and the 
consultants who advise them, felt that schemes that did not pay out were not 
working, and needed to be changed. I suggested to some of the interviewees that 
if a scheme did not pay out, that meant that the executives had not performed 
sufficiently well, and so did not deserve a payment (which approach would be in 
line with agency theory). Whilst none disagreed with this comment, the feeling 
was that it was not a very helpful way to approach matters: 
Oh, that is an argument that is put, but I don't think that it carries you very 
much further forward. You could say that they've gone so far underwater 
that the management doesn't deserve it. You could say that the 
management should therefore be sacked, you should find a new 
management. And there is a bit of that, I'm sure. But every day is the first 
day of the rest of our lives. And if you actually believe, and I think that there 
is some evidence that investors are coming round to this view, but these 
things do have a place in the pantheon, then actually that sort of statement 
is just a cop out. It doesn't get you very much further. 
NED 
At first sight, this might appear to be an instance of 'fat cattery', with executives 
having large elements of PRP and schemes being manipulated to ensure payout. 
However, it should be noted that this phenomenon is not limited to executives. 
There are various examples in the literature of schemes being changed for lower 
level employees for exactly this reason. For example, Gerhart and Rynes (2003: 
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173) discussed an incentive pay programme at DuPont which was considered a 
great success whilst it was paying out, and had to be terminated due to employee 
discontent when the company could not pay due to poor results. They also cited a 
similar outcome with the PRP scheme at Saturn. Similarly, Lewis (1998: 68) 
suggested a feedback loop in his PRP process cycle, such that underperformance 
54 
may lead to a decrease in performance targets . It thus appears that in many 
levels of the hierarchy, PRP is only considered workable when the schemes 
produce a reward. 
Changes in the company 
Many of the changes discussed with the participants came about because of 
fundamental changes, or desired changes, in the company's strategy, culture or 
organisation. As discussed earlier, company strategy is an important input into the 
nature of the schemes, and changing the remuneration scheme was a fundamental 
part of changing the strategy - the performance measures and targets could be 
seen as symbols of the required commercial change. 
There was a recognition among the executive that if we were going to 
change direction, then remuneration had to be reviewed as part of that 
change of direction. 
HR director 
We all, I think, began to reflect the view that the incentives needed to 
change, to meet both our aspirations and the changing shape of the 
business. 
HR director 
54 He also suggested that overachievement would lead to an increase in performance targets. 
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That epitomises what it's been about. So, if you like, the incentive plans - or 
at least the short-term incentive plans - have been designed to support that 
particular objective. 
HR manager 
Well it reflects of course the changing nature of the company. 
CEO 
What we've arrived at here is a management team in [company] that is 
committed to the strategy and understands that the only way that strategy 
will be delivered is if we change the culture, and we can start to drive a 
performance culture into the business. 
Commiftee chairman 
This last quote illustrates the importance of the remuneration policies matching 
the desired culture of the company. Again, several of the participants mentioned 
the need to change remuneration as a signal throughout the organisation that a 
culture change was required. 
So we said well we've got to change this culture, and we will want to bring in 
people who will really, very strongly, feel as if they own the results that we're 
shooting for. Now we then said, okay, that has got to go hand-in-hand with a 
pay practice that recognises the fact that we've got, that we want to attract 
people who feel very good about being personally rewarded for 
overachievement, and who are ready to accept the fact that maybe there's 
going to be bad years in which they will want to suffer with the company for 
bad results achieved. 
CEO 
Another related reason for changing the remuneration scheme was given by a 
company where the schemes lower down the organisation had been changed to 
include more of a performance-related element (again, as part of a culture change) 
and so it was felt that executive schemes needed changing too. 
Changes ofpersonnel 
It would be nice to think, given the above, that the schemes a company selects are 
a rational function of its business enviromnent and needs. Whilst these have a 
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significant impact, other, more idiosyncratic, factors are involved. In some 
companies changes to schemes were put forward as a result of changes in 
personnel. In one, a change in the remuneration committee personnel led to a 
review of policies. The incoming chairman of another company insisted that 
practices be tightened up so that he would not have to justify non-conforming 
policies to critical institutional shareholders. And in several companies the arrival 
of a new CEO or new executives led to changes in the schemes. In most cases this 
was so that the new CEO's strategy would be reflected in the remuneration 
policies: 
Although, having just appointed a new chief executive, he is having a strong 
input as to what he would like to see in terms of a remuneration package 
which would underpin his strategy. Because we've just appointed [name] as 
the chief executive, and he's coming up with a new strategic approach, 
which we welcome. And we also asked him to consider the sort of 
remuneration systems and packages that would underpin what he wants to 
achieve from a strategic point of view. 
NED 
Another reason was that schemes needed to be made attractive to incoming 
executives: 
Because what happened of course was that the kind of people who were in 
the executive team were changing, they had different expectations from the 
ones who had been previously on the board when I first came, when they 
were mainly [company] old hands who had come up through the system and 
were sort of programmed to a certain kind of reward. 
Commiftee chairman 
Stage two was to increase the amount of options that could be granted at a 
critical time. 
Q Right, why? 
A Because they had to bring people in. They wanted to make people feel 
motivated, and they felt that the market had shifted quite a lot. 
Consultant 
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I think the other real reason to lead to a change in the remuneration strategy 
was the arrival of a whole pile of new executives. I've been here three and a 
half years, I'm probably the fourth longest serving member of the executive. 
Only one of the executive directors who was here when I arrived is still here. 
So we got a new chief executive, new group finance director, several new 
MDs, a new group HR director. The change in composition of the executive 
team really generated quite a lot of tension. Because none of them could 
understand the regime we were under. 
HR director 
However, in one instance the arrival of the new CEO meant the departure of the 
old one, who had been blocking a scheme change: 
Well I think it also depends on the personalities. The previous year we'd had 
[name] as the CEO, and he is not actually very strongly in favour of personal 
objectives. So when he was the CEO he fought against having them. So he 
was literally linked to the group objective. So he imposed, to some extent, 
his personality on that I think. And there was some discussion with the 
remuneration committee as to whether or not he should. But I think if the 
individual doesn't buy into them its quite difficult. But with [new CEO] 
coming in I think he was more open to more detailed personal objectives. 
HR manager 
Improving the schemesfor HR reasons 
In a similar manner to scheme changes for strategic reasons, some schemes were 
changed because they were not in line with good HR practice, and so the 
protagonists made improvements. In several instances schemes were changed to 
reduce the level of complexity, as there was no direct line of sight from 
performance to incentive. 
I couldn't understand it! As a senior executive, and a participant, and 
someone who was supposed to administer and advise on it, it was 
completely incomprehensible. I was to learn later on that it showed no signs 
of generating any positive outcomes for people, which it didn't as far as I can 
see. But to me it might have been as well have been written in classical 
Greek, 'cos it made no sense. 
HR director 
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I think that the simpler you keep remuneration schemes, the better. And if 
you have simple, clear measurements, which both your executives and your 
managers understand, and the outside world understands, then I think the 
likelihood of success and buy-in is a lot higher. I don't like complex 
schemes, because usually you have to employ an army of people to 
administer them and another army of people to work out what the benefit 
should or shouldn't be. And the people who are participating usually don't 
understand. So, simplicity I think is the essence. 
Commiftee chairman 
In other instances, consultants' reviews suggested that schemes needed to be 
rebalanced, changing the mix between short- and long-term incentives. 
It came out of the advice they've had from [consultancy]. That the 
remuneration packages looked about right except that they were missing 
that long-term incentive component and that if they didn't have the long-term 
incentive component they were below market. So it was, you know, both 
that there was an element missing and it wasn't made up for in any other 
way. 
Consultant 
Corporate governance reasonsfor changing schemes 
Some companies changed their schemes in order to come in line with what was 
seen as best practice from a governance perspective. This was particularly 
common in the mid- I 990s, following the Greenbury and Myners reports in 1995: 
At the time... we had a share option scheme from about 1990, and that ran 
until about 1995. And then Greenbury, general concern about fat cats and 
so on, and the chief executive of the day, with the remuneration committee, 
decided that the option scheme was out of favour and it was not something 
we should continue to operate. Even though it did have in the latter days 
some specific performance targets. So they introduced the restricted share 
plan instead. 
Company secretary 
However, governance issues are still an important driver of change: 
Coming into line with best practice in remuneration policy terms as viewed 
by the ABI and the DTI and everybody else who had a view on this. 
HR director 
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The influence of the institutional shareholders, and of regulation generally, is 
significant in this field. In at least one instance, a remuneration committee had 
changed the performance measures on the annual bonus scheme to be more 
compliant with 'best practice', despite the fact that a couple of the interviewees 
believed that the existing scheme was more appropriate for the company. 
Appendix 10 sets out the changes made to companies' policies and their processes 
in order better to comply with regulation. It also sets out areas where companies 
acknowledge that they do not comply with regulation, but still do not make 
changes. In two companies, part of the bonus was treated as pensionable pay, 
which is frowned upon. In both cases the reason given was that this had been 
common practice throughout the company for many years. In three companies the 
company chairman sits on the remuneration committee, which is not considered 
good practice. 
One question asked of the respondent focus group was why some companies made 
changes to comply with good governance, and others did not. Two explanations 
were given. One was that companies needed to "think for themselves" and in a 
ccomply-or-explain' culture might ignore best practice if they believed it 
inappropriate. The other explanation was that companies "decide what they want 
to fight on" - they comply with trivialities, and then feel able to defend practices 
that they believe are important. 
5.5.4 Why companies change their remuneration policies: summary of 
section 
Most of the companies in the research study had made changes to their 
remuneration policies and packages. In some instances these were minor 
201 
Chapter 5: How companies determine pay 
amendments, for example rebasing the salary or bonus level. Other changes had 
been more significant, with the whole structure of the schemes being altered. 
Many different reasons were given for making these changes. Of these, the most 
common were that the executive pay being produced by the scheme was below 
market, or that the PRP scheme was not paying out. Changes in company strategy 
or culture were also significant drivers of remuneration change, as were changes 
in personnel. Finally, evolving best practice in corporate governance often led to 
changes in policies. 
5.6 Summary of chapter 
In this chapter I have set out the data underlying several aspects of how directors' 
remuneration is set. Examining the five questions to be addressed by a 
remuneration committee, I have shown how companies determine the level of pay 
and its structure, mostly by reference to 'the market'. I have also demonstrated 
that different companies address remuneration issues in very different ways, and 
the processes they adopt vary considerably, although all could be said to comply 
with governance directives. Finally I have examined the issue of why companies 
change their remuneration policies and packages, which relates to the perceived 
need to pay market rates of base and PRP, and to changes in the company and its 
environment. 
These issues will be considered again in chapters 6 and 7, which analyse these 
findings in the light of possible theoretical approaches. 
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6. REVISITING SOME THEORIES OF 
EXECUTIVE PAY 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 51 set out the research findings on how companies determine their pay 
levels and structures, and why they make changes to their remuneration schemes. 
I pointed out some difficulties companies face in determining pay, and suggested 
that in the absence of a 'right answer' one key aim of committees is to justify their 
remuneration decisions, to achieve legitimacy with stakeholders such as 
shareholders, customers and regulators. The data found inside the 'black box' 
indicate a rich mix of approaches to and reasons for decisions. In this chapter and 
the next I will consider these data in the light of plausible theoretical approaches: 
this chapter sets them in the context of the extensive body of research into 
directors' pay, reviewed earlier in this thesis; chapter 7 extends the analysis to 
suggest some new ways of considering the data. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I begin by considering how the rich 
and diverse research data unearthed by the methodological approach adopted shed 
light on the economic theories discussed in chapter 2, showing how they support 
some aspects of the theories and conflict with others. I then go on to perform a 
similar analysis for the social-psychological and organisational theories set out in 
that chapter. Again, I show that none of the theories in itself is sufficient to 
explain the phenomenon under investigation, or as Finkelstein and Hambrick put 
it a generation ago: 
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The complexity of CEO compensation cannot be easily understood by 
adopting single models. Over-reliance on any single perspective is 
incomplete and can easily lead to the conclusion that one is observing 
'madness ý It is only when economic, social, political and individualforces 
are consideredjointly that effective analysis can occur (1988: 544) 
To end the chapter, I re-visit the theoretical models from chapter 3, which were 
developed from the literature review, and show how they too are too simplistic, 
and suggest how they might be amended in the light of the empirical results. 
6.2 Examining the data in the light of economic theories 
In Table 2-1 1 suggested that of the economic theories, agency theory aimed 
mainly to explain the structure of executive pay, whereas labour market and 
human capital theories focused more on its level. In this section I link this to the 
research data. No data were found that had relevance to tournament theory, and 
therefore this is not discussed further. 
6. ZI The level ofpay 
Labour market theory 
Labour market theory suggests that executive pay will lie at the intersect of a 
supply and demand relationship for executives, at a level set by the market. In 
chapter 51 showed that various somewhat arbitrary decisions have to be made by 
committees in determining their particular 'market': there is no one clear answer 
as to where pay should be set. However, the committee cannot afford to sit 
indecisively on the fence - ultimately they have to make a decision, and this 
decision has certain links to classical labour market theory. 
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The findings showed that the level of directors' base salaries (and therefore their 
total pay, elements of which are multiples of salary) is based on 'the market', as 
determined by size, industry and geography. Those market data come from 
several sources: the use of consultants' remuneration surveys is ubiquitous, and 
HR professionals also collect their own market data from annual reports, etc. 
The finding that pay is determined by market factors is hardly surprising. Such 
factors, particularly company size, have been tested extensively during decades of 
research into executive pay. As shown in Appendix 2, many past studies have 
correlated pay with company size; those that do not test size specifically do use it 
as a moderating factor in their other tests. This was a finding of Tosi et al. (2000: 
329) in their meta-analysis of the remuneration literature: 
In our judgement, the results are consistent with those theoretical 
explanations that emphasize organizational size as an important 
determinant of total CEO pqy, ý that is, indicators of firm size, taken 
together, explain almost nine times the amount of variance in total CEO 
pay than the most highly correlatedperformance measure. 
Tosi et al. noted that researchers had used some 16 different variables as proxies 
for company size, including sales, assets, market value and number of employees. 
In this research, the case companies mainly used turnover and market 
capitalisation as their benchmarks. 
Furthermore, the link between size and pay has become causal, in the sense 
described by Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004): 
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As suggested by Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1998), the size adjustments 
used in the survey instruments both formalize and reinforce the observed 
relation between compensation and company size. In other words, what 
starts out as a simple empirical correlation between size offirm and size of 
remunerationfor top-level managers is turned into a causal mechanism that 
rewards managersfor increasing the size of thefirms they lead even though 
they may destroy value in doing so. (2004: 56) 
This issue of company size influencing the level of pay is seen in managerialist 
theory (Tosi et al., 2000), which suggests that it is to the financial benefit of 
executives to increase corporate size rather than profitability. The data presented 
in chapter 5 refer to two companies that grew by acquisition, and whose 
acquisitions led to a significant increase in the level of directors' salaries. 
Although this would appear to be in line with managerialist theory, it is 
impossible to know the motives underlying these particular acquisitions. 
Accordingly, although the data appear to support the theory, this can neither be 
confirmed nor refuted. 
As stated, the reason that pay is so closely correlated with company size is due to 
the universal use of remuneration surveys. In the case companies studied here, the 
surveys benchmarked companies of similar size, but also using industry as a 
relevant comparison. Although 'industry' is not highlighted in chapter 2 as a 
determinant of the level of pay (it is considered later in that chapter, as a 
determinant of structure), this research finding is consistent with the fact that 
much prior research has controlled for industry, effectively acknowledging its 
importance. 
The third input factor for the decision on level of salary was a geographical one. 
Companies that were undoubtedly global tended to use US comparators; a local 
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company used a more regional benchmark. Although geographical differences 
have been noted by previous researchers (for example Murphy, 1999; Conyon 
and Murphy, 2000), this is not a factor that has attracted much interest in prior 
research, although Lippert and Rahman (1999) indicated that the link between 
CEO pay and company performance is lower in multinationals than in purely 
domestic companies, and Duru and Reeb (2002) showed that geographical 
diversification leads to a premium in CEO pay. 
There are several reasons why prior research should not have specifically 
identified geographical factors as a major influence on pay levels. Firstly, almost 
all studies are country-based, and geographical influences are either not relevant 
or not seen as relevant. Furthermore, a majority of the studies in this field are US- 
based; accordingly their results would not be biased upwards by US comparisons, 
as this is part of their data set. Finally, archival data are likely to be insufficiently 
granular to be able to identify and segregate individual companies that may have 
specific geographical comparators. Accordingly, although these results are not 
greatly supported by previous research, they are not incompatible with it. 
Overall, there is much in this work to support labour market theory. However, on 
closer examination there is a problem. Pay is set in accordance with 'the market', 
but the market is defined idiosyncratically, with each company choosing its own 
comparators. 'Pure' labour market theory appears to suggest one equilibrium 
point for eachjob; in practice there will be as many as there are definitions of the 
market. 
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In determining market position the first argument is what is the market, or 
what are the markets? Because if you would select your CEO from the 
utilities sector and your FID from a much wider sector, and you've actually 
defined two markets. You might have more jobs or you might have more 
markets. 
Consultant 
A related observation was made by Ang, Lauterbach and Yu (2003: 28), who 
commented on the many characteristics that distinguish the labour market from 
more usual types of market where supply and demand operate in a more 
transparent manner. 
Yhe labor marketfor top executives is unique in several ways. First, the 
market is dispersed. There is no central marketplace or a commonly 
available source of key labor market information that would detail CEO 
askingprices, CEO characteristics, and other quality and experience 
indicators. 
In a real sense, therefore, a commonly-used term that has perhaps appeared non- 
problematic and transparent has a fundamental ambiguity and perhaps 
undecidability to it. 
Human capital theory 
The other key input to the pay decision is human capital, individual qualities such 
as age, qualifications and experience. The results reported in previous studies 
have been mixed, in that there appears to be a relationship between pay and 
human capital, but it is not as strong as that for other input factors. 
The empirical research discussed in chapter 5 indicates that human capital does 
have a place in the inputs affecting the remuneration decision. All the individuals 
holding executive positions in the case companies appeared, from their published 
biographical details, to be qualified for their positions, implying that a certain 
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level of human capital is an entry level qualification for the job. However, for 
most of the executives, human capital was not seen as a factor beyond that. These 
research findings support Agarwal (1981), in that human capital factors are 
relevant, but not of major significance in differentiating the remuneration of the 
majority of executives. 
Taking the argument further, several interviewees stated that individuals with 
superior talents would attract higher pay. Those talents include both professional 
skills (for example an accountancy qualification) and also the individual's 
reputation -a 'heavy hitter' will expect, and receive, significantly more than other 
executives. It is reasonable to argue, in line with human capital theory, that what 
is happening here is that the qualities of the individual act as a signal to the 
potential employer, encouraging them to pay a high price for a valuable asset (the 
employee). However, theory does not indicate which qualities will attract more 
pay. In different circumstances, different individuals will appear more attractive, 
or different companies less so. The following extract illustrates: 
A high-profile company, particularly one facing quite significant challenges 
ahead, will only entice a high-profile, effective chief executive with an 
impeccable track record if they are able to satisfy that individual that they 
can compensate them for any potential loss of reputation for moving into a 
high risk job, where their untarnished record - with the best will in the world - 
might be in jeopardy. So that individual may well have fairly forceful views 
about the package which would entice them to move. By contrast, a role in 
a company which is in a less turbulent state, a strong position, may feel able 
to resist the pressure from a particular candidate over their package. And 
then there would be a particular role, say a finance director there is a fairly 
standard remuneration. HR directors are more unpredictable. There is a 
greater range than people might imagine. 
Headhunter 
Accordingly, although human capital theory may be relevant, it is insufficient to 
explain how pay is set. It is not clear how it helps to predict or identify what 
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particular mix of talents will be more richly or poorly rewarded, since this appears 
to be contextually sensitive. 
6. Z2 Agency theory and the structure ofpay 
A basic premise of agency theory is that executives, as agents of the shareholders, 
are risk-averse and effort-averse. Furthermore, the divergence of their interests 
from those of their principals means that they will seek to extract additional rents, 
in the form of extra remuneration and perks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
order to prevent this, agency theory suggests that contracts be written to control 
the rent-extraction by linking pay to performance. In this way the executives will 
be encouraged to behave in ways which are aligned to the shareholders' interests. 
Examination of the research findings in the light of agency theory links closely 
with the work on performance-related pay set out in chapter S. The use of PRP, 
which is ubiquitous, is in accordance with the principles of agency theory. 
However, the explanations given for that use are less so. This is illustrated in the 
following paragraphs. 
Agency concept: executives are effort-averse and risk-averse 
In discussing executive pay and executive roles with both executives and non- 
executives I found no-one who believed that CEOs and their colleagues did not 
work hard. In line with this, few believed that they would work harder for more 
pay 
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The issue of risk was more complicated. One aspect of agency theory is that 
contracts are designed to enable risk-sharing between principal and agent. This 
issue rarely arose in the discussions, although risk generally was mentioned. 
The phrase 'risk-averse' in the agency literature is often used to mean that 
executives would prefer their pay to be structured as mostly fixed rather than 
performance-dependent. By and large, most interviewees took a different view, 
stating that executives seek performance-related pay because it gives them the 
chance to prove their ability, and because it gives them the chance to earn more. 
There's a risk I think from the individual perspective that [if there were no 
PRIP element] potential for improvement through salary would be lost. A lot 
of our people at the top of the organisation are quite driven by the prospect 
of personal wealth, and flat fees, and the level of them, seem to us to 
remove one of the carrots, incentives to get people to do more. 
HR director 
An alternative explanation for this desire for PRP (one which supports the agency 
theory view) was put forward by a headhunter: 
Well I think the reality is that nobody is prepared to give a base salary which 
comes anywhere near what someone would hope to be able to earn on a 
base-plus-incentives. 
Headhunter 
In referring to risk-averse behaviour, another aspect is whether PRP encourages 
executives to take riskier decisions for the business than they might otherwise 
do. 55 This also was mentioned in the interviews, and to some extent it seemed to 
be borne out in one discussion. 
It's something to do, of course, with risk-taking. Why should people take 
risks - because there is some reward. 
NED 
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More generally, participants put the view that having a high proportion of the 
package as PRP attracted a certain type of individual, who was more of a risk- 
taker. From this perspective, PRP does encourage more risk-taking behaviour, 
through the selection mechanism. 
To do that you need to hire combative people, who are aggressive, 
passionate, prepared to put in 60-70 hours a week, and who are certain 
types of personality. And you simply cannot attract those people without 
very significant performance upsides in their pay. 
Company secretary 
However, this tells us nothing about whether such people, having been attracted 
by the package, live up to their advance billing. It is always possible that changed 
environmental conditions, or a change in personal circumstances, could leave the 
individuals acting in a different way. 
AgMcy concept: motivate performance 
In chapter 51 set out at length the various views of the participants as to whether 
pay motivated. A conclusion from this was that it is not the pay itself that is 
important, but its symbolic value. A high bonus communicates an executive's 
worth, within the company and to his peers and rivals. As Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1998: 550) stated: "Pay is an important scorecard for individuals with 
high needs for achievement and recognition". 
Thus it is reasonable to assume that PRP motivates performance - in the areas that 
are relevant to achieve the specified perfonnance targets. This relates back to the 
discussion in chapter 5 about focus: PRP does not motivate executives to work 
35 Generally, shareholders holding diversified portfolios would prefer this. 
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harder, but to work on specific targets. This finding is in line with the work on 
agency theory by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and by Indjejikian (1999). 
Holmstrom and Milgrorn referred to 'multitasking'. They suggested that when an 
employee has a job that involves several separate tasks, incentive pay serves in 
part to direct the employee's attention among the various duties. Indjejikian 
(1999: 152) developed this argument. He stated that the real agency conflict has 
less to do with getting employees to work harder and more to do with getting them 
to choose the right combination of actions and decisions to increase shareholder 
value. This seems particularly relevant to the broad role of top executives, and 
was bome out by these research findings. However, Prendergast (1999: 8) 
pointed out a difficulty in this area, in that whilst setting specific targets may 
provide focus, it can also lead to dysfunctional behaviour, with the agent gaming 
the system to focus only on the task that will produce the reward. She noted that 
in complex jobs, this can present a problem. Such problems were not evidenced 
in the research findings, although several of the participants emphasised the 
importance of selecting the right performance measures and targets. 
The most important thing is setting the bonus targets. 
Commiftee chairman 
You have to be sure that bonuses take care of an annual performance, and 
that your long-term incentives are truly long-term. If all of your incentives 
encourage short-termism, then 'robbing this year to gain a bonus' behaviour 
does happen. 
HR director 
One further point on PRP is worth noting. The following extract from Tosi et al. 's 
meta-analysis refers to difficulties researchers have found with the pay- 
perfonnance relationship. 
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Researchers express shock when they find paylperformance sensitivities 
are low and the results inconsistent with their theory. We suggest that 
there is a distinct possibility thatperhaps the archivalperformance criteria 
may be deficient because they typically tap only a small portion of the 
CEO's job performance requirements, and therefore contain a large 
amount o noise, making unambiguous causal attributions for observed !f 
results very difficult.... Knowing this, boards of directors may well turn to 
measures of performance that include objective indicators as well as 
judgmental, clinical, and subjective assessments of other job-relevant 
dimensions. Such criteria are more likely to represent a holistic, 
multidimensional assessment of executive performance. Thus, the objective 
performance measuresfound in the executive compensation literature may 
be "deficient" for evaluation purposes by those responsible for corporate 
governance, who in turn use a subjective evaluation process to assess the 
executive ý contributions. If this is the case, it would not be surprising that 
weak empirical relationships using archival-based criteria arefound. This 
could mean, then, that the theoreticalpredictions are not disconfirmed, but 
only that the methodology employed does not properly measure the 
performance construct on which the agency contract is based. If this is so, 
then it may be premature to inferftom the research that uses archival data 
of this sort, as Jensen and Murphy (1990) have done, that there is little 
supportfor the notion of "optimal contracting" to align interests. 
Tosi et aL (2000: 331) 
One factor in these research results confirrns the reasons that Tosi et al. give for 
the lack of relationship. In Appendix 8 are set out the numerous performance 
measures used by the case companies in appraising short- and long-term 
performance. The majority of companies used more than one measure, and used a 
mixture of financial and non-financial measures. This confirms Tosi et al. 's view 
of multidimensional measures. A further research finding confutes, to some 
extent, the explanation given. The fact that companies change their remuneration 
schemes so frequently, often because those schemes are not paying out enough/at 
all to the executives, suggests that there really is not a strong pay-performance 
relationship once performance falls. Gillan (2001) suggests that the pay- 
performance relationship is asymmetrical: companies focus on PRP when 
performance is good, and on peer comparisons when it is poor. 
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Figure 6-1 illustrates the 'ideal' relationship, and examples of what might happen 
in practice. 
Figure 6-1 The pay-performance relationship in conditions of poor performance 
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Amended for poor 
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From these results it seems that a straightforward agency theory explanation, that 
contracts offering variable pay induce better performance, is an idea that meets 
44( Old scheme 
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with a mixed reception in the sample companies, and it is definitely not the sole 
driver of the use of perfonnance-related pay. 
6.3 Examining the data in the light of social-psychological and 
organisational theories 
In chapter 21 suggested that of the motivational theories, expectancy theory was 
used mainly to explain the structure of executive pay, whereas equity theory 
focused more on its level. Of the other theories discussed in that chapter, 
institutional theory and legitimacy related both to the level and structure of pay. 
In this section I discuss how those theories were bome out by the results. I also 
discuss theories of power and politics, which have great relevance to the way in 
which the remuneration committee interacts with the executive. Finally in this 
section I consider bounded rationality and decision theory, and the extent to which 
these have some relevance in explaining the research results. 
Other social theories contained in chapter 2 were social comparison and social 
influence. No data were found (or directly sought) that related to social influence 
theory, and this is not discussed further. A small amount of evidence was found 
for social comparison - the mental benchmark held by remuneration committee 
members based on levels of pay in their jobs in and knowledge of other 
companies. As discussed in chapter 5, it is accepted (and indeed appreciated) that 
non-executives bring their experience of other companies to the debate. However, 
it was also argued that the mix of experiences on the board means that it is hard to 
see how any one individual's social comparisons would significantly influence the 
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pay decision. Accordingly, it is difficult to find any great support for this aspect 
of social comparison theory, although the findings do not refute that theory. 
6.3.1 Does pay motivate? 
V- 
. r, qUIty theory 
Equity theory suggests that executives will compare their work-reward ratio with 
that of peers (in the company, or in other companies) and feel dissatisfaction if the 
ratio differs. Considerable research evidence was found for the belief that 
executives who knew or believed themselves to be comparatively under-rewarded 
felt dissatisfaction 56 . This showed in the comments of executives, and particularly 
in the views of NEDs and consultants about how pay should be comparable. Most 
of the interviewees referred to the requirement for 'fairness' in this context. 
What [CEO] wants and expects is to be paid fairly. He would regard being 
paid fairly in two ways. One, that the basic amount he gets is reasonably 
comparable with those that he regards as his peers outside. 
HR manager 
No evidence was found to support the alternative premise of equity theory, that 
executives who were relatively overpaid would attempt to redress that imbalance. 
It is possible that these individuals changed their referent others (Adams, 1963) 
but this is not determinable from the research. Given that there is no correct way 
to define the market, it is not possible (for researchers or the protagonists) to 
determine whether the 'right' referents have been chosen. 
56 Although there was little evidence of such dissatisfaction actually occurring in most of the case 
companies. 
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Expectancy theory 
Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests that pay will motivate executives if 
they believe that by performing the (doable) task, they will receive the (desirable) 
reward. There is strong evidence for expectancy theory principles being applied 
in the companies. This was demonstrated in the perceived need to change 
schemes which had no potential to make a payout. The argument made in several 
companies was that underwater schemes, or those where the performance targets 
were unlikely ever to be met, would not motivate the executives - indeed, they 
may even demotivate. 
Really, it fell into disrepute as a means of remunerating people, because it 
did not pay out for two, and then three years. People just looked at it 
negatively. 
HR director 
As regards the argument in expectancy theory that a potential reward will only 
motivate if it is seen to be attractive, only one participant mentioned this aspect: 
Q: Why set [bonus level] at 50% of salary? 
A: Because it's got to be important enough so that you feel as if there is 
enough differentiation. If I put it at 20%, let's take it to extremes, probably it 
wouldn't enable me to make enough differentiation between an excellent and 
an average performer, if it was only 20% of base pay. 
CEO 
The implication of this is that a bonus of 20% of salary would not be sufficient to 
motivate extraordinary performance. 
6.3.2 Justifying the package -institutional theory and legitimacy 
From chapter 5 it can be seen that many of the practices adopted by companies 
can be explained through the approaches of institutional theory and legitimacy. 
This has relevance to both the level of pay, based on the market, and to its 
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structure, based on institutional acceptance and other companies' practices 57. it 
also contributes to an explanation of how remuneration committees operate, and 
of why they make changes to their schemes. In this section I highlight the ways in 
which the research data support institutional theory explanations and demonstrate 
companies' desire for legitimacy. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discuss three types of isomorphism: coercive, 
mimetic and normative. All three types are evidenced in the research. 
Coercive isomorphism relates to pressures exerted on organisations by other 
organisations on which they are dependent; for example government agencies or 
the expectations of society. Scott (1987: 501) refined DiMaggio and Powell's 
definition, distinguishing two types of coercive pressures: those actually imposed 
by authority and those resulting from coercive power. We can see in the workings 
of remuneration committees that some practices are adopted because they are 
included in the Combined Code, or in the various regulatory reports, whereas 
others are taken up as being best practice. For example, as mentioned in chapter 
5, many companies changed from option schemes to Itips after the publication of 
the Myners and Greenbury reports in 1995. Appendix 10 shows instances where 
companies have deliberately changed their practices in order to be compliant with 
best practice. 58 Table 5-2 shows that in considering the structure of their 
remuneration schemes, a prime influence stated by the interviewees was the 
reaction of institutions, a proxy for best practice. 
57 Pay levels are also legitimised by institutional investors' acceptance. Holland (2002) points out 
that fund managers use 'the market' to justify pay levels. 58 The Appendix also shows instances where companies have not complied with coercive forces, 
an explanation for which is set out in chapter 5. 
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The following extracts provide an illustration of coercive isomorphism. 
I mean, I'm reluctant to use the word box ticking, but you know what I mean 
in that the corporate governance officers - if it something they were familiar 
with, and they know what the norms are, then it's fairly easy to persuade 
them, but if you come up with something new then they might be suspicious 
and think 'oh we have got nothing to benchmark this against'. Therefore I 
know I'm going to have a tough time, and might face shareholder opposition. 
Consultant 
What I think we are seeing over the years is a greater dialogue betwixt and 
between companies and their major institutional investors. And that's a 
dialogue that's been favoured by the various committees on corporate 
governance. And indeed, it's an approach that's approved and 
recommended by the various representative bodies of institutional investors. 
Consultant 
I think that one of the criteria which we're told will come out with the DTI 
paper is that they will insist that you have taken some formal benchmarking 
exercises in arriving at salaries, so that's what we've done. 
NED 
Mimetic isomorphism suggests that organisations model themselves on other 
organisations which appear successful. Often, this is because there is no right 
answer to what should be done, and other organisations' practices appear to be 
successful (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989). In the context of executive pay, 
this idea of 'no right answer' was illustrated by Mangel and Singh (1993: 339): 
So far, much of research on executive compensation has focused on the 
strength of the link hetween pay and performance, even though economic 
theory offers little guidance on the appropriate magnitude of the 
relationship. 
March(1984: 61) discussed how this works in practice: 
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"at makes a scheme appropriate is that it is being used by successful 
companies in the same indust7y. "at makes it progressive is that it has 
been adopted by other firms that are viewed as being intelligently 
innovative. Compensation schemes spreadftom highly regarded companies 
to less highly regarded ones, as the latter t? Y to present themselves as 
equivalent to the former; and the signal a particular scheme provides is 
gradually degraded by its adoption by companies that are neither well- 
managed nor progressive, thus stimulating the invention of new schemes. 
There is strong evidence for this in the data set out in chapter 5. Companies adopt 
schemes in line with market practice - or fail to adopt schemes because they are 
not in accordance with what other companies do. 'The market' is a key influence 
on how companies determine their executive pay structures. 
HR 1: So the herd instinct was alive and well. I think when you're starting 
off for the first time, there's quite a bit of pressure to be seen to do 
something which fits in. And of course you've got the pressure from the ABI 
and the NAPF... 
HR 2: ... it was 'market practice', 
if you want to use a euphemism. 
Two HR managers in same company 
Examples of mimetic isomorphism demonstrated in chapter 5 were the move from 
hips back to options in the late 1990s; the universal use of three years as a long- 
term performance period; and the fact that few companies were prepared to 
implement a novel remuneration scheme 59 . 
But because of [high gains on post-privatisation options] ... a lot of people in the [utility] industry in particular did very well - it suddenly became not the 
thing to do, and therefore Itips became the flavour. And so that's why we 
went on to Itips. But the circle seems to be changing again now, and people 
are moving back to, recognising the problems of Itips, and they are moving 
back to having share options and the like. 
Company chairman 
The evidence supporting normative isomorphism is less strong, but does exist. 
Normative pressures stem from professionalisation, with practices being spread 
39 This last example could also be seen as coercive isomorphism, illustrating Mizruchi and Fein's 
(1999) contention that there is much overlap in the categories, and that many examples of coercive 
isomorphism. are classified as mimetic. 
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amongst networks of individuals undertaking the same tasks. The relevant 
networks as regards executive pay are: company secretaries and HR 
professionals, who administer the committees; networks of non-executives, who 
bring experience of practices in other companies; and of course remuneration 
consultants, who "like Johnny Appleseeds, spread a few organizational models 
throughout the land" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152). 
Thus we have committees which, on the surface, operate the same working 
practices in each company, adopting similar types of remuneration scheme and 
justifying their pay levels with regard to 'the market'. These institutionalised 
practices provide the legitimacy that companies and their NEDs need to justify 
their decisions on remuneration. 
It was clear from the interviews that NEDs and other protagonists were very 
aware of the need for legitimacy, and wanted to be able to justify both the levels 
of pay and the structures they adopted. 
But I do think, there is no doubt that part of this process is a covering of the 
back. It allows the board to say that it has consulted with consultants. 
And 
It does behove a company that is in a monopoly position and requires a 
certain legitimacy and basic goodwill to conduct itself carefully. 
NED 
I mean, again, their [the NEDs'] criterion is 'could we be criticised for being 
unduly generous? '. And if in reality we can show that its in line with market 
practice, that always is the crunch. If the consultants are happy, we think 
that its a good idea, then it will have a good chance. 
HR manager 
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We wanted to be whiter than white. The previous chairman was, quite 
rightly in my view, very concerned that whatever we did was publicly 
defensible. Not just in terms of shareholders, but particularly in terms of 
customers. 
HR director 
But at the end of the day there is that comfort factor [for the remuneration 
committee] of saying 'we have an arrangement which we can justify by 
reference to the market'. 
Consultant 
It thus appears that institutional pressures - be they coercive, mimetic or possibly 
normative - and the need for legitimacy for the companies and their NEDs have 
considerable influence on the remuneration decisions. 
Institutional pressures lead to companies adopting similar practices. However, the 
field of executive pay is one of continuous innovation - many schemes in use 
today did not exist five years ago. The discussion in chapter 5 of scheme changes 
indicates that, although many were to comply with 'the market', some were for 
other reasons, and that not all companies complied with standard practice. A 
reconciliation is needed between the pressures to change and the pressures to 
comply. 
One relevant issue is that the change in executive pay is what Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) refer to as "evolutionary" rather than "radical" change - it takes 
place slowly. As such, this can be accommodated by stakeholders: For example, 
ostrom (2003) refers to changes be ng met initially by investor resistance, which 
was gradually overcome. Bebchuk and Fried (2004b: 17) also address this issue. 
They comment on the "stickiness" in executive pay practices that arises from the 
tendency to conform conflicting with the need to evolve. They also rightly point 
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out that institutional theory can provide an explanation for the "stickiness" but 
"cannot tell us much about why arrangements evolve in one direction rather than 
another". 
6.3.3 How the committee operates -power andpolitics 
In chapter 51 showed that although all of the companies could tick the boxes for 
having good governance practices, their underlying processes were very different, 
and the influence of executives was much stronger in some companies than in 
others. This was not a surprising finding, as previous researchers, for example 
Pye (2001) have reported similar results. Stiles (2001), who conducted interview- 
based research on UK boards, discussed power relationships within the board: 
Yhe CEO has high structural power because of hislher position in the 
organizational hierarchy, while in terms of relational power, the CEO's 
expert and prestige power is also usually pre-eminent over other 
organizational members. The opportunities for board 'involvement' in 
strategic decision-making have therefore been viewed as problematic, due 
to the non-executive directors' lack of expertise and inferior access to 
information. (2001: 630) 
Lorsch and MacIver had similar findings in a US context: 
In the corporate boardroom there are multiple sources ofpower, of which 
the directors' [NEDs Y legal authority is just one. Others are the 
confidence to express one's ideas and views, knowledge and information 
about the matter under discussion, and control over the agenda and the 
discussion process. There is power in unity too, whenever a majority of the 
board stands firmly behind a particular position. But essentially, directors 
are at a disadvantage when these sources of boardroom power are 
realistically considered. Yhe CEO-chairman usually has greater knowledge 
and information and controls both the meeting agenda and the discussion 
process. (1989: 13) 
It is a well-known issue in corporate governance that a company's formal 
structures may not reflect the real distribution of power and influence. Harrison 
(1987), in a discussion of legitimacy, pointed out that the fact that a company sets 
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up a board committee is a legitimising activity, but that structures are not 
necessarily indicative of committee processes: 
For a board of directors, its committee structure symbolizes its method of 
operation, which itsetf is not readily observable. (1987., 111) 
Prior research on the link between executive pay and power, as discussed in 
chapter 2, has focused on aspects of power such as tenure, share ownership and 
the make-up of the board. No evidence that these factors were a particular source 
of power was found in this research (which was not particularly designed to 
highlight them). None of the interviews suggested any particular significance for 
any of these factors, except insofar as a dominant figure (usually the CEO) 
engineered a compliant board. In this respect, the 'political strategist' role 
discussed by Ungson and Steers (1984) did surface, as regards the CEO's role in 
managing relationships within the top echelons of the company. 
The research literature generally examines power to determine whether CEO 
power leads to unduly favourable terms in CEOs' remuneration contracts. The 
nature of this study is such that it is impossible to conclude on this. However, it 
was obvious that the distribution of power amongst the protagonists - where 
power is defined in a more generally relational way - was a significant factor in 
the remuneration-setting process. This subject is discussed more fully in chapter 
7. 
6.3.4 A round-up of other relevant theories 
In this section, two other theories that were introduced in chapter 2 are discussed 
in the context of the research findings. 
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Contingency theory 
A contingency theory approach states that reward systems need to be consistent 
with a company's external environment and internal culture and strategy 
(Barkerna and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). There was strong evidence that 
'contingency' played an important role in the remuneration decisions of the case 
companies. Several of the interviewees remarked that no one scheme could suit 
all circumstances, and that schemes needed to be tailored to circumstances. 
Q: If you were to put the [Company X] scheme into [Company Y], what do 
you think would be the consequences? 
A: Well I don't think you could even think about it. [Company X] is a very 
low capital business; basically people. ... But [Company Y] is completely different. It is vast. .... [Discussion of different business characteristics. ] So I don't think it would work. 
NED 
Furthermore, as set out in the cross-case display in Appendix 9, there were several 
instances of schemes being changed to take allowance of changes in the external 
or internal company environment. This is in line with the findings of Kessler and 
Purcell (1992), where PRP was introduced in a utility to prepare it for a 
performance-oriented culture post-privatisation. 
However, it should be noted that although contingency theory can provide a 
justification for schemes chosen by companies, it can be difficult ex ante to use it 
to predict a company's chosen policies. Bender (2003: 211) points out that two 
utilities with apparently similar businesses had chosen very different remuneration 
policies. Although these policies made sense when the protagonists were 
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questioned in detail, it would have been difficult to understand those choices 
without that intimate knowledge of the companies. 
Decision theory 
The aspects of decision theory considered in chapters 2 and 3 were bounded 
rationality, and adjustment and anchoring. The decisions made by the 
remuneration committee reflect bounded rationality. They (or their advisors) 
detennine which sub-set of the universe of available infonnation will be used as a 
basis for the decision, and work on that. Even if the consultant or HR professional 
takes a reasonably wide view of who the comparators might be, from necessity by 
the time the information reaches the remuneration committee it has been distilled 
into a report. 
The anchoring phenomenon is also seen in the setting of executive pay, 
particularly in the determination of salaries. Survey data are used, with companies 
generally choosing a median position compared to their peers. Existing salary 
levels also act as an anchor: 
Also remember that once a salary has been established, then they tend not 
to go down. 
HR manager 
The level of the anchor has a significant influence on the ultimate salary and 
package. 
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6.4 Revisiting the process model 
Although it is hard to make strong statements about executive pay levels by 
looking at pay outcomes, it is possible to shed some light on this issue by 
looking at the pay-setting 12rocess That is, it is hard to determine whether a 
pick-up baseball game was playedfairly by looking only at the final score. 
But a closer examination of the circumstances would allow such a 
determination. 
Hall (2003: 31) [Emphasis in original] 
The main motivation behind this research was to do what Hall suggests, to 
examine the pay-setting process. I began this when, in undertaking the literature 
review, I developed the model set out in Figure 3 -1 to illustrate how executive pay 
might be set. In this section I revisit that model, and discuss how the research 
findings support it in part, and lead to its development. 
Figure 6-2 repeats the process model from Figure 3-1. 
Figure 6-2 Illustrative remuneration-setting system 
*1 
OUTCOME 
The model was not tested directly with most of the intervieweeS60. It was 
however discussed with two (an HR manager and an NED), both of whom agreed 
that it was a reasonable representation. It was also presented at a seminar I gave 
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to the Remuneration Group, a gathering of remuneration professionals in FTSE 
100 companies. About 26 members attended that presentation, and none took 
issue with the model. 
Having said that, the results of the interviews do lead to a refinement of the 
model. 
A major change is that a feedback loop needs to be added, with the Outcome of 
the processes becoming another Input. This was clearly evidenced in the 
companies that had changed their schemes due to insufficient payout (Appendix 
9). Although I had originally asserted that the Outcome is just a mathematical 
consequence of the remuneration policies adopted by the company, it is much 
more than that. If the policies (or performance) are not leading to a satisfactory 
payout, that is an important factor for the committee to consider. 
And the upshot of it was that in the first few years that we ran this, their 
bonuses were pretty meagre. And I remember times when [executive] was 
getting sort of 6 or 7% bonus, a very small amount, I can't remember the 
exact figures .... ... I think 
it was simply that we had set the way that we'd 
operated the scheme too aggressively. We then thought what should we 
do? Shall we loosen the targets or shall we do something else? 
Company chairman 
Other interviewees made similar comments, including an HR manager who 
pointed out that quarterly progress reports to his remuneration committee meant 
that they were aware long before the end of the performance period that the Itip 
would not pay out. 
60 This was deliberate, as the interview questions were designed to elicit infonnation about 
processes. 
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Another change to the model is that the three processes originally described are 
more interlinked than expected. Although I had stated that the overall process 
would not be as linear as set out in the model, there is more interplay between 
package and policy than anticipated. One explanation for this could be that as 
they are at some level aware that there is no right answer, companies pay attention 
to the likely packages that will arise, and tailor their policies, at least in part, to the 
achievement of these. (This is illustrated in Figure 6-1, showing how bonus 
schemes change when performance undershoots target. ) 
One final comment on the model is that the Outcome of the remuneration process 
is not merely the result of an equation, as initially thought. In some situations a 
judgement has to be made as to whether performance targets have been met, and 
there is no way of anticipating what that judgement will be - or indeed whether 
there will even be a judgement - ex ante. It is worth citing a long extract from an 
interview to illustrate this. 
And I'll tell you where it happens particularly it happens particularly in 
relation to long term incentive plans. Where we are we are asked to give our 
view or sign off despite the fact that the TSR measure or the EPS measure 
shows that only 50% of the award should vest, to give them a view that it 
should be 60% or 70%. 
Q: I didn't realise you got involved in that, I just assumed that it was a 
matter of fact at that stage. 
A: Well that's how we consider it. And we do quite a bit of measurement, 
we measure TSR for companies for the purposes of their long-term incentive 
plans. But we still get asked if we will say right OK well yes, the figures say 
this but we say... 
Q: How can they ask you I mean they must have a justification for asking. 
A: Oh they've always got a justification, they've always got a justification. 
The company that asked to do a spot price for them compared to their 
average price is probably a good example. 'Last week we had a particular 
announcement or something has happened thats had a big impact on... '. 
They've always got a justification ... 
Consultant 
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From the various performance measures that the case companies adopted, it is 
evident that some of these would also require the exercise of judgement. For 
example, one measure (one of many) for one CEO related to designing a suitable 
strategy - such issues are inherently judgemental, and cannot be reduced to a 
quantitative calculation or algorithm. 
Given these considerations, the original process model can now be re-drawn. 
Figure 6-3 Revised remuneration-setting system 
Process I Policy 
Process 2a 
Inputs 




INPUT OUTPUT OUTCOME 
In the revised model, feedback loops have been added from Outcome back to 
Inputs, and also from Packages back to Policy. This reflect the companies' 
apparent desire to ensure that the amounts paid are in line with expectations. A 
further process has been added - the link between Packages and Remuneration 
paid has been made into Process 3, to reflect the judgement that is sometimes 
needed. 
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6.4.1 Inputfactors to the remuneration-setting processes 
The variables considered in the directors' pay decision, as discussed in the 
research literature, were set out in Figure 2-2. Many of them have been discussed 
in chapter 5. In Table 6-1 1 set out the list of these inputs, and show their 
importance in this research, based on the interviews and questionnaires. 
Table 6-1 Inputs which may impact on directors' remuneration 
Input Research finding 
Company size A strong influence on level of pay. An 
influence on pay structure to the extent that 
companies in a particular FTSE index look to 
others' practices. 
Company performance An influence on level of pay to the extent that 
all of the companies used some form of PRP. 
However, a range of performance measures was 
used, not all of which would be visible to the 
outsider. Also, schemes were changed in 
poorly-performing companies, in order to 
facilitate payout. 
Remuneration surveys A strong influence, as surveys are seen as a 
representation of 'the market'. 
Industry An influence on level of pay (through surveys 
and comparators) and on structure (a 
contingency theory explanation). 
Country There was evidence that geography is an 
influence on level of pay. 
Human capital This influences pay levels, particularly in 
attracting and retaining 'heavy hitters' to a 
company. In such circumstances, the structure 
of the package may also be tailored to the 
individual's circumstances. 
Social comparison factors Limited influence. 
Strategy and stage in lifecycle An influence on pay structures -a contingency 
theory explanation. 
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Ownership of the company There was no evidence for this. However, all of 
the case companies were FTSE 350 with wide 
ownership, so this is not surprising. 
Institutional influence A strong influence on the structure of pay, and a 
lesser influence on its level. Companies seek 
legitimacy in the eyes of their major investors. 
Board/committee structure There was no evidence that different committee 
structures led to different types of scheme or 
different levels of pay. Given the design of the 
study, this would have been difficult to 
determine. 
Cash resources None of the companies appeared to be cash- 
constrained, so it is unsurprising that this 
influence was not evidenced. 
Directors' requirements Other than for incoming appointments, there 
was little evidence that individuals' 
requirements directed the nature of schemes. 
Financial accounting In no company was it suggested that schemes 
reflected advantageous accounting practice. 
However, one company changed its schemes the 
following year, citing as a driver changes in 
accounting for share options. 
Tax - individual and corporate Some companies used, or were considering 
using, share options to take advantage of the 
E30,000 tax allowance that individuals could 
obtain on options. No indication was given that 
corporate tax was a factor. 
Retention needs Committees are very aware of the need to retain 
good individuals. This was shown in the levels 
of pay, and in schemes designed to lock in 
individuals for several years. 
6.5 Revisiting legitimacy-comparison theory 
From the literature review, and from knowledge of executive pay obtained in the 
initial stages of the research, I drew up legitimacy-comparison (L-C) theory as a 
possible explanation for how executive pay was determined. Figure 6-4 repeats 
Figure 3-4. 
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Although a driver of the original research design, this theory was not entirely 
confirmed by the research results. Elements of it are valid - indeed, the principles 
of 'legitimacy' and 'comparison' have been found to be fundamental to the 
remuneration-setting process - but the overall approach proved to be too 
simplistic to explain the phenomenon under investigation. 
6.5.1 The level ofpay 
L-C theory suggested that the level of remuneration would be determined by 
several factors: 
* Comparisons made by the executives with their peers in other companies 
(equity theory aspects). 
o Comparisons made by the NEDs with their experiences in other companies 
(social comparison aspects). 
o Anchoring on the numbers so produced. 
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In practice, the equity theory influence was clear to see in the research findings, as 
was the anchoring. Evidence of social comparison, however, proved elusive. As 
stated earlier, the mix of NEDs in a company, and the wide variety of influences 
to which they are subject, meant that only vague hints of this were noted. 
A key influence on the level of pay, which was not directly noted in L-C theory, 
was the need for legitimacy (which had originally been considered only in respect 
of the structure of pay). The use of remuneration surveys and 'market' data 
(where the markets invoked are inherently multiple, opaque and subjective) is the 
key factor in setting pay levels. Because they recognise, explicitly or tacitly, that 
there is no clear right answer, companies justify their pay levels based on those 
paid by other companies. Thus it can be argued that labour market theory and 
human capital theory also provide influences on the level of pay, albeit not in such 
a way as to provide a comprehensively convincing explanation of any individual 
remuneration decision. 
6.5.2 The structure ofpay 
In seeing institutional theory and legitimacy as a strong influence on remuneration 
structures, L-C theory was accurate. As stated earlier, coercive, mimetic and 
normative influences were all found. Aspects of equity theory also go towards 
explaining pay structures. In chapter 51 show that one reason companies use PRP 
is because the executives expect it, because it gives them the opportunity to earn 
the same high levels of reward as do their peers in other companies. And social 
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comparison influences do appear to feature here, inasmuch as the NEDs expect to 
see a PRP structure, because this is what they are used to in other companies. 61 
What is missing from the explanations put forward by L-C theory are references 
to agency theory and to expectancy theory. Although the findings highlighted 
some confusion as to how, or whether, pay motivated executives, it is apparent 
that one reason behind pay structures is the desire to motivate executive 
performance. (Or the desire to be perceived to be motivating executive 
performance -a legitimacy approach. ) 
But what I would call the convention of the toolkit in executive remuneration 
is reinforced from two sides. It's reinforced by the advice companies get in 
terms of the acceptable range of remuneration tools and practices, to which 
there is a herd issue. But also its reinforced from what executives expect 
and find acceptable. 
Company secretary 
6.5.3 Concluding on L-C theory 
Overall, L-C theory appeared to have been correct in the assertion that no single 
theory would suffice to explain both the level and structure of executive pay. 
However, as I have endeavoured to show through my observations of the 
inadequacies of each successive theory advanced as explanations of the data 
assembled here, each such explanation proves in itself insufficient to account for 
the variety of practices seen. Furthermore, there is no apparent mix of them that 
can be adduced as an overall explanation, at least currently: no such mix has been 
advanced and, finther, there is no approach on the horizon that looks to reconcile 
economics-based and other theories. 
61 This explanation given for social comparison theory would of course be equally valid if 
described as normative isomorphism, passing on practices through professional networks. This is 
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6.6 Summary of chapter 
The aim of this chapter has been to set my research findings in the context of the 
theories of remuneration discussed in the literature review, and to see how they 
are supported or otherwise. My overall conclusion is that while individual 
findings will fit with particular approaches, no approach to date seems adequate to 
explain the diversity of findings discovered here. The best that can be said is that 
considerable evidence has been found for an institutional theory explanation of 
directors' pay, closely linked to the desire for companies to achieve legitimacy 
with their stakeholders (including major shareholders and, for utilities in 
particular, customers). This provides an explanation of why so many companies 
adopt the same sorts of structure for their remuneration. Agency, expectancy and 
equity theories also contribute insights towards an understanding of pay 
structures. Pay levels are tied closely to 'the market', but only in the sense of a 
market constructed by each company to suit its own circumstances. Elements of 
labour market and human capital theory go to explain these pay levels, as does 
equity theory. 
At the same time, every one of these theories offers only a partial and defective 
explanation, since each only explains one part or aspect of the cornplex acts of 
remuneration committees and their advisors as uncovered here. 
The initial models developed from the literature review - the process model and 
L-C theory - were found to be useful but incomplete. The process model has been 
amended to show a fuller picture of how remuneration is set, and the list of input 
another example of the overlap between many of the theories used in this field. 
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factors has been expanded and analysed. The weaknesses in L-C theory have 
been noted, but the theory has not been updated: the multiplicity of different 
theoretical influences means that this would not be particularly useful at this time. 
One conclusion from the research is the fact that although 'the market' features 
extensively in companies' explanations of their actions (and in the theories 
underpinning prior research), that 'market' is not a coherent or clearly defined 
construct, but one that has a strong rhetorical function. The implications of this 
are discussed in chapter 7, which also examines more closely the question of how 
to understand the power relationships within the board and the remuneration 
committee. 
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7. THE REMUNERATION COMMITTEE: 
RHETORICS AND REALITIES 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 51 presented data that illustrated how the case companies had 
addressed some of the key issues facing them in determining the pay of their 
executives, and in chapter 61 set these data in the context of theories previously 
used to explain the phenomenon of executive pay. This chapter examines the 
findings in a different manner. It contains three main themes: 
e It proposes that the remuneration-setting process envisaged in the Combined 
Code is an unattainable ideal, and examines the compromises that have to be 
made in practice. 
* On the basis of the thesis that there is no one right answer as to the correct 
level and structure of pay, it considers, in a more fundamental way, how 
committees make and justify their decisions. 
* In so doing it asks more searching questions about the inner workings of the 
remuneration committee and the key individuals associated with it, going 
beyond the formal structure to examine the relationships between the 
protagonists and what this means for how remuneration is set. 
The three themes are interlinked, and one ftu-ther focus of enquiry that emerges 
concerns the rhetorics used by the players to justify all of their actions and 
decisions to an increasingly interested body of stakeholders. 
One interview extract is worth highlighting here: 
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I'm fascinated at the way that you are approaching this, to tell you the truth. 
Because I think its going to have a lot more people issues in it. I think it's a 
lot to do with the way that people interact, and the relationships of people, 
rather than it is about scientific proof of what does and doesn't work. 
Company secretary 
This extract encapsulates much of the discussion that will follow. It reflects the 
fact that there is little science behind the determination of executive pay - as 
noted in chapter 5, the protagonists are honest in their intentions to use 'the 
market' as a benchmark, in the absence of an obvious right answer. It also 
highlights the importance of relationships in the remuneration-setting process. 
These are important findings, which could not have been obtained from other 
research methods. They start to answer the question 'how do companies 
detennine the pay of their executivesT. 
7.2 The ideal remuneration committee 
Regulation demands that listed companies use remuneration committees to 
determine the pay of their executives. In order to appreciate how a remuneration 
committee operates in practice, it is first useful to discuss how the regulation 
appears to require them to operate. For this, it is helpful to start with the 
Combined Code (2003)62, which sets out 'best practice' as required from listed 
companies. Table 7-1 sets out some key principles of the Code which affect 
remuneration committees. 
62 The 2003 Code was issued after the fieldwork for this research was complete. However, using 
this rather than the previous Code makes the research more relevant to the reader, without in any 
way changing the principles on which the research is based. Appendix II sets out some key 
differences between the previous Code and the 2003 version. 
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Table 7-1 Key principles of the Combined Code regarding executive remuneration 
B. 1. main Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and 
principle motivate directors of the quality required to run the company 
successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is 
necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive 
directors' remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to 
corporate and individual performance. 
B. 2. main There should be a formal and transparent procedure for developing 
principle policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration 
packages of individual directors. No director should be involved in 
deciding his or her own remuneration. 
B. 2. supporting The remuneration committee should consult the chairman and/or chief 
principle executive about their proposals relating to the remuneration of other 
executive directors. 
A. 5. supporting The chairman [of the board] should ensure that the directors 
principle continually update their skills and the knowledge and familiarity with 
the company required to fulfil their role both on the board and on 
board committees. 
From this, and from an awareness of the ongoing debate on corporate 
governance, we can surmise that the ideal remuneration committee is run by 
independent non-executive directors who are fully conversant with the company 
and who have a good knowledge of executive remuneration practices. They can 
determine the levels of pay suitable to "attract, retain and motivate" but are also 
aware of where the boundaries lie, so that pay is not excessive: they are 
sophisticated enough to establish 'the correct number'. They can, themselves, 
determine remuneration policy in such a way that it will link closely to 
performance, encouraging the executives to work better for the company. Having 
determined policy, they will discuss individual directors' packages with the line 
managers of those directors - the CEO or chairman; but in this the committee is 
discussing its proposals, seeking confirmation and opinions on individual 
performance rather than asking for recommendations on policy. 
241 
Chapter 7. - The remuneration committee: rhetorics and realities 
Underlying this picture of the ideal committee appear to be the following 
assumptions: 
1. There is a correct number for the level of remuneration (the Goldilocks 
number: not too high and not too low). 
2. Non-executives have a knowledge of the company that is comprehensive 
enough to be able to determine appropriate performance measures and 
targets, without needing extensive advice from the executives. 
3. Non-executives have a good and up-to-date understanding of the types of 
remuneration scheme that may be used, and the practical implications of 
different schemes. 
It is the contention of this thesis, based on the empirical work set out in chapter 5, 
that these assumptions simply do not apply. The remuneration committee 
envisaged in the regulations is similar in some ways to Weber's 'ideal type' 
(Gerth and Mills, 1967; Runciman, 1978): a conceptual tool against which one 
can judge reality. However, unlike the Weberian ideal type, which is designed to 
shine a light on 'real' practices by distilling the essence of a system, the 
regulatory ideal is not intended as a theoretical stereotype. It is a guide for 
committees against which they will be judged in a "comply or explain7' 
regulatory environment (Combined Code, 2003: para 4). In this way one might 
say that it is less like a Weberian ideal type than a Platonic ideal as set out in the 
Simile of the Cave (Plato, translated by Lee (1997: 316)), in that it represents an 
impossible ideal for this world, of which the remuneration committees we see are 
mere imperfect shadows. 
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This is not to deny the validity of the Code in setting an ideal. There is nothing 
wrong with establishing an ideal, provided that it is understood as such. As 
Nicholas Rescher argued: 
For while ideals put before us situations that, in a way, are merefictions, 
these fictions nevertheless direct and canalize our thought and action. .. To be sure, an ideal is not a goal we can expect to attain. But it serves to 
set a direction in which we can strive. Ideals are irrealities, but they are 
irrealities that condition the nature of real thought through their influence 
on human thought. .. Ideals, though instruments of thought are not mere 
myths. For there is nothingJalse orfictional about ideals as such - only 
about the idea of their embodiment in concrete reality. Yheir pursuit is 
something which can be perfectly real and eminently productive. 
Rescher(1993: 130,138), quoted by McSweeney (1997., 707) 
The ideal remuneration committee sets the standard against which all other 
remuneration committees are judged. The argument of this thesis is that the 
remuneration committees we see in practice do not - can not - attain the 
perfection of the ideal committee. The practical issues thus become: why do 
committees in practice fall short of the ideal, and how do they justify this? 
7.3 Remuneration committees in the real world 
7.3.1 The level ofpay 
Determining the 'correct'level ofpay 
Levels of pay, according to the Combined Code, should be "sufficienf' but not 
"more than is necessary". How is this Goldilocks number to be calculated? The 
following paragraphs set out a history of problems in determining the 'correct' 
level of pay for any job. I then go on to explain that although in practice pay is 
set by reference to the market, that market is in fact a device, and produces 
benchmarking data that construct local 'right answers' rather than reflecting an 
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underlying Right Answer. In a sense, the paradox is the same as that of the 'just 
.I pnce 
Just price 
If salaries for the average FTSE chief executive were half as much, then 
relative to each other, they would still be more concerned about that 
relativity than they would about whether its half. 
CEO 
The 'just price' problem illustrates precisely why there is no right answer. There 
are two issues: the question of the 'market-clearing price' (an empirical question 
of multi-agent supply and demand) and the question of the 'proper recompense' 
for a specific deed or act. The latter question is that addressed as far back as the 
13th century by St Thomas Aquinas, who wrote that "... as it is an act of justice to 
give a just price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice 
to make a return for work or toip963 Although Aquinas went on to discuss justice 
in terms of equality, he provided no answer as to how that "just price" should be 
established. Everyone was to be paid fairly, however 'fairly' was detennined. 
When the Church addressed the question again in the 16th century, theologians in 
the School of Salamanca now considered the former question. They argued that 
valuing labour and goods in terms of 'fairness' was a false determination of 
value, and recognised that price was detennined by what people thought 
something was worth in a given circumstance C'the common estimation"). This 
is illustrated in the following quotation: 
63 This text can be found in Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, question 114: 1, 
objection 3. This can be accessed from hqp: //www. ccel. orp-/a/aguinas/summa/FSIFSI 14. html 
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Therefore, those who measure the just price by the labour, costs, and risk 
incurred by the person who deals in the merchandise or produces it, or by 
the cost of transport, or the expense of travelling to andfrom thefair, or by 
what he has to pay the factors for their indust? 34 risk, and labour are 
greatly in error, and still more so are those who allow a certain profit of a 
fifth or tenth. For thejustprice arisesfrom the abundance or scarcity of 
goods, merchants, and money, as has been said, and notfrom costs, labour 
andrisk. If we had to consider labour and risk in order to assess the just 
price, no merchants would ever suffer a loss, nor would abundance or 
scarcity ofgoods and money enter into the question. ... Whyshouldabale 
of linen brought overlandfrom Brittany at great expense be worth more 
than one which is transported cheaply by sea?... Why should a book 
written out by hand be worth more than one which is printed, when the 
latter is better though it costs less to produce?... Thejustprice isfound not 
by counting the cost but by the common estimation. 
Luis Saravia, circa 154464 
Here we see a recognition that the price of goods, services or labour will be 
determined through their perceived saleability, irrespective of cost or justice. 
And 'perceived saleability' will be a function of (a) market supply and demand 
conditions, and (b) the perceived quality of the goods, services or labour in 
question. As described in chapter 5, this is precisely the technique that is 
espoused today in the determination of executive pay. Remuneration committees 
and their advisors obtain 'market data' from comparator companies, through 
surveys and other means. They define what they see as their relevant 'market' 
and the perceived level and quality of their executive labour, and make use of this 
as the basis to determine the levels of pay in their own companies. Judging both 
by prior research and the data gathered here, this is a universally adopted 
practice. However, my contention is that the approach is doubly flawed. It is 
flawed first insofar as it is then perceived as the means to establish a 'just price', 
as such a price cannot in principle be established independently of market 
perceptions, and so is a myth. But secondly, it is equally flawed in that it is 
64 This quotation appears in various places on the internet, but I have not verified it independently. 
Sources include a book review on bM: //www. ponderanew. com/r02-03-24. btm , which quotes 
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predicated on the idea that 'the market' is an independent and reliable touchstone 
for establishing such a price. This requires a somewhat lengthy discussion. 
The m3lh of the market 
Although it is universal practice for executive pay to be benclunarked against a 
market, this is not, in fact, a requirement of the UK governance regulations. The 
closest we have is the Combined Code (2003: B I) which states that committees 
should "judge where to position their company relative to other companies". The 
word 'market' is not mentioned, and the debate then centres around which other 
companies are appropriate comparators. 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman pointed out that the answer to any such question 
about 'the market' is not obvious: 
... a cottage indust? y of consultants that specializes in conducting surveys 
to measure a wide range of CEO compensation statistics ... [which 
suggests that] surprisingly, very little is known about the use of 
"competitive market going rates" as a criterion to set CEO pay, despite the 
lip service paid to it in economic theory, the human resource management 
literature, and compensation practice. (1997: 327) 
Porac, Wade and Pollock (1999), examining the comparators against which their 
US sample companies chose to benchmark pay, found that although companies 
tended to use their primary industry as a comparator, they selectively defined 
peers in ways that suited themselves when such peers could lead to an increase in 
pay levels. Although this study was not designed to highlight such practices, 
certain similarities can be seen. 
ftom Economic Thinkingfor the Theologically Minded, by Samuel Gregg, University Press of 
America November 200 1. 
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The first problem with using 'the market' as a benchmark is that the data being 
used are not neutral. A company choosing to take its comparators from a sector 
is making an implicit assumption that the sector is both appropriate and 
representative. This is not necessarily the case. One can envisage a situation 
(indeed, it was implied by the consultants' reports reviewed in this research) 
where the data become anomalous. Figure 7-1 illustrates how a 'benchmarking 
merry-go-round' might operate. 
Figure 7-1 The benchmarking merry-go-round 
Utility A benchmarks pay levels against other utilities; including Utility 
B. 
Utility B is a multi-business company. Being inclined to expand its 
non-regulated activities, it chooses to benchmark pay against companies 
in a particular Services sector. Thus, it distorts the survey data obtained 
by Utility A. 
Within this particular Services sector is Company C. C too is a multi- 
business group. Only half of its business is in Services; the rest is in 
Technology. C's remuneration committee sets pay based on an average 
of Services and Technology companies. 
Thus C's Technology benchmark impacts upon B's Service benchmark 
which in turn affects the pay of A and of any other company which 
appears to be benchmarking against Utilities. 
It can be seen from Figure 7-1 that the market against which Utility A- for 
which, substitute Any Company - benchmarks may not as such exist. This was 
illustrated by one of the interviewees: 
And we use the term 'labour market' generally as if there was such a thing 
as a labour market. Truly, the definition or the terminology 'labour market' 
is shorthand for a plethora of different markets. 
Consultant 
Additionally, within any company, individual jobs may be benchmarked. from 
outside that sector. This happens particularly in 'staff jobs such as finance 
247 
Chapter T The remuneration committee: rhetorics and realities 
director, where individuals are very mobile between sectors. The net needs to be 
cast wider, to attract suitable individuals. This was illustrated in conversation 
with the committee chairman for a utility: 
If you're a good enough finance director, and the finance director we have 
at [company] did not come from any of those sectors. He came from 
[different] sector. Therefore, what you want is a market view, whatever that 
is, of how much it is going to cost you and what you need to pay a finance 
director, at a certain point in his career, with a certain profile. Quite often, 
salaries surveys don't help you. Because if you go to them you'll end up 
with the wrong answer and recruit the wrong person. 
Committee chairman 
Furthermore, although our ideal remuneration committee will draw its 
information from sources covering the whole of the possible universe of 
comparators, the real world remuneration committee members operate under the 
constraint of bounded rationality; it is physically impossible for them to 
accommodate all possible sources of information, and so they just sample what is 
available. This is an interesting issue. It indicates that what is being 
benchmarked is not 'a market' but instead 'a sampling population': companies 
define their market as a limited population of elite salaries, sampled 100%. 65 
This was discussed by Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998: 141): 
1155 In a chapter 61 discussed the remuneration decision in terms of legitimacy. Here I would point 
out that the phase 'based on the market' carries considerably more legitimacy than the phrase 
'based on a limited sampling population. 
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An important concern in this regard is how to define the market. Yhe 
relevant market is an abstraction that exists in people's mind 
Conceptualizing the market as a socially defined entity is a notion that can 
be traced back to labor economist John Dunlop's writings on "wage 
contours" in the 1950s (e. g., Dunlop, 1957). However, this notion has 
never been examinedfor CEOs. nen afirm decides to pay executives the 
going rate in the CEO market, it must first decide on the appropriate 
"comparison other" in the market. Making this choice is a social and 
political process that may not be subject to explanation on economic 
grounds. Ezzamel and Watson support this sociopolitical interpretation 
since CEOs can benefit from remuneration committees' deliberately 
choosing higher-paid external CEOs as points of reference. Yhis is a 
subjective process involving judgments of the committee members, 
legitimized by the opinions of external consultants. 
It is of course likely to be a process in which the companies do not simply choose 
"higher-paid external CEOs". However, even if they sample more widely, at any 
given moment their sample will incorporate only current survivors. So there is an 
embedded survivor bias as well. 
The problem of how companies establish a market-aware but fair remuneration 
level was raised at the focus group meeting used to test some of the research 
findings. In a discussion of 'fairness' one participant stated that his company 
benchmarked similar companies on two different measures, to give, enough data 
to form an opinion, but also, significantly, so that others (unspecified) could see 
that it was a fair way of paying; in this way the rate was seen as legitimisable to 
the outside world. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that there is not one market but a series of 
overlapping markets, whose parameters are determined by perceptions of 
relevance. Different companies will make different selections. This is illustrated 
in Figure 7-2. 
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Figure 7-2 How companies define their comparator markets 
W Universe of 
companies from C 
il C which comparators 
ay be drawn rm 
Each of the five companies A to E selects a different comparator group as its 'market'. 
None is necessarily more correct than any other. Given the limited universe of legitimate 
comparators it is reasonable to assume that there will be overlaps, but it is important to 
appreciate that the intersects in their choices do not represent the 'right' answer. 
Moving on, there is a second fundamental problem with this concept of salaries 
based on 'the market': it is not a market in the generally-accepted sense. 
Economists discussing theories of supply and demand (an underlying basis for 
labour market theory) assume a competitive market in which prices settle at the 
intersect of supply and demand curves to arrive at a market-clearing price. The 
goods being traded are identical, or at least closely similar. If a merchant sets his 
prices at a premium to the market-clearing price he will find that there are few 
buyers; likewise, setting below-equilibrium prices should increase the demand 
for his goods. 
How does this differ from the 'market' for executives, which is used to determine 
their remuneration? Firstly, the executives, with different qualifications, talents, 
backgrounds and reputations, are perhaps less interchangeable than products in 
some other markets. These human capital attributes mean that any 'market- 
determined' price may need to be tailored to individual circumstances. However, 
this anomaly can be accommodated; as discussed in chapter 5, high-profile 
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individuals move to companies for remuneration packages that are out of line 
with others, and this does not necessarily provide an immediate distortion of the 
market. 
The main objection to this market hypothesis is more fundamental. The market 
prices reported in surveys do not themselves represent a price at which 
individuals could, to put it crudely, be acquired. They represent the prices 
currently being paid to other elite individuals. They are not an 'offer for sale' 
and will never be tested as such. The market data reflect what others are 
reporting as earnings, not what a market clearing price would be. For example, if 
the median rate for CEOs in a certain sector is E300,000 it would almost certainly 
be possible to find a qualified individual who would take the job for, say, his 
reserve price of E200,000. Paying the median gives that individual a surplus of 
E100,000. The money is certainly sufficient to "attract and retain", but it fails on 
the criterion of "not excessive". 
An illustration of this point came in a discussion with a company chairman who 
had increased the salaries of his executives significantly, despite the fact that they 
appeared to be content at their existing, sub-market levels. 
And we increased salaries by some 30%, or probably a bit higher than that, 
to try to get them more in line with where they should be. To be absolutely 
frank, I've never had any representation from any of them [the executives] 
about salaries, it was never an issue. 
Chairman 
This could be interpreted as the chairman's need for fairness in remuneration 
resulting in the executives being given a 'producer surplus', receiving a wage 
higher than they would demand in a free market. 
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7.3.2 Structuring pay to produce performance 
[regardingthe elasticity of directors'pay to performance] 
However, there exists no theoretical benchmark to serve as a guide for 
what size number should be expected... 
Rosen (1990: 3) 
In the ideal world, the remuneration committee will select policies that will best 
"attract, retain and motivate" and also "link rewards to corporate performance". 
In the real world this is more difficult. In chapter 2, Tables 2-2 and 2-3 set out 
the advantages and disadvantages of some common performance measures and 
scheme types, and noted that none met all these different demands. We may now 
better appreciate that this is impossible, as the demands are incommensurable. 
Thus the committee has to make a satisficing decision rather than a maximising 
decision. The recognition of this was illustrated in discussion with an 
experienced HR manager: 
You're most certainly not perfect, so its how little imperfect you can be. 
HR manager 
There is no one right answer to the question of how to structure remuneration 
policies (although there will be some wrong answers for each company in every 
circumstance). Nevertheless, remuneration committees still have to make a 
decision, to choose a scheme. The data set out in chapter 5 indicate that to do this 
they have regard in practice to two inter-related influences: 
9 What is being done in other, comparable companies? 
* What is acceptable to the investing institutions? 
This was illustrated by a consultant discussing how remuneration committees 
tend to take the safe option in determining their schemes: 
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But at the end of the day there is that comfort factor of saying 'we have an 
arrangement which we can justify by reference to the markef. 
Consultant 
The comparison with other companies came through consistently in chapter 5, 
with companies and consultants looking to 'market practice' in devising their 
scheme structures. Several instances of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) can be determined here. Most noticeably, it appears to be an 
example of mimetic isomorphism With no obvious answer, companies look to 
practices that appear to have worked in other companies, and apply those. A 
discussion of how the research data reflect the tenets of institutional theory was 
contained in chapter 6; here I merely note that this use of convenient 
comparisons bears no relation to the ideal behaviour of the knowledgeable non- 
executive described earlier. 
7.3.3 The knowledgeable non-executive 
In the ideal remuneration committee, non-executives consider the universe of 
potential structures and select the one that will best "attract, retain and motivate" 
and also "link rewards to corporate performance". This involves a good 
understanding of the attributes of different schemes, of market practices (the 
package has to be attractive to potential recruits), and of the company's key 
performance drivers. Some of this understanding can come by proxy, through 
remuneration consultants employed and briefed by the committee. 
In practice, the situation has to be more fluid. NEDs are not at the company full- 
time, and cannot realistically be expected to understand it as well as the 
executives, nor to understand the ramifications of remuneration schemes as well 
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as do FIR professionals. Accordingly, they rely to a greater or lesser extent on 
advice from executives and HR staff within the company. This asymmetry of 
information is particularly relevant when considering the relationships between 
the various parties, considered later. Before that it is useful to examine the role 
of the other key player - the consultant. 
7.3.4 The role ofthe consultant 
The literature on management consultants suggests various reasons why 
companies might use their services (for example, Sturdy, 1997; Wood, 2002). 
The consultants may act as experts, extras or facilitators (Tisdall, 1982). 
Remuneration consultants bring expert knowledge of market practices, of 
remuneration schemes, and (importantly) of the preferences of institutional 
shareholders; they act as an 'extra pair of hands', gathering data on behalf of the 
FIR professionals; and occasionally they act to facilitate and legitimate change in 
the companies' schemes. Such roles are seen in the narrative below. 
All of the companies except one made use of consultants, some extensivel 6. In 
the context of this chapter, the key consultancy roles were: 
e providing market data and details of schemes; 
9 providing training; and 
9 as intermediaries between the company and the investors. 
66 In the one company that was the exception, the view was that the internal HR professionals 
knew more about the company, and at least as much about schemes, than did the consultants, and 
so there was little to be gained from their use. This approach was put to the remuneration 
committee each year for re-consideration. This practice may represent an exercise of power as 
described by Lukes (1974), discussed later in this thesis. 
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In their role as experts, the consultants also act as a legitimising device. 
Companies can state that they have taken independent advice, and that they have 
benchmarked their schemes against those of peer companies, using objective 
data. This legitimacy arising from technical rationality is discussed by Sturdy 
(1997: 399). One of the NEDs phrased it succinctly: 
But I do think, there is no doubt that part of this process is a covering of the 
back. It allows the board to say that it has consulted with consultants. 
NED 
The consultants reinforce their position as experts by running seminars (for 
directors and institutions) and publishing reports, thus establishing their 
credentials. Because of this, they are often used in the intermediary role, 
explaining the committee's decisions to the shareholding institutions. This again 
strengthens their position as a key link in the remuneration-setting process: 
[Name of Consultants] are well respected by the institutions, which is one of 
the reasons we would always be very keen to work with them. 
HR Manager 
Although consultants clearly have a legitimising role, it is interesting that the 
substantial increases in executive pay in recent years have cast doubt on their 
independence, and hence their legitimacy. It is starting to become more common 
for companies to use two firms of consultants, one for the company and one for 
the committee. This split is intended to reaffirm the legitimacy of the external 
advice, although some interviewees cast doubt on its usefulness. 
A further point about the use of consultants is worth considering. It was noted 
earlier that companies tend to adopt similar types of scheme. This has been 
ascribed variously to coercive or mimetic isomorphism, but it could also 
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represent nonnative isomorphism, with practices passed on through a 
professional body, even if many would dispute whether consultancy is in fact a 
profession (Tisdall, 1982: 78). Sturdy (1997: 406) proposes another reason for 
this similarity of practice. He suggests that a main aim of any consultancy 
assigmnent is to generate further assignments, hence consultants cannot afford to 
be wrong in their recommendations. By following market practice they are in 
effect legitimising their own work, and minimising the danger of being caught 
out using a flawed technique. Somehow they manage to sell their work as being 
acceptable, in line with market norms, whilst also being tailored to the company's 
sPecific situation. 
7.3.5 Playingthegame: realities 
You want to avoid situations of what is perceived to be gross over-reward 
for poor performance. Sadly we've all had to deal with the media as much 
as the institutions, i. e. the owners of the company. Certainly, people like 
[name] and I will have as much if not more of a view on how something is 
going to be reported in the press as to how the institutions are going to 
react. Because we are who we are. ... The last thing I want - and the 
same with you - is to have shots being fired at our board remuneration 
practices on the front page of the Daily Mail! 
Focus group participant [Emphasis added] 
The above quotation acts to illustrate the importance of the perception of 
remuneration by key others, as well as its reality. This section and the next 
consider what happens, and how the message is presented. This includes 
consideration both of the words used, and of the governance forms formally 
adopted. 
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Structures 
The Combined Code (2003: B2) states that there should be "a formal and 
transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for 
fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors". Much attention has 
been focused on the outward manifestations of this, with disclosure required of 
the make-up of the committee, the number of meetings, attendees, etc. 
Unfortunately, the result of this is that committees have what might be called a 
formal and transparent structure, but the informal structure and the underlying 
processes are opaque. 
This was illustrated in a conversation with an HR professional, about the 
influence his company chairman had on the remuneration-setting process. His 
initial response was that several years earlier the company chairman had also 
chaired the remuneration committee, but due to the requirements of 'good 
governance' he had withdrawn from this role and from playing a very active part. 
Q. The reason I ask is just that in the work I've done, we've started from 
the point of view that the chairman shouldn't attend the meeting because 
that's good governance, and everybody has said well look, he is in charge 
of company strategy... 
A. Oh, off the record, it's ludicrousl ... To separate it like that, to separate the way they're paid, the way their performance is managed from the 
running of the company, I agree is a total nonsense. But I can't publicly say 
that... 
HR Manager 
The company had formally structured itself to comply with the regulations, but 
the underlying processes had changed less than it might have appeared. This 
reflects comments made by Sonnenfeld (2002) who discussed the fact that many 
of the US's failed companies had 'good' governance in that they followed all of 
the required procedures: 
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In other words, they [the boards] passed the tests that would normally be 
applied to ascertain whether a board of directors was likely to do a good 
job. And that's precisely what's so scary about these events. Viewing the 
breakdowns through the lens of my 25 years of experience studying board 
performance and CEO leadership leads me to one conclusion: It's timefor 
some fundamentally new thinking about how corporate boards should 
operate and be evaluated. We need to consider not only how we structure 
the work of a board but also how we manage the social system a board 
actually is. We'll be fighting the wrong war if we simply tighten procedural 
rules for boards and ignore their more pressing need - to be strong, high- 
functioning work groups whose members trust and challenge one another 
and engage directly with senior managers on critical issues facing 
corporations. (2002: 106) 
During the course of the research I interviewed at 12 companies, talking to three 
or more individuals at five of those companies, and learning too about other 
companies with which the interviewees were involved. What became obvious 
was that although each of the companies, by and large, could tick all the boxes to 
demonstrate good governance, within that constraint they all operated in very 
different ways. As set out in chapter 5, in some companies the NEDs appeared to 
control the process; in others the main focus was the executives. The balance of 
power and influence differed, with no two companies operating their executive 
remuneration processes in the same manner. This was foreshadowed by the 
comment of a company secretary in discussing my research: 
I'm fascinated at the way that you are approaching this, to tell you the truth. Because I think its going to have a lot more people issues in it. I think it's a lot to do with the way that people interact, and the relationships of people, 
rather than it is about scientific proof of what does and doesn't work. 
Company secretary 
This is demonstrated in the relationship summaries set out in Table 7-2. For each 
of the five companies where three or more people were interviewed (labelled A to 
E, to avoid the possibility of identification) this table shows who the main players 
were, who else was involved in the remuneration-setting process, and gives brief 
details of how the process worked. 
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Chapter Z The remuneration committee: rhetorics and realities 
Before analysing the relationships further, it is useful briefly to consider different 
aspects of power and influence. Power is discussed in chapters 2 and 6 as regards 
the literature on remuneration. Here I approach the subject more generally. 
Power in the boardroom -prior research 
There is an extensive literature on power and influence, which have been 
categorised in many ways. In order to make sense of the research findings, three 
approaches are considered here: Handy's list of sources of power (1993); 
Pettigrew and McNulty's studies of power and influence in the boardroom (1995, 
1998); and Lukes' 1974 work on the dimensions of power. Each has a 
contribution to understanding how remuneration committees operate. 
Sources of power 
Handy (1993) defines influence as the process by which A seeks to modify the 
attitudes or behaviour of B, and power as that which enables him to do so: 
influence being the use of power. He draws upon a relational view of power: if 
A's power source has no importance for B, or B has greater power than A, then 
A's attempt at influence will be unsuccessful. Given this, Handy suggests several 
potential sources of power, some of which seem particularly relevant to this 
discussion. These are position power (which includes control over invisible 
assets such as information), expert power and personal power (charisma), all of 
which are individualist models, insofar as these attributes are portrayed as 
possessions or properties of a given individual or entity. 
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These different sources of power will be considered further when discussing the 
relationships in companies A to E. 
Power and influence in the boardroom 
As set out in chapter 6, previous research has shown that power relationships in a 
boardroom can undermine its formal structure. Pettigrew and McNulty's studies 
(1995,1998) were interview- and survey-based, examining boardroom practices 
in large UK companies. Their findings, as relevant to this thesis, were as follows: 
Power is indeed a relational phenomenon; generated, maintained and lost in 
the context of relationships with others. 
Power sources relate to an individual's or individual entity's position, and to 
the ability to control rewards and sanctions. By and large, NEDs have few of 
these sources, and so have to be politically skilful in their work. Their power 
sources include prestige, experience, positional power on committees, and 
their role as a potential source of legitimacy. 
o Boards have different cultures - some deliberately encourage NED 
contribution; others do not. 
Dimensions of powe 
Lukes (1974) expands considerably on the relatively simplistic definitions of 
power such as those given earlier. Building on a paper by Bacharach and Baratz 
(1962) he states that there are three dimensions of power. For his third 
dimension, the one which is of interest in this thesis, he defines power as: A 
exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests 
(1974: 34). This is a more subtle definition, introducing the possibility of 
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reciprocal interactions into the individualistic model of power. So, for Lukes, 
power includes shaping the way people think: 
... is not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent 
people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their 
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and 
unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial? (1974: 24) 
Power is still a property or possession, but it can now, for Lukes, include the 
power to control the agenda - to prevent issues being considered. In terms of 
remuneration committees, this is literally true - the narratives in chapter 5 
discussed who actually sets the committee agenda in the different companies, and 
whether others could/did put forward items for discussion. So, on this aspect of 
power, we would need to analyse committees in terms of who sets the agenda, 
both literally and in terms of institutionalising, for each committee, the areas 
which are considered within its remit and those which are not to be part of its 
debate. 
Pye discussed power in the boardroom in a way that recognises this level of 
complexity. She stated that even those NEDs who are considered independent: 
... are still very much in the hands of the Chairman and the CE in terms of how agendas are put together, meetings are ftamed, information shared 
and decisions made. ... If executives are "economical" with the truth or 
manipulate data orfail to share knowledge with NEDs, then NEDs cannot 
enact their role appropriately. Hence the culture which underpins 
boardroom conduct and which is underpinned by the relationship forged 
between the Chairman and the CE and honed over time by influential 
others (e. g. investors) is crucial. (2001: 191) 
Pye went on to report that NEDs who sit on different companies' boards say that 
they work differently in each company, as board cultures vary. The next section 
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draws upon a similar nuanced understanding of power that is relational yet 
interactive, to interpret what goes on inside the 'black box'. 
Power in the boardroom - the case companies 
It was very obvious that the board cultures differed in the five companies. In 
some, the NEDs were a prime force; in others the executives were prominent in 
the process. The people defined as 'main players' in Table 7-2 were those who 
were involved in the dialogue in many ways, and who had a chance to influence 
the agenda of the committee meetings. In this category I have placed the 
supporting HR manager or company secretary, who not only had physical control 
over the distribution of the agenda, but generally influenced its content. 
In considering the remuneration-setting processes in the five companies 
examined, it appeared from the interviewees' accounts that the CEO had a 
prominent role in two (D and E). In a further company (C) the CEO played an 
important part but the non-executives were very involved. For the other two 
companies, the process in one was dominated by the non-executives and the other 
(B) was managed by the company chairman. It is difficult to draw conclusions 
from such a small sample, but in considering the dynamics of these companies, 
their cultures and their histories, some tentative hypotheses came to mind: 
1. In all of the companies the executives (in particular the CEO and the HR 
professionals) had position power due to their control over information. 
By definition executives know more about the business than the non- 
executives. In setting executive pay this knowledge is relevant in 
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determining appropriate performance measures, and establishing the 
targets. It is also relevant in assessing the performance of individual 
executives. 
2. In all except one of the companies (B), the expert power of the HR 
professional was acknowledged. Even in the companies that used 
remuneration consultants, the committee placed great reliance on the HR 
support. In company B the reason lay in the company's history: a 
previous company chairman had himself been an HR expert, and had not 
needed professional support. When a new chairman was appointed, the 
company carried on its existing mode of operation, which had become 
institutionalised. (It took a lot of questioning to establish this reason: the 
circumstances lay back in the company's history, and most interviewees 
had forgotten why the HR director was excluded. ) 
3. The personal power will vary with circumstances. It is likely that the 
CEO will have the influence if (a) he has personal power arising from 
reputation, or from the company's need for him (e. g. in a turnaround); or 
(b) the company has a history of being successful under his watch. This 
was the case in the relevant companies although in one the personal 
power of the CEO also came from his long tenure. 
4. Notwithstanding the potential sources of executive power, it is likely that 
the remuneration committee will have more influence if the company has 
been subject to critical attention from shareholders and media in the past. 
In this instance, more attention will be paid to the views of institutional 
shareholders than otherwise might be the case. 
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Overall, the data suggest that remuneration committees act in accordance with 
governance rules set down by the Combined Code etc, but these regulations do 
not - and cannot - dictate how individuals behave towards each other. These 
relationships guide what really happens in companies. This insight will not come 
as a surprise to anyone involved in corporate governance. Interview notes from a 
meeting with an institutional representative quote him as stating: 
At the end of the day, the boxes can be ticked in a wide variety of 
circumstances, but good governance comes down to the relationships 
between the individuals. 
This disconnect between the formal and informal structures adopted by 
companies was also highlighted by Holland (1996: 54). In interviews with 
institutions (conducted in 1993 and 1994, before the Greenbury report) he noted 
that having a remuneration committee was seen as 'good governance', but quoted 
one interviewee as saying that it was relatively easy for companies to appear to 
comply (with the Cadbury regulations), but that this: "... would not tell investors 
if boards and managers were likely to comply in spirit and substance". 
7.4 Playing the game: rhetorics 
Given that there is no right answer, an important part of the remuneration-setting 
process is the communication of its output to stakeholders, in order to ensure 
legitimation. It is interesting to note the rhetorics used in this. The differences 
between the espoused practices set out in companies' rhetorics, and the enacted 
practices of their reality, are illustrated in Table 7-3. 
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Table 7-3 Rhetorics and realities 
Rhetorics Realities (enacted practices) 
Practices that might reflect Practices that might reflect 
'weak' governance 'strong' governance 
The CEO attends committee The CEO attends every The CEO is invited to attend 
meetings by invitation meeting, and has considerable certain meetings. 
input into the meeting agenda. 
The committee employs the The consultants are employed The committee members, led 
remuneration consultants by the HR professional, and by its chairman, interview 
take their terms of reference in prospective consultants (either 
part from the executives. their suggestions or the HR 
professional's) at a beauty 
parade, and then make the 
decision as to who is 
employed. 
The committee and the HR 
staff have separate consultants. 
Stretching performance targets Performance targets are Bonus payments are never 
are used always achieved, indicating 100% of the possible, 
that they may not be stretching indicating that the targets are 
enough. demanding. 
Pay is based on the market As discussed earlier in this c hapter, the market is a social 
construction. 
A substantial amount of the Although a substantial amount Although a substantial amount 
reward is based on is based on performance, this is based on performance, if 
performance is always paid out this is not paid out on a regular 
basis the scheme is changed. 
[This is not necessarily an 
example ofstrong 
governance. ] 
The rhetorics set out in Table 7-3 are distilled from companies' published 
remuneration reports, and reflect common forms of wording. Within this public 
face of the remuneration committee, the realities differ. 
One further piece of rhetoric is relevant to this discussion. Governance 
regulations always refer to the need to "attract, retain and motivate" executives. 
It is interesting to note that in discussing pay at lower levels of an organisation, 
the phrase more often used is "recruit, motivate and retain" (e. g. Kessler and 
Purcell, 1992: 19). The subtle difference between 'recruit' and 'attract' implies 
that senior directors are a breed apart, who need to be wooed, perhaps with higher 
267 
Chapter 7., The remuneration committee: rhetorics and realities 
pay awards. It suggests a seller's market for executives, who often receive 
'golden hellos' (another piece of rhetoric) to attract them to companies, and a 
buyer's market for more junior employees. Thus the large pay awards may 
become more acceptable, on the implied understanding that somehow they are 
needed. 
7.5 Summary of chapter 
In chapter 51 set out data showing how remuneration is set in large companies. 
All of the companies are obliged to follow the Combined Code and to meet with 
good governance practice. All do, with a few minor infractions. But their 
internal processes and relationships are very different, and each has a different 
approach to setting remuneration. Although regulation sets down what an ideal 
committee might look like, this is impossible in practice - the Goldilocks number 
does not exist, and the NEDs operate in a power structure dependent in part on 
the company's history and culture. 
In practice, companies adapt to the reality of their situation. Their dilemma is 
that, given there is no 'right' answer, they still need to find an answer: the 
executives need to be paid, and that pay needs to be satisfactory to all key 
constituencies - in particular the executives and the outside world, represented by 
the institutional shareholders and the media. Accordingly, they rely on a 
'market' to grant legitimacy. 
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Since the efficiency of various routines and practices (such as 
compensation design) is not well understood and, thus, not eas 
defensible on its own merits firms may copy one another (thus lending 
support to claimsfor legitimacy). For example, whenjaced with defending 
executive compensation design, firms may find credibility in adopting 
compensation designs thatfollow indust? y or nationalpractice. 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (199Z 362) [emphasis added] 
Committees arrive at a level of pay by using comparators that can be justified 
rather than those that are 'correct': the 'just price' does not exist, and 'the 
market' is a myth. They adopt structures suggested by isomorphic practices, 
rather than attempting to find the unique 'best'. They legitimisc their 
remuneration with reference to the market, and by using consultants who, in their 
(self-) designated role as experts, are perceived to be independent. They attempt 
to comply with regulation but are just as much concerned with the perception as 
the actuality. 
Remuneration committees work within this general set of constraints and 
paradoxes, finding different (sometimes very different) ways to resolve the 
endemic problem - they have to come up with a number for each award. But 
although the approaches vary, as we have seen, at the level of detail, all are 
seeking to ensure external legitimacy (and perhaps internal self-justification) 
through ensuring that all the governance boxes can be ticked. So the inner 
workings of the committee will reflect a dynamic set of group and individual 
relationships which may bear little resemblance to its formal structure, but which 
will lead to disparate but recognisably similar decision outcomes. 
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8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
In this concluding chapter I summarise the research project and review its main 
findings, placing the work in the context of previous research, and attempting to 
explain its contribution to knowledge. The limitations of the work are also 
described, and areas for ftirther research suggested. Finally, I discuss the 
implications of this work for practitioners involved in setting remuneration in 
listed companies. 
8.2 Summary of the project 
The research question that formed the basis of this thesis is: 
How do companies determine the remuneration of their 
executive directors? 
This question developed from my interest in the area, and from a literature review 
that demonstrated a clear gap in prior research. 
8. Zl The research approach 
In order to address the research question I adopted a qualitative approach, 
conducting interviews with people who sat on and advised remuneration 
committees, as these are the people who are best-placed to comment on what 
really happens. Such an approach has rarely been seen in studies of directors' 
remuneration. 40 interviews were conducted with individuals from 12 companies, 
institutional representatives and headhunters. These face-to-face interviews 
provided a wealth of data which has been analysed using an approach that is 
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grounded purely in neither economic, social-psychological nor organisational 
perspectives, but has drawn upon a diverse range of theories previous used to 
address the executive remuneration problem. Such a multiply-influenced 
theoretical approach is itself uncommon in this field (Merchant et al., 2003). 
8.2.2 Setting this project in the context ofprior literature 
The research question of this thesis has not directly been addressed in the 
extensive body of prior research into directors' pay. Many studies have used 
archival data to consider the statistical relationship between various input factors 
(for example company size, performance, characteristics of the board) and pay, 
determined in different ways. However, few have considered the processes that 
underlie the remuneration decision. Figure 8-1, repeated from chapter 1, 
illustrates this. 




Furthermore, in previous research most studies that examined the level of pay 
have ignored its structure, and vice versa. This study considers both. An 
additional difference between this study and others is that the theoretical 
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approaches adopted by previous researchers have mainly been situated in either in 
neo-classical economics, or in a social-psychological or organisational base; the 
multi-theoretical approach adopted here has rarely been used. Table 8-1 sets out 
the differences between this research and the body of prior literature as discussed 
in chapter 2. 
Table 8-1 Differences between this study and the body of prior research 
Prior research* This study 
Mostly quantitative. Qualitative approach. 
Mostly deductive. A more inductive approach. 
The use of data and constructs meant that The research was close to its subject, 
the research was conducted at a distance embedded in companies. 
from companies. 
Generally examines the determinants of Examines the remuneration-setting 
pay in an 'input-output' model. processes. 
Generally approaches the research through A multiply-influenced theoretical approach, 
a particular theory. This means that most which considers the dilemmas of all 
studies relate to the individual or to the relevant parties. 
market, but rarely to both. 
Focused on particular areas of executive A wide-ranging study that encompasses 
pay. many different aspects of executive pay. 
* Whilst there are exceptions, and it is unfair to characterise all previous research as 
fitting into the description set out above, this generic description would be recognisable 
by a reviewer of that literature. 
In setting out the differences between this thesis and the existing body of research 
I acknowledge a debt to that body of knowledge. Without the prior literature this 
work would have been less clearly focused. This study has extended prior 
research, and shows the value of taking a qualitative approach alongside a body of 
quantitative work, as suggested by Werner and Ward, 2004. 
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8.3 The research contribution 
This thesis has contributed both in its findings and in its methodology. Whilst the 
methodology used is not original, it had previously been unusual in this field. 
This study shows that it is possible to do interview-based work in this area, and 
that such work generates rich data that has opened up the 'black box' of process. I 
hope that this will encourage others to follow. 
In this thesis I developed a typology of theories used by previous researchers, and 
used that to explore how useful these theories were in explaining how 
remuneration is set. I found that none in itself was sufficient to explain the 
complex processes uncovered by the research; nor was any combination of 
existing theories sufficient. 
A major theme that emerged from the research has been the finding that 
institutional theory and 'need for legitimacy' approaches continue to make 
particular sense of certain features that are common to the disparate ways adopted 
by committees to solve the remuneration problem. As summarised in Tables 8-2 
and 8-3, companies set their level of pay in line with 'the market' and they adopt 
the same pay structures as their peers. What is significant about this is that the 
participants appreciated that there is no single right answer to the question 'how 
should we pay the directorsT (although there may be wrong answers for any 
individual company at any time). Accordingly, a key constraint on any 
remuneration committee is the need to be able to justify its decisions, to legitimise 
the company and the NED committee members. The use of 'market comparators' 
is one way to do this, as is the rhetoric surrounding the remuneration decision. 
273 
Chapter 8: Summary, conclusions and implications 
8.3.1 Outcomes ofthe remuneration decisions 
In examining the processes of setting remuneration, it was inevitable that I would 
also be enquiring as to the outcomes of the remuneration decisions on the level 
and structure of executive pay. Tables 8-2 and 8-3 set out the key findings as 
regards those outcomes. 
Table 8-2 Summary of key findings regarding the level of pay 
Pay could be said to be justifiable if it were (a) the 'just price' for the job, or (b) a 
reflection of supply and demand in the market. As it is impossible to determine just 
price, companies have to set and justify their pay by reference to market forces. 
All companies report that the level of pay is based on 'the market, as determined by 
remuneration surveys and other benchmarks. These benchmarks, being external to 
the company, can confer legitimacy on the remuneration decisions. However, the 
market for executives does not exist independently: it is in fact a collection of elite 
referents established by each company. This socially-constructed market has become 
institutionalised, and is accepted by all players as a legitimate way to set pay. 
Given the existence of multi-business companies, and companies that aspire to be in 
sectors other than their own, there is no guarantee that these elite referents reflect 
what they claim. A benchmarking merry-go-round exists, making any independent 
comparison impossible. 
Where schemes were considered to be significantly below 'the market', levels of pay 
were revised upwards. No instances were seen of pay levels being reduced. 
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Table 8-3 Summary of key findings regarding the structure of pay 
All of the companies adopt schemes including salary and short- (one year) and long- 
term (three year) performance-related pay (PRP). 
A map was constructed (Figure 5-2) of the various structuring decisions a company 
has to make. The issues impacting these are both internal and external. The internal 
factors include the company's strategy and culture (current or intended) and the HR 
practices that it follows. External factors reflect an institutional theory explanation, 
with companies following 'best practice' in order to gain legitimacy. Institutional 
investors have a strong influence on pay structures. 
* It was noted that companies adopt similar structures, but often for different reasons. 
" The PRP element in pay packages is large, and growing, with bonus potential and 
long-term awards rising each year. This is claimed to be partly to motivate good 
performance (although many respondents argued that pay does not motivate 
performance) and partly in order to conform with good governance practice: PRP is 
seen as one way to legitimise large remuneration packages. 
" By implication, pay is structured, at any given point, in comparison to successful or 
survivor companies, thus introducing a 'structural survivor bias'. 
" When a PRP scheme does not pay out, or pays out less than was expected when the 
scheme was devised, the scheme is normally changed. Thus, pay is only related to 
good performance; for poor performance the rules change. 
One contribution of this thesis is the finding that companies change their 
remuneration schemes frequently, and that such changes cover both the level and 
structure of the pay. No previous academic studies have been found that directly 
address this. The changes in the level of pay would be disclosed in companies' 
published remuneration reports, although changes due to a revision of the 
comparator group might not be very obvious. Likewise, many of the changes in 
scheme design (short- and long-term) would be disclosed, although some of the 
more subtle changes would not be reflected in the published remuneration reports. 
The most common reasons for making changes included the desire not to be 
'below-market' and to ensure a payout on performance-related schemes which 
were in danger of not paying out the expected amount. Changes were also made 
for reasons to do with the company's strategy and changes in its personnel. 
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The overall effect of the changes was to increase remuneration. This occurred due 
to increases in the level of pay and increases in the level of bonus or long-term 
incentive as a percentage of that basic pay. Thus there was a multiplier effect, 
total remuneration reflecting greater multiples of a larger amount. 
A constant criticism of 'fat cat' pay is the fact that executive pay levels continue 
to rise more steeply than those for other employees. The changes discussed above 
are one reason for this. Another, related, reason is the use of a self-defined 
'market'- whether consciously or unconsciously on the part of the players, there is 
always a survey available to show that a company is below the market, and NEDs 
feel obliged to meet that 'market' in order to avoid losing good executives to the 
competition. Given that there is no 'right answer', this ratcheting-up appears to be 
an inevitable feature of the system. 
Previous researchers (e. g. Prendergast, 1999; Tosi et al., 2000) have commented 
that the lack of a clear relationship between pay and performance could reflect 
contracts that were not designed with this relationship in mind, or could reflect 
contracts too sophisticated to be captured in statistical studies done at a distance 
from the companies. In examining the detailed performance measures and targets 
adopted by the case companies, this study has demonstrated that the latter 
explanation might be true. In noting the continuing changes made to schemes that 
do not pay out, it has also suggested another explanation for other researchers' 
findings - that in practice pay is only performance-related when that performance 
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is good (whether or not that good performance reflects factors outside the 
individual executives' control). 
8.3.2 The rem uneration-setting processes 
The research has looked at the remuneration-setting processes through the eyes of 
the main players: the remuneration committee chairmen, other NEDs, CEOs, HR 
directors, company secretaries, company chairmen and consultants. It further 
considered the views of an institutional professional body and headhunters, to 
obtain their views on process. 
Although a process model was drawn up (Figure 6-3) to show the influences on 
executive pay and outline how it is set, the actual processes of setting pay are 
more subtle than the model can accommodate. In each of the case companies, 
procedures could be said to follow those laid down in the governance regulations. 
Nevertheless, each company's remuneration committee operated in a very 
different way. In some companies the committee, and the NEDs on it, were 
clearly a major influence on how remuneration was set. In others it was apparent 
that the executives (particularly the CEO) controlled what was done, with the 
remuneration committee being there almost to rubber stamp some decisions. 
Although outwardly all companies were compliant with governance regulation, it 
was the relationships between the key players that determined what happened. 
The Combined Code envisages remuneration being set by an independent 
remuneration committee, staffed by non-executives who are knowledgeable about 
both the company and remuneration schemes. This is an impossible ideal. The 
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non-executives on the committee lack the time, knowledge and experience to 
contribute fully in this way, and need to take advice from internal staff as well as 
external consultants. The remuneration committees we see in practice are 
imperfect shadows of the ideal put forward by the Code. 
The setting of directors' remuneration is an example of the 'is-ought' problem. 
There is no one right answer; we do not know what pay levels and structures 
ought to be. However, levels and structure do need to be determined for each 
company. Accordingly, they are set based on what is, using other companies and 
perceived best practice as a template. This enables companies to justify their pay 
decisions in an 'objective' manner. Although Legitimacy-Comparison theory 
proved inadequate as an explanation of the process, its two components - the need 
for legitimacy and the use of comparisons - are significant inputs into the pay- 
setting decision. 
8.4 Limitations of this study and opportunities for further 
research 
8.4.1 Limitations 
This UK-based study has examined practices in 12 FTSE 350 companies. Its 
results must be interpreted in the light of the fact that participation in the study 
was at the discretion of the key participants. In those companies where there were 
several participants, the participation decision was often discussed at a 
remuneration committee meeting; in those where there was only one interviewee, 
that person had to be willing to volunteer their time. It is reasonable to assume 
that companies where the protagonists were in some way uncomfortable with their 
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practices, or where they did not fully trust each other, would not volunteer to 
participate in this study. Accordingly, there is an inevitable bias in the sample. 
Were it the intention of the study to generalise the findings to a wider population, 
or to constitute a set of universally-applicable conclusions about or principles for 
executive remuneration, this would present a problem. (Indeed, were there any 
such intention, this research approach would not have been adopted. ) However, 
as one aim of the sample selection was to consider only companies that appeared 
to have good governance - in order to see what 'good' looked like in this context 
- the self-selection of the sample is an observation rather than a limitation. 
Further, while one might anticipate that similar characteristics will continue to be 
exhibited in the activities of remuneration committees, this cannot be a foregone 
conclusion. Indeed, the findings here may themselves constitute a potential 
intervention in such future activities, insofar as they are seen as relevant or 
insightful. 
A limitation of the study was the inability to obtain more than one interviewee in 
five of the 12 case companies, and having only two participants from two other 
companies. The research design had originally called for five participants from 
eight companies; as explained in chapter 4, it was felt that this would provide a 
good understanding of each company's situation. The circumstances of the 
research prevented this, as discussed in chapter 4. Although there is no way of 
knowing whether further participants from these companies would have provided 
significantly different data from those who were interviewed, reassurance was 
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obtained from the fact that the narratives of so many individuals in different 
companies coincided. 
8.4.2 Opportunitiesforfurther research 
This research could be extended in several ways. At a simple level, another 
researcher could duplicate the work in the same setting (FTSE 350 companies) in 
order to determine how committees work in the light of new governance rules, for 
example the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002). Alternatively, it 
would be useful to duplicate it in other contexts, for example listed companies in 
other jurisdictions, or in large private companies, to see how context affects the 
processes. Another useful variation would be to repeat the research during a time 
when stock markets were noticeably rising or falling, to see how this changes 
interviewees' actions and perceptions. 
The design of this research was to consider remuneration as comprising salary and 
short- and long-term performance-related pay, in line with practices adopted in 
previous research. Pensions and perks are not included. At the time the research 
commenced, the issue of executive pensions was not a matter of great interest for 
the public or the institutional shareholders; over the last couple of years this has 
changed, and pensions have achieved prominence in the 'fat cat' debate (e. g. 
Cohen, 1993; Tucker, 2003). Extending the research to ask interviewees about 
their pension choices would provide an interesting insight to this debate. 
The research could also be used as the basis for further studies into the roles 
played by the protagonists in the remuneration-setting discussion. This would 
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include the executives, the NEDs and the consultants. Also, given the finding of 
the importance of investing institutions to the deliberations of the remuneration- 
setters, it would be useful to combine research of this type with research into how 
the institutional investors see the remuneration-setting process. 
The findings of this research could also be used to develop new constructs, to test 
in qualitative and quantitative analysis. For example, it would be interesting to 
take the list of input factors developed in chapter 2 and examine the contexts in 
which each factor is considered appropriate. In particular, it seems that a 
company's history and culture have a significant impact on how the committee 
operates and how its rqmuneration is determined, and this would be a useful area 
for future exploration. 
8.5 Implications for practice 
To some, it might seem impertinent to suggest that this research has implications 
for practice: although the findings add to the academic debate, the findings were 
obtained in interview with practitioners, who are already aware of what is 
happening. However, the great advantage of the academic approach is the way 
that data are analysed in the light of theory. Accordingly, I believe that there are 
significant implications for non-academics, as set out below. 
8.5.1 For those involved in the remuneration-setting decision 
One finding of this research was that in each company the remuneration-setting 
decision was approached differently. In some, the remuneration committee 
members played a large part in determining pay, and in appointing the 
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committee's advisors. In others, although the committee was nominally involved, 
the majority of the work was done by the executives. For non-executives sitting 
on remuneration committees the research should highlight the need for them to 
consider the following questions: 
9 How and by whom were the terms of reference of the remuneration committee 
set? Do they need altering? 
9 How many remuneration committee meetings are there in a year, and is this 
sufficient to do justice to the committee's terms of reference? 
* How is the agenda for committee meetings set, and how easy is it for NEDs to 
contribute to this agenda? 
* Who sets the terms of reference for external advisors, and is the committee 
satisfied as to their independence of mind? 
9 How do the CEO and the company's chairman interact with the committee and 
do they have undue influence over its decisions? 
8.5.2 For those regulating remuneration 
In recent months, the governance debate on both sides of the Atlantic has reflected 
companies' complaints that the burden of regulation has become too great, and 
that time and money are being spent in unnecessary compliance which does not 
add value (see, for example, Targett, 2004a, 2004b). This research shows that 
companies adapt to regulation in their own idiosyncratic ways. Each of the 
companies in the research could state that it complied with governance regulations 
- it could 'tick the boxes'. However, each complied in a different manner. 
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The practical implication of this is that although regulation can be used to set 
minimum standards (for example, levels of disclosure, the use of a remuneration 
committee), fin-ther layers of regulation may have little impact on pay levels and 
remuneration-setting processes. Companies can adapt to comply without 
necessarily changing their underlying governance cultures. As Jensen and 
Meckling (1994) argued, regulations will almost always generate unanticipated 
behaviour, as people invent ways to adapt to the constraints. 
Further, given that there is no right answer, and that companies construct their 
own comparator 'market' in establishing pay levels and structures, it seems almost 
impossible that regulation can control the 'bidding up', or ratcheting of directors' 
pay. 'The market' is used both as a benchmark for HR purposes and to provide 
legitimacy. Although recent examples of shareholder outrage (e. g. Buckley, 
2004) show that this legitimacy may be waning; this does not seem to be 
restricting awards (Tucker, 2004). In the absence of a government-backed 
incomes policy it is difficult to see just what will happen to control pay levels; 
companies fear losing valuable executives due to under-paying, so no 
remuneration committee will want to be the first to impose restrictions. 
8.6 A rinal word 
The aim of this study was to open up the black box of directors' remuneration, to 
find out how companies determine their executive pay. This aim has been met. It 
has been achieved by taking a novel approach to examine a field that has been the 
subject of much prior research. This thesis has added to the existing body of work 
in different ways. It has confirmed some of the findings of previous research, and 
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explained why others may be problematic. It has extended the knowledge of the 
field by illuminating practices used in the case companies to determine executive 
pay, and their rhetorics ofjustification. 
As such, as noted above in this chapter, the study is itself an intervention in the 
practice of remuneration-setting that might potentially make a difference to that 
practice going forward. Such an outcome may of course not take place, and 
certainly cannot be predicted; nor can any specific impact be anticipated. At the 
same time, it cannot be ruled out that there may be some impact, whether in terms 
of how this practice is theorised, or how well it is pursued in real-world business 
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Glossary ofterms and abbreviations 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AM Association of British Insurers 
Cap A bonus cap is the maximum level of bonus 
payable, normally expressed as a percentage 
of base salary. 
CB1 The Confederation of British Industry: an 
employers' organisation in the UK. 
CEO Chief executive officer 
CFO Chief financial officer 
Combined Code (on Corporate A regulatory code annexed to the Listing 
Governance) ("The Code") Rules for listed companies. A new Code 
was issued in July 2003, following the 
publication of the Higgs report. 
Directors' Remuneration Report A Statutory Instrument requiring listed 
Regulations (2002) companies to increase substantially the level 
and quality of their disclosures about 
directors' pay. This applies for financial 
years ending on or after 31" December 2002. 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
EPS Earnings per share 
Director Executive director of a company 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation. A performance measure 
often used by analysts in examining a 
company. 
Exercise price The price at which the holder of share 
options is entitled to buy the shares. 
FD Finance director 
FTSE 350 The top 350 companies on the London Stock 
exchange, by market capitalisation. The 
largest of these are the FTSE 100; the FTSE 
25 0 includes the companies from 10 1 to 350. 
Gearing The relative level of performance-related 
remuneration (for example, annual bonus) 
compared to fixed remuneration (for 
example, basic salary). A highly-geared 
package will contain a high proportion of 
performance-related remuneration 
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Greenbury report A report on Directors' Remuneration, 
published in 1995, commissioned by the CBI 
following concerns about 'fat cats'. 
Higgs report Review of the Role and Effectiveness of 
Non-Executive Directors, published in 
January 2003 as a consultative document, 
parts of which were later incorporated into a 
revised Combined Code. 
HR Human resources 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standard 
In-the-money Term referring to share options for which the 
exercise price is lower than the current 
market price, making it financially 
worthwhile to exercise the options. 
Inputs Factors, both company-specific and 
environmental, that influence the setting of 
the remuneration policy and the individuals' 
specific remuneration packages. (For 
example, company size, industry, 
individual's experience. ) 
L-C theory Legitimacy-comparison theory; developed 
during the literature review for this study. 
Leverage As gearing 
LT Long-term 
Ltip Long-term incentive plan. 
M&A Merger and acquisition. A generic term for 
both types of corporate combination. 
NAPF National Association of Pension Funds 
NED Non-executive director 
Option A call option on the shares of a company. 
This gives the holder the right - but not the 
obligation - to buy shares at a set price (the 
exercise price) at some point in the future 
(normally after three years). 
Out-of-the-money Term referring to share options for which the 
exercise price is higher than the current 
market price, making it not financially 
worthwhile to exercise the options. 
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Outcome The amount of remuneration (in all its 
forms) received by an individual director in 
a particular period (which may depend on 
performance achieved). 
Outputs The remuneration policies and packages 
determined by a company as a result of the 
remuneration processes. 
Pay risk The risk to the director of receiving lower 
pay than anticipated. A highly geared 
scheme carries high pay risk. 
PRP Performance-related pay 
PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Level of pay The amount actually paid for expected 
performance, including both the fixed and 
variable elements. 
Remn Common abbreviation for remuneration. 
Remuneration package The translation of the overall remuneration 
policy into terms for an individual director. 
(The Hampel report (1998) uses the term 
"remuneration package" to cover both this 
definition and the amount of remuneration 
received in a period. To avoid confusion in 
this paper, the term "outcome" has been 
used to define the latter. ) 
Remuneration policy The framework in which the directors' 
individual remuneration packages are set: 
the company's stance on remuneration 
issues. For example: selection of 
comparator group for benchmarking 
performance; positioning of remuneration 
relative to comparator group; level of 
gearing of the remuneration; choice of 
performance measures; choice of 
performance period; pensions policy. (A 
fuller list of items to consider in a 
remuneration policy is given in Section C of 
the Greenbury report, 1995. ) 
Remuneration processes The processes of (1) determining a 
remuneration policy and (2) translating it 
into remuneration packages for individual 
directors. 
Relative performance evaluation 
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RPI Retail Price Index. Used as a benchmark for 
companies to assess eps growth. 
SID Senior Independent Director. An NED, 
other than the chairman, designated as a 
potential route for institutional liaison. 
ST Short-term 
Structure of pay The combination of fixed and variable pay 
elements, together with the performance 
measures and targets chosen, and the forms 
of payment. 
TSR Total shareholder return: the return to a 
shareholder over a given period, comprising 
dividend and capital gain/loss. 
Undenvater options Colloquial term for out-of-the-money 
options. 
Variable pay Any element of pay which is contingent 
upon performance criteria or share price. 
Generally, anything other than base salary. 
(Used synonymously with performance- 
related pay. ) 
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APPENDIX 1 DIRECTORS'REMUNERATION IN 
UK LISTED COMPANIES 
The average executive director of a UK listed company will receive a substantial 
remuneration package comprising several different elements. This section 
provides a brief overview of what might be in such a package. 
Salary 
The package will be built around a base salary. Although the salary element may 
form proportionately a smaller part of the package than it has done in the past 
(Centre for Business Performance, 2003) due to the growing importance of 
variable pay, it is important for two reasons. Firstly, and somewhat obviously, it 
is the fixed pay which the executive knows that s/he can expect to receive. The 
other reason that base salary is important is that the amounts of variable pay are 
generally expressed as multiples of base salary. For example, the annual bonus 
may be up to 60% of base salary; the longer term award may be 200% of base 
salary. Accordingly, increases in base salary have a multiplier effect on the whole 
package. 
Annual bonus 
Most companies will award both short-term and longer term variable pay. The 
short-tenn award is generally in the form of an cash bonus, paid for achieving 
annually-set performance targets. The targets may be a mixture of financial and 
non-financial, individual and corporate. As stated above, the amount of bonus 
available will be a multiple of salary. Companies will often state that no bonus 
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will be paid until a certain perfonnance threshold is achieved, and then further 
performance produces increased bonus. Figure Al (based on Murphy, 2001) 
illustrates a typical bonus payout. 
Figure Al Annual bonus payout 
Bonus 
Performance 
The bonus threshold is set at a performance level of A: until this performance is reached, 
no bonus will be paid. Expected performance is at level B, at which the expected bonus 
of X will be paid. The bonus is capped at Y, and even if performance exceeds level C, no 
additional bonus will be paid. The bonus cap will be set in relation to base salary, such 
that, for example, X is 60% of salary and Y is 100% of salary. 
One further fact is worth noting about the annual bonus. In recent years it has 
become common for companies to pen-nit or demand that part of the annual bonus 
award is commuted into shares rather than taken as a cash payment. Those shares 
will vest after a finther period, sometimes with fiu-ther performance conditions 
attached. Companies often 'match' these shares, such that if the executive 
commutes into shares an amount equivalent to say E100,000 of pre-tax bonus, 
when the shares vest the company will award him or her extra shares, the number 
of shares that that f 100,000 could have bought at the time the bonus was awarded. 
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Long-term incentiveplan 
Common practice is to incentivise directors to think for the longer term, and 
companies also wish to align the directors' interests with those of the long-term 
shareholders. Accordingly, many companies use a long-term incentive plan (Itip). 
Up is the generic term for many different types of share-based plan. In a typical 
plan shares would be awarded conditionally to the director at the start of the plan, 
but the shares would not vest until a performance period (often three years) had 
passed and performance conditions had been met. The proportion of shares 
vesting would depend on how well the performance conditions had been met; as 
with the annual bonus, there is often a sliding scale of award for different levels of 
performance. 
Share option scheme 
Directors' share options are call options on the shares of the company, with an 
exercise price generally set at the share price at the date of grant, and a period of 
between three and 10 years during which the director can choose to exercise the 
option. It used to be the case that companies would either use an Itip or a share 
option scheme to reward their directors, but it is becoming common practice for 
companies to have both schemes available for use (New Bridge Street, 2003b). 
Otherforms ofremuneration 
There are two other forms of remuneration in common use in the UK - pensions 
and perks. Most directors belong to a company pension scheme, often a defined 
benefit scheme. Also, almost all directors will have some additional perks, for 
example a company car, health insurance, etc. The academic literature on 
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directors' remuneration, reviewed in chapter 2, has almost nothing to say about 
these aspects of remuneration (for example, Murphy, 1999: 2517; Werner and 
Ward, 2004: 217). It focuses mostly on the determination of the level of base 
pay, and on various aspects of variable, performance-related pay. This thesis 
follows that tradition. 
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APPENDIX 2 EXAMPLES OF VARIABLES USED IN 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
This appendix sets out examples of papers which were used to derive the list of 
input variables in chapter 2. 
Table Al Prior studies examining the relationship between company size and 
directors' remuneration 
STUDY REMUNERATION DETERMINATION SAMPLE RESULTS 
MEASURE OF SIZE 
Lewellan and Current income (a) Sales and 50 large US Correlation between 
Huntsman equivalent of all pay (b) Market value companies, 1942 market (1970) sources to 1963 capitalisation and 
pay but insignificant 
between sales and 
pay 
Deckop Cash compensation (a) Sales and 120 large US Insignificant 
(1988) (b) Market value companies, 1977 correlation between 
to 1981 sales and pay. 
Difficult to interpret 
data re market 
value. 
Finkelstein Cash compensation Total assets I 10 large US Strong correlation 
and Hambrick leisure companies, between size and 
(1989) 1971,1976,1982 pay 
and 1983 
Boyd(1994) Cash compensation Sales 193 large US Insignificant 
companies, 1980 correlation between 
sales and pay 
Conyon and Cash compensation Sales 294 large UK Strong correlation 
Leech (1994) companies, 1983 between sales and 
to 1986 pay 
McKnight Salary tested Sales 90 large UK firms Salary correlated to 
(1996) separately to bonus 1992 to 1994 size; bonus 
correlated to size 
and per ormance 
Ezzamel and Cash compensation (a) Sales and 199 large UK Strong correlation 
Watson (b) Capital employed companies, 1992 with both factors (1997) to 1993 
Finkelstein Cash compensation (a) Sales and 600 firms in Strong correlation 





Following the lead of Tosi et al. (2000), this table includes studies using size as a control 
mechanism as well as studies where size is the principal variable. 
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Table A2 Prior studies investigating links between company performance and 
directors' remuneration 
STUDY REMUNERATION DETERMINATION SAMPLE RESULTS 
MEASURE OF 
PERFORMANCE 
Lewellan and Current income Accounting profit 50 large US Strong correlation 
Huntsman equivalent of all pay companies, 1942 between profit and 
(1970) sources to 1963 pay 
Murphy Total compensation Shareholders' returns 72 large US Strong correlation 
(1985) in all forms companies, 1964 between 
excluding pensions to 1981 shareholders' 
returns and pay 
Deckop Cash compensation Accounting profit 120 large US Strong correlation 
(1988) companies, 1977 between profit and 
to 1981 pay 
Finkelstein Cash compensation Return on assets; 600 firms from Low correlation 
and Boyd and long term return on equity 1987 Fortune between returns and 
(1998) compensation 1000. pay 
Jensen and Directors' wealth Changein 1049 large US $1000 change in 
Murphy including current shareholders' wealth companies, 1974 shareholder wealth 
(1990a) compensation, future to 1986 led to $3.25 in 
revisions and directors' wealth, 
benefits from stock mostly from stock 
ownership ownership - authors 
consider this a low 
impact 
Gregg, Cash compensation Shareholder returns 288 large UK Weak correlation up 
Machin and and eps companies, 1983 to 1988; breaks 
Szymanski to 1991 down after that 
(1993) 
Main, Bruce Cash compensation Shareholder returns 60 major UK Strong correlation 
and Buck and share options listed companies, between 
(1996) 1989 shareholders' 
returns and pay 
Ezzamel and Cash compensation (a) Return on equity 199 large UK No significant 
Watson (RoE) companies, 1992 correlation between 




in one year only 
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Table A3 Prior studies investigating issues relating to the structure of directors' 
remuneration 
STUDY ISSUES EXAMINED SAMPLE RESULTS 
Balkin and Link between 33 high-technology and Companies in the growth 
Gomez-Mejia compensation strategy, 72 non-high-tech firms stage of their life-cycle had 
(1987) organisation and or business units in the proportionately more 
environment us incentive pay, and (in the 
opinion of managers 
responsible for pay policies) 
such pay was more effective 
for them than for mature 
companies 
Gomez-Mejia, Difference in 71 very large US Owner-controlled companies 
Tosi and remuneration structures manufacturers, 1980 to pay relatively more for 
Hinkin (1987) between owner- 1983 performance and less for size 
controlled and of business than counterpart 
manager-controlled firms with no dominant 
companies owne 
Ely (199 1) Relationship between 173 US companies in Different industries used 
CEO pay and four industries similar performance 
accounting-based firm (banking, electric measures but different pay 
performance variables utility, oil and gas, and structures 
in different industries retail grocery), 1978 to 
1982 
Beatty and Relationship between 435 US firms High risk companies had 
Zajac (1994) firm risk and pay undertaking 1POs in lower pay-risk (i. e. less 
structure of the top 1984. gearing) 
team 
Conyon & Influence of board 94 major UK listed Boards dominated by 
Peck(1998) composition on top companies, 1991-1994 outsiders are more likely to 
management pay use performance related pay 
Daily, Influence of 194 Fortune 500 No correlation between the 
Johnson, compensation companies, 1992 number of non-independent 
Ellstrand and committee membership directors and the level of 
Dalton (1998) on CEO pay CEO pay, small correlation 
with the gearing of CEO pay 
David, Influence of Fortune survey of 200 Companies with significant 
Kochhar and institutional investors largest US companies outside shareholders are 
Levitas (1998) on CEO compensation 1992 to 1994. more likely to use 
policy performance related pay 
Finkelstein Relationship between 600 Fortune 1000 CEOs with greatest potential 
and Boyd managerial discretion companies from 1987 impact on performance are 
(1998) and CEO pay paid more; greater 
relationship between CEO 
pay and managerial 
discretion in high- than low- 
performing companies 
Bloom (1999) Impact of risk on 536 large US High risk companies tend to 
managerial companies, 1981 to de-emphasise the use of 
compensation 1988. incentive pay. 
Organisations relying more 
heavily on incentive pay 
offer higher levels of basic 
pay to offset some of the 
directors' risk 
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Newman and Influence of 161 Forturie 250 Relationship between CEO 
Mozes (1999) compensation companies, 1991 and pay and performance was 
committee membership 1992 biased in CEO's favour when 
on CEO pay firms had insiders on 
compensation committee 
Conyon and Determination of CEO 320 internet /software Compensation structures 
He (2004) equity incentives in US and 154 biotech changed significantly in the 
entrepreneurial high companies that floated years post float. Different 




venture capital investment 
also affected pay structures. 
Table A4 Prior studies examining factors relating to the form in which directors' 
remuneration is paid 
STUDY ISSUES EXAMINED SAMPLE RESULTS 
Jensen and CEOs' ownership of 1400 large US CEOs need to own 
Murphy company stock companies, 1974 to substantial amounts of the 
(1990b) 1988 company's stock in order for 
this form of reward to affect 
performance 
Main, Bruce Link between directors' 60 major UK listed Share options provide a 
and Buck pay and performance. companies, 1989 performance-sensitive 
(1996) Differences in the use connection between pay and 
of options in the US performance 
and UK 
Yermack Timing of managers' 620 option awards by Executives appear to 
(1997) exercise of stock Fortune 500 companies, manipulate the timing of 
options 1992 to 1994 exercising share options to 
benefit ftorn favourable stock 
market movements 
Murray, Accounting treatment 100 large US Different accounting 
Smithers and of stock options companies treatments of options makes 
Emerson it possible to avoid or reduce 
(1998) a charge against income 
Cooper and Financial reporting for Impact of fair value Net income would be 
Hraiki (1998) stock options. reporting on 50 largest reduced (in some cases 
Differences in US and US companies by significantly) if options were 
UK accounting market capitalisation fully charged against income 
practices 
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Table A5 Prior studies examining the relationship between performance targets 
and directors' behaviour 
STUDY ISSUES EXAMINED SAMPLE RESULTS 
Healy (1985) Extent to which 94 US companies, 1930 Executives choose 
managers manipulate to 1980 accounting procedures that 
earnings, using total manipulate profit downwards 
accruals, to maximise at upper bonus limit and 
bonus payments upwards at lower limit 
Holthausen, Extent to which Data for 1982 to 1984 Profits were manipulated 
Larcker and managers manipulate and 1987 to 1991 from downwards at the upper 
Sloan (1995) earnings, using two compensation bonus limit, no manipulation 
discretionary accruals, consultants' surveys found at the lower limit 
to maximise bonus (443 firm-year 
payments observations in total) 
Murphy The impact of using 177 bonus plans for Internal standards led to 
(2001) internally-determined listed US companies, income smoothing and less 
performance standards 1996 to 1997 variable bonuses 
as against externally 
benchmarked ones 
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APPENDIX 4 INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Your thoughts on the debate about the level and structure of executive 
directors' remuneration 
a. How does it affect directors' performance? 
b. Does it motivate them? 
c. What else motivates them? 
d. Who are the stakeholders in the remuneration debate? 
e. How important is the drafting of the remuneration report. Who 
does it? 
f. What if you have a good structure as far as the company is 
concerned, but it is novel - no-one's ever done it before? 
2. How the company arrived at its remuneration policies 
Committee meetings 
a. How often, who attends, who speaks most? 
b. What information available? How long in advance? 
C. What was the role of the consultants? Of the executives in attendance? 
d. Any training given in remuneration matters? 
e. How are the committee meetings conducted? 
The process 
f Explain in more detail than in the remuneration report. 
g. Link to the corporate objectives? 
h. What else was considered and why was it rejected? 
i. Time line of the process. 
j. Did policies drive packages or was it iterative? 
k. Directors' pay compared to pay levels in the rest of the organisation? 
3. How do the company's remuneration policies compare to other 
companies of which you are aware 
a. As regards level of pay? 
b. As regards structure of pay? 
C. Based on your knowledge of the 'industry', are there any companies 
whose policies and packages you believe to be particularly good (or 
bad)? Why? 
4. (Not sent in advance) 
Here is a list of factors that academic researchers have seen as important in 
determining directors' pay. Could you please indicate on a scale of I-5 
which you see as important in the remuneration decision in [Company]. 
(See questionnaire in Appendix 5) 
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Appendix 5:. Questionnaire onfactors 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE LEVEL AND STRUCTURE OF 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORPREMUNERA TION 
The level of directors' remuneration relates to the amount of pay which is likely to 
be awarded for expected performance. The structure of directors' remuneration 
refers to the use of performance-related remuneration, the choice of performance 
measures and how they are divided between short and long term, and the choice of 
share-based or option-based remuneration schemes. 
In respect of the factors listed in the questionnaire, some of the issues that might 
be considered under each heading are given below. 
Company size 
Turnover; market capitalisation; level of balance 
sheet assets; number of employees. 
Company profitability Profit before tax; profit after tax; earnings per share; 
return on sales; return on investment; return on 
equity. 
Shareholder returns Increase in share price; dividends paid. 
Cash flow Free cash generated by the company over the period. 
Individual directors' experience and Age, educational qualifications, experience in 
qualifications previous companies. 
Company strategy Situated in a turbulent or stable industry? Free 
market or regulated business? Early-stage business or 
mature? Strategic aims of the company? 
Tax (for the individual) Effect on the individual's tax liability of the structure 
of remuneration. 
Tax (for the company) Effect on the company's tax liability (actual and 
deferred) of the structure of remuneration. 
Financial accounting considerations Effect on the financial accounts (for example, charge 
to P&L account) of the remuneration structure 
selected for executives. 
Investors' views 
Please return to: 
Ruth Bender 




Views of any major investor, or of a group of 
investors. 
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APPENDIX 6 LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE 
REMUNERATION GROUP 
2 nd August 2002 
Addressed to the HR professional who 
had mentioned the Remuneration Group 
Dear [Name] 
RESEARCH INTO EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS'REMUNERATION 
When we met last month you kindly agreed to pass my details on to the members 
of the FTSE 100 Remuneration Group, so that I may ask for their assistance with 
my research. I have set out brief details of the project on the attached pages. I 
would be very grateful if you could circulate this to the Group members, and 
perhaps encourage their participation. 
Kind regards 
Ruth Bender 
r. bender@cranfield. ac. uk 
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RESEARCH INTO EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS'REMUNERATION 
Ruth Bender 
The research question 
How do FTSE companies determine directors' remuneration? 
Why does it matter? 
It's obviously a highly contentious area. With academics just crunching numbers 
about whether or not pay is performance-related, and regulators continually 
adding in layers of new rules, research that highlights the complexities of the issue 
could lift the debate to a higher level. Most authors, and the press, seem to work 
on the basis that it's a very simple issue, and that remuneration committees are 
working for the benefit of the executives. Shedding light on the judgements that 
need to be made should inform both the regulatory bodies and the public debate. 
What's different about this research? 
Academics have been researching this area for almost 80 years, generally by 
collating statistics about how pay has moved compared to company size, or 
profitability, or any one of a number of things. This is now a pretty barren area, 
and just tends to conclude that pay is increasing, but does not explore why. 
Almost everything that's been done has revolved around looking at the amounts 
actually paid by companies to their executives- looking at what they paid. I 
intend to look at 3yhy they paid it, and how the decision was made. Nobody's ever 
done that before, not in a formal and objective academic study. 
Where will the research be published? 
As well as my eventual Phl), the research will be disseminated in academic 
j ournals, at conferences, and in articles in management j ournals. 
What is involved for the companies? 
The research design involves interviews with the people most involved in 1he 
remuneration-setting decision. Generally, these are the HR director and/or the 
remuneration manager; the CEO; the chair of the remuneration committee; one 
other non executive who sits on the committee; and any remuneration consultants 
employed by the company to assist in this area. I would also want to review some 
of the documentation surrounding the process. 
Interviews take place at a time and location convenient to the interviewee. 
Obviously, obtaining the time of such busy people is challenging, and although I 
would like about an hour of time for each interview, I am grateful for whatever 
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people can make available. 
In addition to companies participating in the full research programme, I am also 
interviewing just the HR director and/or remuneration manager in some 
companies, to broaden the scope of the research where full access has not been 
possible. 
What about confidentiality? 
The companies and individuals will not be identified in the research. They will be 
referred to as Company 1, Company 2, etc. Because I am researching the 
processes rather than looking at the actual amounts paid, there will be no need to 
present the actual levels of directors' pay in the published research, and this should 
make it easier to maintain anonymity. Likewise, any details of schemes from 
which it might be possible to identify a particular company will be omitted or 
disguised. 
What's in it for the participants? 
There are two sets of benefits. On a 'global' level there is the opportunity to 
move forward the debate on remuneration and potentially to influence future 
policy - or at least to give the policy-makers a better understanding of the issues. 
On a personal level for the individuals, the chance to discuss some very complex 
issues with someone totally independent. A summary of the research findings will 
of course be made available to the participants. 
Who am I to be doing this? 
I'm a finance lecturer at Cranfield School of Management, doing a PhD with 
Warwick Business School. My resumd is attached. My background is as a 
corporate finance partner with Grant Tbornton. I became interested in directors' 
remuneration via an interest in shareholder value -I was asked to explain how 
remuneration schemes could add value to companies, and discovered that it wasn't 
as simple as everyone thought! 
What's the next step? 
If you are interested in hearing more about the research, please contact me. I'll be 
glad to explain it further, and to discuss how you may participate. 
Also, if you are aware of other companies who may be interested, please pass this 
letter on. The criteria for participation are that the company should be in the 
FTSE 100 or FTSE 250, and that it should comply with good governance 
principles as regards having non-executives on the board and on the remuneration 
committee, etc. The aim of the research is to see what 'best practice' looks like 
from the inside, so I am not looking at companies which don't appear to comply 
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with best practice. (However, I am working with companies whose schemes have 
not found favour with 'the authorities' but who have still complied with the 
various standards. ) 
Thank you very much for reading this. I do hope to hear from you about the 
research. 
Ruth Bender 




r. bender(a-)cranfield. ac. uk 
Tel 01234 751122 
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APPENDIX 7 CODING STRUCTURF, 
NVivo revision 1.3.146 Licensee: SOM Cranfield School of Manag 
Project: PhD I User MN0678 Date: 8/3/04 - 11: 35: 45 
NODE LISTING 
Nodes in Set: All Nodes 
Crea ted: 4/11/02 - 03: 03: 00 
Modi fied: 4/11/02 - 03: 03: 00 




4 Gain sharing 
5 Hard work 




10 NED risks 
11 Not paying out 
12 People are our greatest asset 
13 Press comment-public eye 
14 Public sector 
15 Quote 
16 Ratchet effect 





22 (1) /Economic 
23 (12) /Economic/Agency 
24 (12 1) /Economic/Agency/Conflict of interest 
25 (13) /Economic/RPE 
26 (14) /Economic/Tournament 
27 (16) /Economic/Labour market 
28 (2) /Organisational theories 
29 (2 1) /Organisational theories/Power politics 
30 (2 2) /Organisational theories/Institutional theory 
31 (2 2 1) /Organisational theories/Institutional theory/It would be around 
already 
32 (2 2 2) /Organisational theories/Institutional theory/Bahamas 
33 (2 3) /Organisational theories/Legitimacy 
34 (2 4) /Organisational theories/Social comparison 
35 (2 5) /Organisational theories/Anchoring 
36 (2 6) /Organisational theories/Equity theory 
37 (2 6 1) /Organisational theories/Equity theory/Fairness 
38 (2 7) /Organisational theories/Expectancy theory 
39 (2 8) /Organisational theories/Social influence 
40 (2 9) /Organisational theories/Decision theory 
41 (3) /Inputs 
42 (3 2) /Inputs/Market and benchmark 
43 (3 2 15) /inputs/Market and bench mark/Su rveys 
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44 (3 2 25) /Inputs/Market and bench mark/[ nternationalism 
45 (3 4) /inputs/Size 
46 (3 5) /Inputs/Industry 
47 (3 6) /Inputs/Human capital 
48 (3 7) /inputs/Strategy 
49 (3 7 1) /Inputs/StrategyNolatility-Ability to forecast 
50 (3 8) /Inputs/Tax 
51 (3 10) /Inputs/Accounting 
52 (3 12) /Inputs/Inputs - general 
53 (3 13) /Inputs/Commiffee membership 
54 (3 14) /Inputs/Governance considerations 
55 (3 15) /Inputs/Input categories not used 
56 (3 15 1) /inputs/Input categories not used/Profit 
57 (3 15 3) /inputs/Input categories not used/Market performance 
58 (3 15 9) /Inputs/Input categories not used/Cashfiow 
59 (3 15 11) /Inputs/Input categories not used/Ownership 
60 (3 16) /inputs/Motivate 
61 (3 17) /Inputs/Attract 
62 (3 17 1) /Inputs/Attract/Right sort of people 
63 (3 18) /Inputs/Retain 
64 (3 19) /Inputs/Jelly beans 
65 (3 19 1) /inputs/Jelly beans/Ego 
66 (3 19 2) /Inputs/Jelly beans/Emotional issue 
67 (3 21) /Inputs/Individual requirements 
68 (3 22) /Inputs/Institutional input 
69 (3 22 1) /Inputs/Institutional input/Vote 
70 (3 24) /inputs/History and culture 
71 (3 26) /inputs/Regulators 
72 (3 27) /inputs/Align 
73 (3 28) /Inputs/Stakeholders 
74 (3 28 1) /Inputs/Stakeholders/Greenbury 
75 (3 28 2) /Inputs/Stakeholders/Pay dispersion 
76 (3 29) /Inputs/Privatised utilities 
77 (4)/Process 
78 (4 1) /Process/People involved 
79 (4 2) /Process/Consultants' role 
80 (4 3) /Process/Committee role 
81 (4 4) /Process/CEO role 
82 (4 5) /Process/Company chair role 
83 (4 6) /Process/Chairman role 
84 (4 7) /Process/HR role 
85 (4 8) /Process/Headhunters 
86 (4 9) /Process/Committee meetings 
87 (4 10) /Process/Secretary role 
88 (4 11) /Process/Process 
89 (4 12) /Process/Art not a science 
90 (4 13) /Process/Model ling 
91 (4 14) /Process/Negotiation 
92 (4 15) /Process/NXDs 
93 (4 15 1) /Process/NXDs/Sit on many boards 
94 (4 15 2) /Process/NXDs/Stick your head over the parapet 
95 (4 16) /Process/Need the facts 
96 (4 17) /Process/Power 
97 (5) /Policies and packages 
98 (5 1) /Policies and packages/Salary level 
99 (5 2) /Policies and packages/Annual bonus 
100 (5 3) /Policies and packages/Options 
101 (5 3 1) /Policies and packages/Options/Underwater 
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102 (5 3 2) /Policies and packages/Options/B lack Scholes 
103 (5 3 3) /Policies and packages/Options/Expected value 
104 (5 4) /Policies and packages/1-tips 
105 (5 5) /Policies and packages/Performance period 
106 (5 5 1) /Policies and packages/Performance period/Short termism in the 
markets 
107 (5 5 2) /Policies and packages/Performance period/Short v long term 
108 (5 6) /Policies and packages/Pay-performance link 
109 (5 6 1) /Policies and packages/Pay~performance link/Focus 
110 (5 6 2) /Policies and packages/Pay-performance link/Poor performance 
ill (5 6 20) /Policies and packages/Pay~performance link/Incentive-Reward 
112 (5 7) /Policies and packages/Simplicity-complexity 
113 (5 8) /Policies and packages/Aims of the scheme 
114 (5 9) /Policies and packages/Performance measures - TSR 
115 (5 9 1) /Policies and packages/Performance measures - TSR/Dividend 
116 (5 9 2) /Policies and packages/Performance measures - TSR/Comparator 
group 
117 (5 10) /Policies and packages/Performance measures - eps 
118 (5 11) /Policies and packages/Performance measures - S-T 
119 (5 12) /Policies and packages/Targets and budgets 
120 (5 13) /Policies and packages/Risk 
121 (5 14) /Policies and packages/Directors' shares 
122 (5 15) /Policies and packages/Change in scheme 
123 (5 15 1) /Policies and packages/Change in scheme/Change in company 
124 (5 15 2) /Policies and packages/Change in scheme/Change in people 
125 (5 16) /Policies and packages/Performance measures general 
126 (5 17) /Policies and packages/Bonus in shares 
127 (5 18) /Policies and packages/Bonus % 
128 (5 19) /Policies and packages/Perks 
129 (5 20) /Policies and packages/Contract 
130 (5 21) /Policies and packages/Pensions 
131 (5 22) /Policies and packages/Policy 
132 (5 23) /Policies and packages/Structure of package 
133 (5 24) /Policies and packages/Total package 
134 (5 25) /Policies and packages/Gearing 
135 (5 26) /Policies and packages/Policies and packages 
136 (5 27) /Policies and packages/Highly geared schemes 
137 (5 28) /Policies and packages/Holiday 
138 (5 29) /Policies and packages/Pay bonus in advance 
139 (5 30) /Policies and packages/Termination bonus 
140 (5 31) /Policies and packages/Transaction bonus 
141 (5 32) /Policies and packages/Flexibility 
142 (5 33) /Policies and packages/Need to pay them a lot 
143 (5 34) /Policies and packages/Quality of life 
144 (5 35) /Policies and packages/Smoothing remuneration over time 
145 (5 36) /Policies and packages/Strike a balance 
164 (8) /Fat cats 
165 (8 1) /Fat cats/Big sums 
166 (8 2) /Fat cats/Compare with Beckham and VCs 
167 (8 3) /Fat cats/Perception of waived bonus 
168 (8 4) /Fat cats/Unduly generous 
169 (8 7) /Fat cats/Fat cat coding 
NB This schedule does not include those codes that were developed but found 
not to be relevant to this research. 
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APPENDIX 8 FEATURES OF THE SCHEMES IN USE 
IN THE CASE COMPANIES 
This appendix sets out some of the features of the incentive schemes in use in the 
case companies. Individual companies' schemes are not identified; instead, the 
appendix illustrates the range of schemes and measures in use. 
Annual Bonus Schemes 
Cash bonus, based on a percentage of base salary. Often, the bonus available 
to the CEO is greater than that available to other executive directors. 
Often, part of the cash bonus may or must be deferred. Deferred bonus is used 
to buy shares, matched (generally 1: 1, often matching gross: net) by the 
company and vesting after two or three years. Some companies have an 
additional performance condition on the vesting (such as eps growth). 
Matched shares are forfeited if the executive leaves the company during the 
vesting period. 
* Part of the bonus placed into a bonus bank, with one third of the bank balance 
available for withdrawal each year. 
e In most companies, bonus is not pensionable. 
Longer term schemes 
Options 
* Annual grant of share options at current market value. The amount of the 
grant will be based on a multiple of salary and/or performance in the year. 
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9 Vesting after three years, subject to a minimum performance condition. The 
amount of options that vests will depend on the performance achieved; for 
exarnple, only 30% of options may vest if eps grows at RPI+3%, rising to full 
vesting for growth at RPI+8%. 
* Some companies allow re-testing of performance conditions at four or five 
years if the minimum target is not met after three years. 
* Most, but not all, options havc a 10 ycar life. 
Dips 
e Annual award of shares. The amount of the award will be based on a multiple 
or percentage of salary and/or performance in the year. 
0 Vesting after three years based on a performance condition. (Vesting on a 
sliding scale, similar to that for vesting of options. ) 
* Some companies allow re-testing of performance conditions at four or five 
years. 
Performance measures in use 
For short-term schemes: 
9 Various, including: business unit financial targets, sales value, group 
operating profit, combined operating ratio, new business contribution, 
cashflow, personal targets, health and safety targets, risk targets, strategic 
objectives, EBITDA, cost control, financial ratios, environmental targets, 
corporate social responsibility targets. 
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For long-term schemes 
e TSR relative to a peer group, or relative to a combination of peer groups. 
Generally, no vesting will occur if performance is less than median compared 
to the group; maximum vesting will occur for upper quartile performance. 
* Eps gro,, Nlh based on a percentage above inflation (an RPl+X% formula). 
9 Eps growth in absolute terms. 
e Return on capital. 
Share ownership requirements 
* Some companies combine participation in their incentive schemes with a 
requirement that the executives hold shares in the company, to a value based 
on a multiple of their base salary. Some schemes allow for cash bonuses to be 
paid in shares to encourage this. 
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Appendix 10: Changes made - and not made -for regulatorypurposes 
APPENDIX 10 CHANGES MADE - AND NOT MADE - 
FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES 
Company Things the companies changed deliberately in order to 
comply with regulations / best practice 
A Employed another consultant to check what they were doing, 
independently 
C They are getting the remuneration committee chairman involved' 
in the consultant decision 
E Rolling re-testing of option perfonnance criteria will change. 
F Changed from subjective to more objective performancc 
measures 
Company Things they have not changed despite not being in 
compliance with regulations 
A No performance condition on bonus match 
Use the auditors as consultants. (Tbis is not actually against the 
rules, but interviewee mentioned it as not being recommended. ) 
C Bonuses are partly pensionable 
Company chairman sits on the remuneration committee 
E Bonuses are partly pensionable 
Company chairman sits on the remuneration committcc 
F No performance condition on bonus match 
L Company chairman sits on the remuneration committee 
In this table I have omitted companies making changes in 1995 and 1996, moving 
from options to Itips post the Greenbury and Myners reports, as this was 
widespread. 
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